ANCIENT INDIAN VIEWS ON TRUTH AND FALSITY

Edited by

Na[illegible]anarayan Bandyopadhyay

SCHOOL OF VEDIC STUDIES
Rabindra Bharati University
Kolkata 700 050

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IN MEMORY OF

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OVERVIEW

N. N. Bandyopadhyay

The Department of Sanskrit, Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata organised a two-day National Seminar on "Truth and Falsity : Ancient Indian Concept" on March 18 and 19, 1999 at the School of Vedic Studies in the Emerald Bower Campus. The object of the seminar was in the following perspective.

satyam eva jayate nānṛtam : This is our national motto. Here a question may arise: what is *satya* and what do we mean by *anṛta*? So far Indian concept is concerned there are divergent views from the Ṛgvedic period. We are familiar with the Ṛgvedic words *ṛta* and *satya* (*ṛtaṃ ca satyaṃ cābhīdhhāt* 10.190.1). The word *ṛta* is generally meant by 'regulatory principle' of the universe. But in course of time with the advancement of intellectual discourse the concept of *ṛta*, *satya* 'truth' and *anṛta*, *mithyā* 'falsity' has undergone various changes according to different points of views and approaches. Both orthodox and heterodox schools of Philosophy are at loggerheads on metaphysical and epestemological standpoints. Difference of opinions also persist among scholars of the same school :

trayīsāṃkhyaṃ yogaḥ paśupatimataṃ vaiṣṇavam iti,
prabhinne prasthāne param idam adaḥ pathyam iti ca/...
(*Śivamahimnaḥstotra* by Puṣpadanta, Śloka 7)

That is why the members of the Department of Sanskrit thought of assembly of scholars and researchers in a platform where they can share their understanding of divergent views in respect of truth and falsity as expressed in ancient India in multi-dimensional way and form a holistic view and scientific outlook :

> *yadā vai vijānāty atha satyaṃ vadati nāvijānan*
> *satyaṃ vadati vijānann eva satyaṃ vadati vijñanaṃ tveva*
> *vijijñāsitavyam iti* (Chāndogya-Upaniṣad 7.17.1)

The Business sessions were organised keeping those different viewpoints in mind : (a) concept of truth and falsity from the viewpoints of Vedic lore, Epics and Purāṇas, Dharmaśāstra and Arthaśāstra (b) Indian classical literature, Bauddha, Jaina, Tantra and Āyurveda philosophy (c) Vyākaraṇa philosophy (d) Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Uttaramīmāṃsā (Vedānta) and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy.

The seminar was inaugurated by the respected Vice-Chancellor Dr Subhankar Chakraborti on 18th March, 1999 at 11 A.M. In his address he stressed the need of following the path of truth in life and action. Students and teachers, according to him, without being enlightened by the sense of truth would not be able to achieve success. Guest-in-Chief Professor Nirod Baran Chakraborty delivered the keynote address covering various perspectives of the theme of the seminar. Professor Biswanath Banerjee and Dr. Dhyanesh Narayan Chakrabarti were special guests and spoke on the occasion. This session was chaired by Professor Asim Chaudhury, Dean of the Faculty of Arts. Shri Nabanarayan Bandyopadhyay. Head of the Department and Director of the seminar welcomed the scholars and thanked them for their kind presence.

The first Business session started with the reading of the paper entitled "Truth and Falsity in the Vedic Literature" by Prof. Bhabani Prasad Bhattacharya, followed by the speech and the paper on the topic of the seminar by Prof. Samiran Chandra Chakrabarti and Dr Dhyanesh Narayan Chakrabarti respectively under the chairmanship of Prof. Biswanath Banerjee who deliberated upon "Truth : Buddhist Way." Prof. Samiran Ch. Chakrabarti expressed his view that the term *ṛta* has been used in different senses. The adjective *satya* has been employed in respect of *sat* 'durable and unfalliable'. That is why Brahman is *satya.* He also added to this view that *satya* should be morally good. Occasionally apparent truth is regarded as *satya*, but the truth lies in its supremeness. This kind of truth, of course cannot be realised with the help of external senses. If *brahma satyaṃ* is realised, then one can understand *jagan mithyā*. But *mithyā* 'falsity' is not *atyantābhava* since it has been said : *nābhāva upalabdheḥ* (Brahmasūtra 2.2.28). By the expression— *satyasya satyam,* these two types of truth *vyavahārika* and *pāramārthika* have been kept in view. The second business sesssọn was presided over by Prof. Debabrata Sen Sharma who also read at the end a paper on "Concepts of Truth and Falsity in Advaita Śaiva School of Philosophical Thought". The following papers were presented in this session:

(a) "Jaina Theory of Truth and Falsity" by Subuddhi Charan Goswami, which has been published in the *Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, R.B.U.,* Vol IX, 2000.

(b) "Truth and Falsity in Jain Philosophy" by Satya Ranjan Banerjee,

(c) " Truth (*Pramā*) and Falsity (*Apramā*) in the Medical Science Āyurveda" by Dr Brahmananda Gupta,

(d) "Truth and Falsity : The Bhāgavata Tradition" by Dr Sunil Kumar Das.

Third business session was held on March 19, 1999. Dr Gurusankar Mukherji was chairman of this session. Prof. Karunasindha Das read a paper on "A Linguistic Perspective on Truth and Falsity". Prof. Keshab Chandra Dash's paper was on "Philosophy of Fullness : An Essay of Easy outlook". Prof. Rabisankar Banerjee presented a paper on truth and falsity from the grammatical point of view. Dr Nandita Bandyopadhyay read the paper entitled "Truth and Falsity in Buddhist Logic : A study of Dharmakīrti". Dr. Gurusankar Mukherji delivered his presidential speech dwelling upon the main "Concepts of Truth and Falsity in India".

The fourth business session began with the presentation of the paper viz., "Truth and Falsity in Śaṃkara's Advaita Vedānta" by Dr Dipak Ghosh followed by the papers : (a) "Nyāya View of Valid Knowledge" by Prof. Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyay (b) "Truth and Falsity in Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta" by Prof. Sukharanjan Saha. Prof. Sitanath Goswami was in the chair of this session. His deliberations were predominantly on "a Comparative Study of the Definition of *adhyāsa*".

The valedictory session was chaired and addressed by Dr. Anantalal Thakur, retired professor of the University of Burdwan. Dr. Panchnan Ghatak of the Department of Sanskrit of this University presented the summary of the proceedings of the seminar before the learned gathering. Prof. Pratap Bandyopadhyay from the University of Burdwan expressed his staisfaction over the successful conduct of the seminar and said a few words on the topic of the semianr from the literary point of view. Prof. Thakur in his address expressed that where there is hardly *satya,* there is no *dharma*. What is achieved by *dharma* has the truth. If anything is achieved by *adharma,* it has no truth. Though the term *ṛta* is frequently used in the Ṛgveda, the word *satya* is mostly used in place of *ṛta* in the later Saṃhitās, Upaniṣads, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata. There is mention of classifications of truth in the Mahābhārata. Rāmacandra went to forest to obey *pitṛsatya*. Here *satya* means *pratijñā. Pratijña* here is based on *satya*. Forms of truth change in accordance with the change of situation. That is why a truth-abiding Muni had to undergo sufferings of Naraka as referred to in the Mahābhārata. *Satya* is to be adhered to according to place, time, situation, etc.

We are happy to publish most of the papers presented at the seminar in the present volume. We are thankful to Prof.

Pradyot Kumar Mukhopadhyay who being invited was unable to participate in the seminar as a resource person was kind enough to send us a paper entitled "True or Truly : An Indian Perspective" for publication in this volume. Papers on Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Vaisṇava Vedānta philosophy were not presented at the seminar. But we are happy that Prof. Panchanan Ghatak has submitted a paper on "Truth and Falsity : A Critical Study with Special Reference to Sāṃkhya-Yoga View" and Prof. Subuddhi Charan Goswami on "Reality, Truth and Falsity in Mādhva Philosophy" to include them in the present publication. A brief perusal on the concept of truth and falsity according to Pūrva-mīmāṃsā philosophy will be presented at the end of this overview.

We are extremely sorry to announce that the paper presented by Prof. Rabisankar Banerjee since deceased could not be published here. We unfortunately could not procure the final draft of his paper. An humble attempt is being made to pay our sincere respect to this late lamanted professor by dedicating the present volume to his hallowed memory. Some of the points discussed by him at the business session on March 19, 1999 are presented here from his incomplete draft paper :

Concept of truth and falsity in Sanskrit Grammar

Truth, falsity, blunder and error, telling a lie are so many ideas which are related exclusively to a human mind. To err is human. To make a blunder is not a difficult thing for any inexperienced being. Falsity is also regarded as the end, while falsity, blunder, error are all means to arrive at that end called truth. All these ideas—truth, blunder, error, lies and the like have easily crept into the zone of linguistics or the domain of Vyākaraṇa. Grammarians are keen to impart truth which is called *dharmaniyama* as recorded in the Paspaśā Āhnika of Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya. Men are prone to commit a mistake while calling the word *go* 'cow' as *gāvī, goṇi, gotā* or *gopatalikā*. The linguistic code grammar is there to lead him to know the truth that the correct word is *go*. Men are within their right to use of these incorrect or false words like *gāvī, gotā, gopatalikā* to express their idea about a cow but grammar is to tell him that it will be appropriate and correct for them if they call the animal as *go*. Patañjali, on the authority of a Vārttika has exhorted that the use of the correct word *go* will obtain for him *dharma* or the sublime truth in life. The word *go* as the correct form towers above all such incorrect or false words like *gāvī, goṇi, gotā, gopatalikā,* etc. Correct or proper words drive away all incorrect synonyms. This is a very common feature in grammar. Grammarians have led men to pick up what is correct, what is bereft of falsity or blunder to express their feelings. The Buddhists too will urge upon them that the object called a container of water has got a correct word like *ghaṭa* as its name and all other words with wrong gender or wrong number has little power to express the idea like the container of water. The word *ghaṭa* as the correct form is the truth and all other incorrect words to express this *ghaṭa* are cases of errors, grave errors called blunders and so on.

Pāṇini has framed the rule : *prātipadikārtha-liṅga-parimāṇa-vacana-mātre prathamā* (2.3.46). Kāśikā and many other commentaries have noted examples of *prātipadikārtha* as *kṛsṇa, śrīḥ, jñānam, taṭaḥ, taṭī, taṭam.* We have an amusing verse :

> *kūrmaromapaṭācchannaḥ śaśaśṛṅgadhanurdharaḥ/*
> *eṣa bandhyāsuto yāti khapuṣpakṛtaśekharaḥ//*

How can we justify the nominative case-ending *bandhyāsutaḥ* by this rule *prātipadikārtha* etc. The idea of *bandhyāsutaḥ* is definitely a false idea, since no son may be born of a barren woman. Therefore, the nominative case-ending here is a matter of falsehood only. But should we call the grammarian Pāṇini as the pedlar of untruth or falsehood? Kāśikāvṛtti has explained *prātipadikārtha* as *sattā*. But words like *ghaṭa, paṭa, go, aśva* have possesed *sattā* 'existence', while sky-flower; son of a barren lady have no such *sattā*. In nominative case-ending by the rule *prātipadikārtha* etc. cannot be justified in such cases. Logicians have come to the rescue of Pāṇini and justifies the first case-ending in all the words, *gaganakusuma, bandhyāsuta* as cases of a distinct *sattā* called *abhidheya-sattā*. In the example of the rule *akathitañ ca* (1.4.51): *gopaḥ gāṃ dugdhaṃ dogdhi,* the use of accusative case (*gām*) in place of ablative case (*goḥ*) is not also proper since it is unreal. In this way many cases of false ideas admitted in the rules of *kāraka-vibhakti, sandhi, samāsa, lyappratyaya,* etc. can be cited. The opinion of Dharmakīrti that falsity is occassionally realised as truth according to relations may come in rescue of the grammarians.

Concept of truth and falsity in Pūrvamīmāṃsā

mānameyavibhāgena vastūnāṃ dvividhā sthitiḥ—thus said by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in his Mānameyodaya. In fact Pramāṇa and Prameya are two principal topics of discussion in any discourse of philosophy. *ajñātatattvārthajñana-sādhanatva* is the definition of *pramāṇatva. Pramā* or valid knowledge is *ajñātattvārthajñāna* i.e. the knowledge of a subject which is not known before. That is why *smṛti* (memory) and *aṇuvāda* (repetition) are not valid because they are not previously unknown. A question may arise if valid knowledge of a things previously unknown is called *pramā,* how continuous knowledge like it is a *ghaṭa* (earthen pot) should be a *pramā*. In reply it is said that the second third and the like cognitions become *pramā* or valid on including next unknown parts of them. The existence of an earthen pot after its first knowledge is not known before. Hence continuous knowledge is also valid (*pramā*). *Tattva* referred to in the difinition of *pramā* means *yathārtha* 'real', 'true'. That is why *bhrama* 'illusion', *saṃśaya* 'doubt' is not *pramā* or valid. *Pramā* is also meant by indication *prākaṭya* or *prakāśatva* (expressiveness). The instrumentality of this *prakaṭatā* of *pramā* is called *pramāṇa* or means of valid cognition.

According to Mīmāṃṣā philosophy, Pramāṇas are six in number viz. Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāna (inference), Śabda (scriptural or verbal testimony), Upamāna (Analogical cognition), Arthāpatti (presumption), Abhāva or Anupalabdhī (Non-Apprehension). Among these Pramāṇas, Prabhākara did not accept Abhāva or Anupalabdhi as a Pramaṇa. In analysis of the perceptional means of valid cognition, *bhrama* 'illusion' is of prime importance. Kumārila has recognised *anyathākhyātivāda* in this respect. *Khyāti* means cognition but in the following śloka *khyāti* is meant by *bhramajñāna* 'illusory knowledge' :

ātmakhyātir asatkhyātiḥ akhyātiḥ khyātir anyathā/
tathānirvacanakhyātir ity etat khyātipañcakam//

According to Kumārila, in the case of illusion of a rope as a snake, both the rope and the snake are real. Where there is rope, snake is not there. Illusion in rope is pertaining to a snake which is in another place. Rope is not perceived as a rope but as a snake, hence here is *anyathākhyāti* otherwise called *viparītakhyāti*. Prabhākara is *akhyātivādin*; in his view, if a person is frightened by misconceiving a rope by snake, it is because he has failed to recognise the very thing in front of him and he has recollected the prior knowledge of a snake in his memory. He is in fear since he is then oblivious of the difference of knowledge between the proper object and the snake. Here is not cognition of the rope as the snake but want of knowledge (*agrahaṇa*) of difference (*bhedajñāna*).

Prameyas are devided into eight, according to Prabhākara : Dravya (substance), Guṇa (quality), Karman (action), Sāmānya (generality), Samavāya (inherence), Saṃkhyā (number), Sādṛśya (similarity); and five, according to Kumārila; Dravya, Jāti (Sāmānya), Guṇa, Kriyā (Karman) and Abhāva (Negation). As regards the things of the world, the Mīmāṃsakas are confirmed Realists. They believe in the reality of the external world. They are dualists so far the concept of *jīva* and *saṃsāra* is concerned : *avādhita-pratyakṣādipramāṇasiddhānāṃ dravyajātiguṇakarmaṇām abhāvasya ca satyatvam*. The reality of external world (*saṃsāra*) is established by the means of knowledge of perception etc. *Saṃsāra* is *anādi* (beginningless). Only *nityapralaya* (the stage of final destruction) not *khaṇḍapralaya* is accepted by Mīmāṃsakas. Jīva and Ātman point to the same. Ātman is *acit* or *jaḍa* according to Prābhākara, *cetanā* or consciousness arises in Ātman after *manaḥsaṃyoga*, but it is *cidacidrūpa*, according to Kumārila. Consciousness exists also at the *suṣupti* (deep sleep) stage. Universal knowledge of 'I' is relating to Ātman. If one likes to know the proper nature of Ātman which is bereft of birth and death, one has to go through the Upaniṣadas i.e. Vedānta. Kumārila opines at the end (śl no. 148) of his *Ātmavāda* in the Ślokavārttika :

ity āha nāstikyanirākariṣṇur
ātmāstitāṃ bhāṣyakṛd atra yuktyā/
dṛḍhatvam etad viṣayaś ca bodhaḥ
prayāti vedāntaniṣevaṇena//

To conclude, the following words from Michel Foucault's article "Truth and Power" are worthy to be quoted here so far contemporary thoughts and discourses on truth are concerned :

> "... The important thing here, I believe, is that truth is n't outside power, or lacking in power : contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth is n't the reward of free spirits, the child of

protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world : it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth : that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true : the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned : the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth : the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true."

Let us inspire the following words of Rabindranath Tagore :

morā satyer 'pare man, āji kariba samarpan/
jaya jaya satyer jay/ (*Gītavitān*, Vol. 2, p 561)

'We would offer our mind upon truth. Be victory of truth, be its victory!'

TRUTH AND FALSITY IN ANCIENT INDIA

N. B. Chakraborty

The first question we are to face in the context of the discussion of this topic is— what period of Indian history are we to mean by the expression 'ancient India'? Perhaps the ages of India prior to the advent of the Mohammedans may well be roughly considered as ancient India. But this cannot be identified with the Hindu period only as this will also include Buddhism and Jainism which date back to the sixth Century B.C. If anybody contends that the Buddhists and the Jains are only the rebel children of Hinduism, as a religion, the Buddhists and the Jains, I am afraid, will not like this idea. At least this contention will be controversial. But it is a fact that many scholars of Indian history have identified ancient India with Hindu period.

The problem of Truth and Falsity is primarily a philosophical problem and this may be discussed from moral, metaphysical, epistemological and logical standpoints. We now like to enter into a short discussion on these points.

In the Ṛgveda (1.1.8; 1.23.5; 1.24.9.) we get the conception of *ṛta* which literally means truth, the opposite of which is *anṛta* or falsity. This *ṛta* is a moral law relating to the belief in an eternal moral order that makes for regularity and righteousness, and works in the heavenly bodies and mundane creatures. Barring the solitary exception of the Cārvāka materialists all philosophers of ancient India including the Buddhists and the Jains have faith in moral order. If *ṛta* is a moral law it cannot be inviolable as freedom which includes freedom of violation as a postulate of morality. Moreover, we get the story of Yama and Yamī in the Ṛgveda 10.10 itself supporting our view. Yama and Yamī were related as brother and sister. They committed adultery secretly and thought that they would go unpunished. But punishment they had to suffer. The lesson of the story is that *ṛta*, the moral law may be violated but this violation will lead to punishment. This conception of *ṛta* later on developed into the famous Indian conception of law of *karman* equally admitted by Hindus, Buddhists and Jains. In this conception of *ṛta* or truth truth has been identified with Good, the ideal of morality, and falsity will mean what is bad by implication.

In the Nāsadīya Sūkta of the Ṛgveda (10.129) we get a conception of Reality which cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent (*na sat, na asat*) and Śaṃkara's Advaita which conceives of Indeterminte Brahman as ultimately real is based on it.

In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (2.1) Brahman is said to be *satyam, jñānam, anantam.* Śaṃkara interprets this text by pointing out that these represent the essence of Brahman and not its attributes. The word *satyam* (Truth) is significant in this context. As Brahman is Ultimate Truth so logically what is other than Brahman is other than Truth. Brahman is consciousness from itself (*cidrūpa*), the world being unconscious (*jaḍa*) is other than Brahman. Thus Śaṃkara propagates the falsity of the world. In the following Upaniṣadic texts he finds his support : (i) *neha nānāsti kiñcana*, (Kaṭha 4.11) and (ii) *mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati* (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4.4.19).

Brahman, the ultimate Truth and Reality is also accepted as Self (Ātman) in Aitareya (1.1) and Bṛhadāraṇyaka (1.4.1) and as *sat* in Chāndyogya Upaniṣads. Thus from the metaphysical standpoint in the Ṛgveda and in some Upaniṣads Truth is Brahman or Ātman or Sat and this is consciousness non-subjective and unobjective, the world is false. Śaṃkara developed this viewpoint in his Advaitavāda.

Other Ācāryas have their different interpretations into which we cannot enter now.

Falsity in Śaṃkara's philosophy is different from unreality. The son of a barren woman can never be presented and so it is unreal. But the world is presented and so it is different from the unreal (*alīka*). All Advaitins will admit *cit* or Brahman as the only Reality and the world as false. But falsity has been defined in different ways by different Advaitins.

Padmapāda, the author of Pañcapādikā defines falsity as not being the locus of either reality or unreality (*sadasattvānadhikaraṇatva*). Prakāśātman defines the false as that which is eternally negated in the same locus where it is cognised (*pratipannopādhatraikālikanineṣdhapratiyogitvam mithyātvam*). The implication of this definition is : the false appears but it is negated.

Prakāśātman defines falsity yet in another way. The false is that which is contradicted by knowledge (*jñānanivarttyatvaṃ mithyātvam*). This means that what appears as a content of illusory cognition and ceases with the cognition of the real nature of the content is false.

Citsukhācārya considers the false as that the locus of which is equally the locus of its eternal negation (*śvāśrayaniṣṭhāntyabhāvapratiyogitvaṃ vā mithyātvam*). This definition appears to be a replica of the first definition of falsity given by Prakāśātman. But a close observation will reveal that the substantive and the adjective of the first definition have changed their places here.

Ānandabodha describes falsity as other than reality (*sadviviktatvaṃ vā mithyātvam*). Here unreality has not been recognised as a category.

These five definitions are alternative definitions of falsity ultimately implying the same thing. The false is that which is presented and later on contradicted or negated.

Śaṃkara's Brahman is *nitya* (Eternal), *śuddha* (Pure), *buḍdha* (consciousness) and *mukta* (Freedom) Ātman. Eternality is emphasised and change is rejected as false. But in Buddhism that opposite view is upheld. Lord Buddha is said to have propagated the theory of non-permanence (*anityavāda*). The four noble truths he realised in meditation are *duḥkha* (suffering), *duḥkha-samudāya* (the cause of suffering), *duḥkha-nirodha* (cessation of suffering) and *duḥkha-nirodha-mārga* (the way to attain it). The presence of the law of causation is obvious in these truths. Suffering as a fact is accepted first, then its cause is ascertained and then an honest attempt at removing the cause to stop the effect is made. The law of causation is based on the acceptance of change or impermanence. Thus Buddhism propagates *anityatā* or impermanence as truth and permanence as falsity and this is what Śaṃkara refuted later on to establish his opposite view. In Buddhism *sat* or Real or Truth is said to be *arthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇam* or as causal efficiency and this is a pointer to what has been said. The theory of momentariness follows from this definition.

Jainism considers Śaṃkara's emphasis on eternity as partial (*ekāntavāda*) and emphasis on change in Buddhism as equally parital. To the Jains Reality or Truth is many-sided (*anekānta*) and from different perspectives different views are true and hence nothing can be totally false. In Syādvāda this point is substantiated. According to this theory every statement may be true from a particular perspective and so every statement is relative to that perspective. This relativism requires absolutism as its basis because unless there is something not relative, relativism loses significance. But absolutism is not accepted in Jainism.

Moreover, if every statement is partially true in the sense that it is true from a particular standpoint, then it will also be partially false from another standpoint. Thus the ultimate distinction between truth and falsity will be untenable.

The problem of truth and falsity, in Indian epistemology, takes the form of the problem of *pramā* (true knowledge) and *apramā* (false knowledge). *Pramā* and *apramā* are defined in different ways in different systems of Indian philosophy and an elaborate, separate discussion is necessary to find out the points of difference. Sometimes in India *jñāna* means true knowledge as in the case *jñānāt muktiḥ*. Liberation cannot be attained through false knowledge. Sometimes the word *jñāna* is not used in epistemological sense at all, it is used in a metaphysical sense as in the text *satyam jñānam anantaṃ brahma*. This text, according to Śaṃkara implies the essence of Brahman, the Ultimate Reality.

Epistemology, in Indian systems of philosophy is always dependent on Metaphysics. The metaphysical differences of different system are represented in their different epistemological theories.

Logic in India appears to be a part of epistemology as *anumāna* and *anumiti* which are discussed in epistemology as *pramāṇa* and *pramā* respectively. The problem of truth will appear as *anumiti pramā* and falsity as *hetvābhāsa* is Indian Logic.

Nyāya and Indian Logic are not identical as the Buddhists, the Jains and the different systems of Vedānta have their own logic. But perhaps the Nyāya view of *hetvābhāsa* is admitted in other *āstika* schools.

From the foregoing analysis it is clear that the problem of truth and falsity in ancient India may be studied from four different angles of vision— morality, metaphysics, epistemology and logic.

The question may arise— are these viewpoints entirely different or are they harmonious as exhibiting an inner bond? As we have already said that Indian epistemology is dependent on metaphysics and logic may be a part of epistemology, so we find that there is an inner bond among metaphysics, epistemology and logic. But what about the relation between morality and metaphysics? There is an inner relation here also. The Sanskrit word *sat*, as noticed by Max Müller long ago, means not only the 'real' or 'truth' but also the 'good'. Thus metaphysics, the study of Reality or Ultimate Truth is linked with moral science which discusses the nature of Good, the moral ideal. Will it be wrong to say that Good is Good as it is Real or Truth? Otherwise the moral pursuit will be a phantom chase.

TRUTH AND FALSITY IN VEDIC LITERATURE

B. P. Bhattacharya

Like day and night, shadow and light, pleasure and pain, virtue and vice the twin concepts of truth and falsity should be taken together for an analytical discussion of the same. Let us look at the observation of the great grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari—*asatye vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṃ samīhate* (2.238) which brings out the true essence of these twin concepts of truth and falsity. According to the author of the Vākyapadīya one attains the realm of truth after going through the path of falsity. Hence it can be stated in all probability that truth and falsity form the obverse and reverse sides of the same coin.

The Vedic literature is represented by four classes of literary composition— the Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads. Let us now look at the concepts of truth and falsity as revealed in the entire gamut of Vedic literature beginning from the Saṃhitās down to the Upaniṣads. In the Ṛgveda we come across the use of *ṛta* in the sense of truth. The word first occurs in Ṛgveda (=ṚV 1.1.8) (*gopāmṛtasya dīdivim*) and then in ṚV 1.2.8 (*ṛtena mitrāvaruṇāv ṛtāvṛdhāv ṛtaspṛśā/ kratuṃ bṛhantam āśāthe//*). In the first place it has been explained as *satyasyāvaśyambhāvinaḥ karmaphalasya*; whereas in the second it has been variously explained by Sāyaṇa in the following manner :

ṛtena avaśyambhāvitayā satyena phalena. . . / ṛtāvṛdhau/ ṛtam ity udakanāma (Nirukra=Ni 2/25), *satyaṃ vā yajñaṃ vā* (Ni. 4/19) *iti yāskaḥ/ udakādīnām anyatamasya vardhayitārau/*. Sāyaṇa first of all assigns the meaning *satya* to *ṛta*, but not being satisfied with it he quotes from Yāska's

Nirukta to render two more meanings viz. *udaka* and *yajña*. Not only here but in subsequent occurrences of the ṚV we find the word *ṛta* in connection with the twin divinities Mitra and Varuṇa and specially with Varuṇa. Like Yāska, Skandasvāmin also explains the word in the threefold sense of *satya, yajña*, and *udaka* as we find in ṚV 6.59.4 (*ṛtāvṛdhā ṛtāvṛdhau satyasya yajñasya udakasya vā vardhayitārau*). Thus the famous Vedic word *ṛta* either singly or combined with a di-syllabic suffix makes its appearance in the whole of the ṚV. It is interesting to note in this connection that the word *ṛta* is of frequent occurrence in the eleven hymns ranging from 5. 62 to 5. 72 addressed to Mitra and Varuṇa. In 5. 62.1a, we find *ṛtena ṛtam apihitaṃ dhruvaṃ vām* which means 'your firm ordinance is concealed by ordinance' and here in all probability it corresponds to 'truth'. In 5.15.2 and 5.68.4 we notice a similar use as *ṛtena ṛtam* and *ṛtam ṛtena* respectively. In this context let us consider the meaning of the word *ṛta* with special reference to Varuṇa as spoken of before. Varuṇa is looked upon as the preserver or the spring of *ṛta* (*khām ṛtasya* 2.28.5). This word as it occurs in the ṚV seems to denote three ideas, all connected to each other or one idea under three aspects due to the difference of domains.

Firstly, *ṛta* represents the cosmic order, which means its authority over the world and nature. The regular order of the natural phenomena, the rising and setting of the sun, the coming of dawns and so on are all regulated by *ṛta*. Thus the gods themselves are described as born of the *ṛta*, as observing and loving *ṛta* (*ṛtajāta, ṛtajña, ṛtayu, ṛtāvān*, etc.). Here we may refer to ṚV. 4. 3.9 (*ṛtena, ṛtaṃ, niyatamīḷa ā gorāmā sacā madhumat pakvam agne/ kṛṣṇā satī ruśatā dhāsinaiṣā jāmaryeṇa payasā pīpāya//*) where the cows' legitimate milk has been arranged by order.

Secondly, *ṛta* denotes the correctness and regularity of the cult of god-worship or sacrifice. There is some underlying principle which guides and regulates the different aspects of the sacrifice, the coming of gods, the offering of sacrificial oblations and so on and this is nothing but *ṛta*. Thus the regular course of sacrifice (rite) is meant by *ṛta*, as opposed to the magic rites and acts of witchcraft which may, therefore, be called *anṛta*. Agni is especially the guardian of *ṛta* in the ritual sense, because the sacrificial fire is regularly kindled everyday. Thirdly comes the phase in the domain of the moral conduct of man. The moral law which every law-abiding person must observe forms the chief function of Varuṇa who always oversees that it is observed properly. It is called *ṛta* which may be rendered by *satya*, and *anṛta* would then mean *asatya*. Thus Varuṇa is especially the guardian of *ṛta* in the moral sense, who watches the truth and falsehood of people : *satyānṛte avapaśyan janānām* (7. 49.3).

Generally speaking *ṛta* and *satya* are synonymous. But if we examine the above two words closely, a difference in their meanings appears before our eyes. Let us look at the statement *ṛtaṃ ca satyaṃ ca vadata* in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā of the Black Yajurveda, where both the words are used side by side. The great commentator Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, apprehending incongruity in the use of the two words furnishes the solution in the following way :

> *avitatham atrānupapattiḥ—tasyāś cāyaṃ parihāraḥ/ vastuto nātra satyam ṛtaṃ brūte, napy ṛtaṃ satyam āha/ vāci satyaṃ pratiṣṭhitaṃ mānasaḥ saṅkalpa ṛtam/*.

He further clarifies *ṛta* as *mānasaṃ tathyam ṛtaṃ*. From the above interpretation of the learned commentator it can be stated that though the two words are synonymous still a certain amount of difference exists between the two. Therefore, *ṛtaṃ ca vadata* will mean *yathā manasā saṅkalpitaṃ tathā vadata* because *ṛtam* is equivalent to *mānasaṃ tathyam*. In a similar manner *satyaṃ ca vadata* will mean *yathā vācā pratijñātaṃ tathā vadata*. So, according to Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, *ṛta* is nothing but mental truth while *satya* denotes verbal truth, what is mentally resolved is another name for *ṛta* and what is expressed in speech gives rise to *satya*. From the above utterance springs the good saying—*manasy ekaṃ vacasy ekaṃ karmaṇy ekaṃ mahātmanām*, which goes to describe a noble soul who after going through a mental resolve and a verbal conviction is desirous of performing a deed. This salient feature is brought out in another way in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad :

> *sa yathākāmo bhavati tat kratur bhavati/ yat kratur bhavati tat karma kurute/ yat karma kurute tad abhisampadyate/*.

Now a question naturally arises how the above two concepts *ṛta* and *satya* come into being? Let us look at the mantra *ṛtaṃ ca satyaṃ cābhīddhāt tapaso'dhyajāyata* (ṚV. 10. 190.1) which gives us an inkling into the genesis of the two. Sāyaṇa in his commentary says :

> *ṛtam iti satyanāma/ ṛtaṃ mānasaṃ yathārthasaṅkalpanam, satyaṃ vācikaṃ yathārthabhāṣaṇam/ cakārābhyām anyad api śāstrīyaṃ dharmajātaṃ samuccīyate/ tat sarvam abhīddhāt abhitaptāt brahmaṇā purā sṛṣṭyarthaṃ kṛtāt tapso'dhi adhi uparyarthe uparyajāyata udapadyata/*.

According to Sāyaṇa's commentary *ṛta* is a synonym of *satya* and it means mental conviction of truth, whereas *satya* itself refers to rightly delivered verbal speech. The underlying sense seems to be that if *ṛta* in the form of mental faculty and *satya* in the shape of verbal expression are construed together, then all the remaining Śāstric materials are to be taken into account by the two *a-kāras* in the above mantra-portion *ṛtaṃ ca satyaṃ ca*. These two things came into existence through the severe austerities performed by Brahmā in ancient times for the creation of the world. In other words it means that Brahmā created this world by severe penance and along with creation came into being the twin concepts of *ṛta* and *satya.* A question now crops up—which *dharma* enunciated by the Śāstras is to be embraced by the two *ca-kāra*s referred to above? To this query the Atharvaveda 10.7.1 furnishes the following answer :

> *kasminn aṅge tapo asyādhi tiṣṭhati kasminn aṅga ṛtam*
> *asyādhy āhitam/*
> *kva vrataṃ kva śraddhāsya tiṣṭhati kasminn aṅge*
> *satyam asya pratiṣṭhitam//*.

First of all, one asks the question in which part of Brahman (*skambha*) occurs *tapaḥ* in which exists *ṛta*, in which emerges *vrata*, in which lies *śraddhā* and in which *satya* is established? The *Ātharvaṇaśruti* interprets the above two *ca-kāra*s as comprising the *tapas, śraddhā* and *vrata* which finds a powerful expression in the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda *satyaṃ ca me śraddhā ca me* (4.7.2) and *ṛtaṃ ca me'mṛtaṃ ca me* (4.7.3). If a man regulates his life through *ṛta* and *satya,* all his *vrata*s are fulfilled, his mind is naturally filled with *śraddhā* and by this great penance he attains immortality.

Now let us look at the two words *satya* and *ṛta* in their outward forms. On this plane *satya* is equivalent to *ṛta* and vice versa. But in the use of the two, the real essence is not revealed at once. We again find in the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda *ṛtaṃ satyam* which is explained by Uvaṭa as *ādityaḥ ṛtam/agniḥ satyam.* The commentator Mahīdhara also echoes the viewpoint of Uvaṭa. It means that if we understand the significance of *ṛta* and *satya* we have a direct vision of Āditya and Agni. The twin manifestations of the Supreme spirit *paramātman* are Sūrya and Agni and resorting to this method, a spiritual (*ādhyātmika*) interpretation of these two can be attempted.

Not only in the Saṃhitās but in the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads the twin concepts of truth and falsity attract our attention. In the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa we find :

> *ṛtaṃ vāva dīkṣā/ satyaṃ dīkṣā/ tasmād dīkṣitena satyam eva vaktavyam/... satyasaṃhitā vai devāḥ/ anṛtasaṃhitā manuṣyā iti/ ...*

The Upaniṣads also refer to the above concepts. In the Īśopaniṣad (15) we find :

hiraṇmayena pātreṇa satyasyāpihitaṃ mukham,
tattvaṃ pūṣann apāvṛṇu satyadharmāya dṛṣṭaye//.

The Kaṭhopaniṣad also says (1.3.1), *ṛtaṃ pivantau sukṛtasya loke* where *ṛta* has been explained as *satya* or *avaśyambhāvi phalam* (inevitable result). In the Muṇḍakopaniṣad (3.1.6) we come across the famous saying *satyam eva jayate nānṛtam, satyena panthā vitato devayānaḥ* while in the beginning of the Tattirīyopaniṣad we hear the prayer : *ṛtaṃ vadiṣyāmi/ satyaṃ vadiṣyāmi.*

From the above discussion it can be concluded that *ṛta* forming the second member of the compound *an-ṛta* in ordinary usage, is generally taken in the sense of *satya; anṛta* negatively expressed means *asatya* or untruth which has its echoe in *idam aham anṛtāt satyam upaimi* which is tantamount to the statement— 'having forsaken untruth may I attain truth.' Thus, *satya* and *anṛta* form a pair and both of them are necessary in the realisation of highest knowledge (*satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya*) *ṛta* which is of frequent occurrence in the Vedas admits of threefold meaning— *adhidaiva* (divine) *adhiyajña* (sacrificial) and *adhyātma* (spiritual). In its *adhidaiva* aspect it is associated with all the Vedic gods known as *ṛtajāta, ṛtajña,* etc. and especially with Varuṇa who is the custodian of *ṛta* in the moral sense. The *adhiyajña* aspect is brought out in the correctness and regularity of the cult of sacrifice, while in its *adhyātma* aspect it can be equated with Āditya who is nothing but a manifestation of the Supreme Being (Paramātman).

Let me conclude with the eternal prayer—

satyaṃ brūyāt priyaṃ brūyāt mā brūyāt satyam apriyam/
priyañ ca nānṛtaṃ brūyād eṣa dharmaḥ sanātanaḥ//.

TRUTH AND FALSITY : ANCIENT INDIAN CONCEPT

D. N. Chakrabarti

Ranging from the Ṛgveda to Rabindranath Truth has been regarded as the ultimate aim of human endeavour. *satyaṃ eva jayate* has been accepted as the choicest ideal of Government of India after independence. This great saying has been culled from the verse of Muṇḍakopaniṣad :

satyam eva jayate nānṛtaṃ,
satyena panthā vitato devayānaḥ/
yenākramanty ṛṣayo hy āptakāmā,
yatra tat satyasya paramaṃ nidhānam//
(M.U.3.1.6)

Tagore, the great poet following the path of the Vedic seers reminded us :

rūpnārāner kūle
jege uṭhilām;
jānilām, e jagat svapna nay/
rakter akṣare dekhilām
āpanār rūp/
cinilām āpanāre
āghāte āghāte
bedanāy bedanāy!
satya ye kaṭhin,
kaṭhinere bhālabāsilām—
se kakhano kare nā bañcanā/
āmṛtyu duḥkher tapasyā e jīban—
satyer dārūṇ mūlya lābh karibāre,
mṛtyute sakal denā śodh kare dibe/
('Śeṣlekhā', *Sañcayitā*)

Truth is apperantly difficult, firm and rigid. But it does not deceive and ultimately it wins.

The whole Sanskrit literature depicted the conflict between the truth and falsity and reflected the victory of Truth. Rabindranath assured this by quoting the Sanskrit verse in his essay— 'Crisis of Civilisation' :

> *adharmeṇaidhate tāvat tato bhadrāṇi paśyati/*
> *tataḥ sapatnān jayati samūlas tu vinaśyati//*
>
> (Manusaṃhitā 4.174)

Rāmāyaṇa, the most popular and instructive great epic depicted the life of Śrī Rāmacandra, who is the apostle of Truth. He has been eulogised by the words : *rājendraṃ satyasandhaṃ daśarathatanayaṃ śyāmalaṃ śāntamūrtim.* He is the representative ideal of human character of India for the eternity. He is the incarnate of the observance of Truth not only of himself, but also of his father.

Firm faith in the Almighty is the message of Indian culture, enshrined in Sanskrit literature. Let us peep into the Vedic literature through the window of Upaniṣads to have a look of *satya* means 'truth'.

Taittirīya Upaniṣad depicts the great god as— *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma*— 'The great god is truth, knowledge and infinite.'

According to Muṇḍakopaniṣad, truth reveals in conduct, not only in theory, not only in speech, but also in deeds. By constant practice of *satya* one can achieve and realise Parabrahman :

> *satyena labhyas tapasā hy eṣa ātmā,*
> *samyag jñānena brahmacaryeṇa nityam/*
> *antaḥśarīre jyotirmayo hi śubhro,*
> *yaṃ paśyanti yatayaḥ kṣīṇadoṣāḥ//*
>
> (M.U. 3.1.5)

M.U says : 'who knows that great Puruṣa as *satyam*, he should transmit that knowledge to a learner who comes eagerly with suitable particular bent of mind' :

tasmai sa vidvān upasannāya samyak
praśāntacittāya śamānvitāya/
yenākṣaraṃ puruṣaṃ veda satyaṃ provāca tāṃ tatvato brahmavidyām// (M.U.1.2.13)

Īśopaniṣad says that, Brahman is *satya* and his realisation is also *satyadharma.* The immage of *satya* remains covered with radiant sun. Puṣan, the sustainer, is prayed to remove that effulgent screen :

hiraṇmayena pātreṇa satyasyāpihitam mukhaṃ/
tat tvaṃ pūṣann apāvṛṇu satyadharmāya dṛṣṭaye//
(Ī.U. 15)

That great god is *ṛta* as well as *satya.* The sage of Nārāyaṇopaniṣad is paying homage to that *satya* :

ṛtaṃ satyaṃ paraṃ brahma puruṣaṃ kṛṣṇapiṅgalam/
ūrdhvaretaṃ virūpākṣaṃ viśvarūpāya vai namaḥ//
(Nārāyaṇa U 1)

That Great *satya* is achieved by the observance of truth in life. Though it is very difficult, still it must be observed for a better life. Today truth is the first casualty of modern life. So, the necessity of the observance of truth with untiring effort, prescribed by the Upaniṣads is the only way of salvation.

Not only discussion in intellectual level, but also translation of truth in our day-to-day activities is a desideratum. This is the instruction of the Vedic seers. For this reason *ācāraprabhavo dharmaḥ* should be remembered. *Ṛta, satya* and *dharma* do not depend on discussion, but on observance. We must renew our faith in the Ṛgvedic prayer which we find in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad :

oṃ vāṅ me manasi pratiṣṭhitā, mano me vāci pratiṣṭhitam/
āvir āvīr ma edhi.../ ṛtaṃ vadiṣyāmi satyaṃ vadiṣyāmi// ...
(T. U. 1.1)

The great god holds up the universe by *satya* and *dharma.*

Excepting Him whom we shall propitiate?—

> *mā no hiṃsīj janitā yaḥ pṛthivyā yo vā divaṃ*
> *satyadharmā jajāna/*
> *yaś cāpaś candrā vṛhatīr·jajāna, kasmai devāya haviṣā*
> *vidhema//* (Ṛgveda 10-121]

Satya is the essence of life which delights all. The seer of Śuklayajurveda prays to have the share of that *satya* :

> *kas tvā satyo madānāṃ maṃhiṣṭho matsadandhasaḥ*
> *dṛḍhā cidāruje vasu/* (Ś.Y.V. 36.5)

Taittirīya Upaniṣad gives instruction in the convocation to the fresh graduates at the moment of their entering the second stage of life, that means life of a house holder to observe truth and not to shun the path of truth in any eventuality :

> *satyaṃ vada satyān na pramaditavyam*
> (T. U., Śikṣāvallī, 1.11.1.)

The accomplished graduate also takes the vow :

> *ṛtaṃ vadiṣyāmi satyaṃ vadiṣyāmi*
> (Ibid)

Following that tradition still now the advice given by the preceptor in traditional Sanskrit Academics is :

> *vidyāṃ vīryavatīṃ kuryāḥ śīlena sukṛtena ca/*
> 'Let you make the learning vigorous by your conduct and activities.'

The derivation of *satya* is : (*as* + *śatṛ* = *sat*) + *kya* = *satya.* In the Padma Purāṇa *satya* has been defined as :

> *yathārthakathanaṃ yac ca sarvalokasukhapradam/*
> *tat satyam iti vijñeyam asatyaṃ tadviparyayam//*

Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa gives instruction to observe *satya* dauntlessly :

> *satyam āyāsyati hariḥ satyaṃ niṣkapaṭaṃ vada/*
> *vada tat svabhayaṃ tyaktvā satyaṃ brūhi susaṃsadi//*
> *nahi satyāt paro dharmo nānṛtāt pātakaṃ param//*

The detailed description and the result of the observance of Truth, found in the Agnipurāṇa may be remembered :

tasmāt satyaṃ paraṃ brahma satyam eva paraṃ tapaḥ/
satyam eva paro yajñaḥ satyam eva paraṃ śrutam//
satyaṃ vedeṣu jāgarti satyaṃ ca paramaṃ padam/

According to the Mahābhārata and the Garuḍa Purāṇa (1.115.52) :

na sā sabhā yatra na santi vṛddhā,
vṛddhā na te ye na vadanti dharmam/
nāsau dharmo yatra na satyam asti,
na tat satyaṃ yac chalenābhyupatam//
(Mahā, Udyoga 35.58)

In the Bhāgavata Purāṇa Lord Brahmā being accompanied by other gods recited in praise of Kṛṣṇa :

satyavrataṃ satyaparaṃ trisatyaṃ,
satyasya yoniṃ nihitañ ca satye/
satyasya satyam ṛtasatyanetraṃ,
satyātmakaṃ tvāṃ śaraṇaṃ prapannāḥ// (10.2.26)

Śrīmad Bhāgavata begins with the adoration to Parabrahman as *satya* :

janmādyasya yato'nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñaḥ svarāṭ,
tene brahma hṛdā ya ādikavaye muhyanti yat sūrayaḥ/
tejovārimṛdāṃ yathā vinimayo yatra trisargo'mṛṣā,
dhāmnā svena sadā nirastakuhakaṃ satyaṃ paraṃ dhīmahi//
(1.1.1)

Innumerable passages and verses along with stories and facts may be cited regarding Truth from the vast range of Sanskrit literature beginning from the Vedas to the modern Sanskrit literature.

At the end let us pray :

satyaṃ vijayatāṃ nityaṃ lokāḥ satye pratiṣṭhitāḥ/
satyam eva samāśritya saṃhatāḥ santu sajjanāḥ//

TRUTH AND FALSITY :
THE BHĀGAVATA TRADITION

S. K. Das

Our approach to the problem is not epistemological, but metaphysical. That is to say, we are not going to deal with the truth or falsity of an epistemic proposition, but that of the ontological being. Is the world-appearance as it stands to our sense-experience true or false, i.e. real or unreal? And is there any transcendental Reality underlying the sensible world beyond the limits of the ordinary sense-experience? If there is, what is its essential nature? And how is it related to the sensible world of things and beings? In course of our discussion, our humble attempt would be to answer these questions from the standpoint of the Bhāgavata tradition of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta.

If the Bhāgavata be taken as a commentary on the Brahmasūtra by its author himself Maharṣi Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana Vyāsa, then it may be considered to be an authoritative interpretation of the Brahmasūtra, coming as it does from the author of the Brahmasūtra itself. In spite of there being a host of diverse interpretations of the Brahmasūtra, the Bhāgavata interpretation is at the root of many other interpretations forming the bulk of the traditional Vaiṣṇava Vedānta. It is in this tradition that we are going to make our enquiry into the problem of truth and falsity concerning the ontological being.

The essence of all the teachings of the Bhāgavata may be said to have been encapsuled in the benedictary verse of the

Bhāgavata:

janmādy asya yato'nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñaḥ svarāṭ/
tene brahma hṛdā ya ādikavaye muhyanti yat sūrayaḥ/
tejovārimṛdāṃ yathā vinimayo yatra trisargo'mṛṣā,
dhāmnā svena sadā nirastakuhakaṃ satyaṃ paraṃ dhīmahi//
(Śrīmadbhāgavata 1.1.1)

> 'I meditate upon that Absolute Truth or Reality (Parabrahman), from Whom as the material and efficient cause, the creation, sustenance and destruction of this world follow; Who is omniscient and self-dependent; Who manifested Brahmā, the primeval poet by His mere thinking, before Whom the gods become stupefied, in Whom the three types of creation— the conscious, the living and the unconscious appear as true, because of their origination from the absolute truth, just as the three elements— fire, water and earth, superimposed upon one another, appear as true, Who by His own lustre dispel the darkness of nescience'.

A minute philosophical analysis of the meaning and implication of the above-quoted verse makes it clear that according to the Bhāgavata, Parabrahman is the Absolute Truth, the ultimate Reality or the supreme Being, there being none equal to or greater than Him : all other beings have a reality dependent upon Him. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He is omniscient and omnipotent, dependent on nothing but Himself alone. Even Brahmā, the so-called creator of the world was created by Parabrahman by His mere thinking or will-power. Even the gods bow down to Him in humble submission. The three types of creation, viz, the conscious, the living and the unconscious, have only a phenomenal reality; but they appear as real, because of their relation to Parabrahman as the Absolute Truth, from whom they derived their being. He alone is capable of freeing the individual souls from their ignorance and bondage of this mundane world.

While in Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is taken as the

Absolute Truth without a second and the finite souls and the material objects of the world as nothing but the false appearances of Brahman under the influence of Māyā, the Cosmic Nescience; the Bhāgavata Vedānta takes all these as real, admitting only erroneous cognition of things of the phenomenal world, like the rope-snake illusion. In Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is taken to be pure consciousness—formless, featureless, attributeless and changeless; but in the Bhāgavata Vedānta, Parabrahman as the Absolute Truth is not anything abstract, but a concrete Being. According to the Advaita Vedānta, even God (Īśvara) is a creation of Māyā, and as such, non-eternal and falls short of reality; but according to the Bhāgavata Vedānta, God and the Absolute are essentially one.

So says the Bhāgavata : "The undivided knowledge which the knowers of Reality call by the name 'Reality' as designated by the names of Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat" (*vadanti tat tattvavidas tattvaṃ yaj jñānam advayam/ brahmeti paramātmeti bhagavān iti śabdyate//* Srīmadbhāgavata 1.2.11; Compare : *advay jñāntattvabastu kṛṣṇer svarūp /brahma ātmā bhagabān tin' tnār rūp//* Śrīcaitanyacaritāmṛta 1.2.53)

The same Absolute Truth is realised as Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat according to the respective capacities of realisation of the seekers after truth.

In the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, the Absolute Truth or Ultimate Reality has been called Kṛṣṇa *(kṛṣṇas tu bhagavān svayam)*, who has innumerable aspects, three among which are Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat, attainable by *Jñānayoga*, *Aṣṭāṅgayoga* and *Bhaktiyoga* respectively. Jīva Gosvāmin, the follower of Rūpa Gosvāmin, Śrī Caitanya's disciple, elaborately deals with the conception of the ultimate Reality as Kṛṣṇa, the non-dual, self-luminous, pure conciousness without there being anything equal to Him or greater than Him. Everything is rooted in Kṛṣṇa wherefrom it derives its being, and it does not have the same sort of reality as Kṛṣṇa has, as the primal source of its being. In the Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, different grades of reality are recognised, but not the falsity of the phenomenal or empirical world of things and beings, as held in Advaita Vedānta.

Kṛṣṇa as the Absolute Truth (Parabrahman) has three inseparable aspects— Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat. Brahman is nothing but the effulgence of Kṛṣṇa's spiritual body which appears to be identical with Him, as the sun-rays appear to be identical with the sun itself. Paramātman is that aspect of Kṛṣṇa which is immanent in the conscious Jīva and the unconscious Prakṛti, and is the presiding Deity of the *Jīvaśakti* and *Māyāśakti,* Kṛṣṇa as Bhagavat is the indwelling spirit of Paramātman. He is not a formless abstract entity, but an embodiment of existence, consciousness and bliss, a concrete Being, with distinct form and innumerable potencies and attributes which are essentially identical with Him. Of His innumerable potencies, three are most important—*Citśakti* or *Svarūpaśakti* (internal potency), *Māyāśakti* (external potency) and *Jīvaśakti* (marginal potency). *Citśakti* has three functions, viz., *sandhinī, saṃvit* and *hlādinī* corresponding to the *sat, cit* and *ānanda* aspects of Kṛṣṇa. Rādhā is an embodiment of the *Hlādinīśakti* of Kṛṣṇa. *Māyāśakti* binds the finite soul in the prison-house of the body. It is Kṛṣṇa's power and Māyā cannot overpower Him. *Jīvaśakti* stands midway between *Citśakti* and *Māyāśakti* of Kṛṣṇa. Of His innumerable attributes, six are the most important—*aiśvarya* (majesty), *vīrya* (strength), *yaśas* (glory), *śrī* (beauty), *jñāna* (conscience) and *vairāgya* (detachment). Innumerable are His Names— Hari, Govinda, Vāsudeva, Gopāla, etc. Of His innumerable *dhāmans*, Goloka-Vṛndāvana is the highest. He has eternal *parikaras* and *līlās*. He also manifests Himself in the form of *Avatāras* in exigencies.

It might seem humanly impossible to conceive of the non-dual Absolute Truth as having *rūpa, guṇa, śakti, nāman, parikara, līlā* and *avatāra*. But for an omnipotent supreme Being, everything is possible. Kṛṣṇa as the all-pervading, all-perfect supreme Being, like Aristotle's God as the Unmoved Mover of the Universe, is capable of manifesting Himself in panoramic forms by dint of His will-power out of His plentitude of Bliss. We humans cannot imagine how many universes are there in the limitless space without horizons, and how many ages have passed in the beginningless time. We only get lost in our futile attempts to measure the depth of the fathomless ocean.

The Bhāgavata believes in the transformation of energy (*śaktipariṇāma*) and explains the creation of the world as the transformation of Kṛṣṇa's *Māyāśakti*. Of the three grades of existence— material, mental and spiritual, the material existence is based upon Māyā or Prakṛti— the unconscious material principle; the mental existence is based upon *sāttvika ahaṃkāra;* and the spiritual existence is based upon the all-pervading spirit of Kṛṣṇa.

Whatever follows from Kṛṣṇa, the Godhead, has reality, but not absolute reality like that of Kṛṣṇa. According to the Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, absolute reality belongs only to the Godhead, whereas all His manifestations have only a relative reality, but they are not unreal like sky-flowers, or illusory like the snake perceived in a piece of rope. The analogy of rope-snake illusion is not applicable to world-appearance, as it is a real manifestation of the Godhead out of His infinite blissful nature. The illusion of snake in a piece of rope is a superimposition (*adhyāropa*), but the world is not a superimposition upon the Godhead.

Thus the Bhāgavata admits *vivartavāda* in the case of rope-snake illusion, but does not admit that the world is a false appearance of Parabrahman, it holds rather that the world is a modification of Māyā or Prakṛti, and as such, not unreal or illusory.

Parabrahman in His essential nature is undifferentiated, immanent, all-pervading, real, perfect, beginningless and endless, devoid of three *guṇas*, eternal and non-dual pure consciousness :

viśuddhaṃ kevalaṃ jñānaṃ pratyak samyag avasthitam/
satyaṃ pūrṇam anādyantaṃ nirguṇaṃ nityam advayam//
(Śrīmadbhāgavata 2.6.39.)

He is true to His will or determination, attainable by Truth, true in the process of the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world, the prime source of Truth, as the cause of the five gross elements, and remains true even after the destruction therof, the Truth of all truths, the eternal true principle, the cogniser of all truths, the truth in essence :

satyavrataṃ satyaparaṃ trisatyaṃ, satyasya yoniṃ nihitañ ca satye/
satyasya satyām ṛtasatyanetraṃ, satyātmakaṃ tvāṃ śaraṇaṃ prapannāḥ// (Śrīmadbhāgavata 10.2.26.)

As Parabrahman is all-pervading, nothing exists outside Him, so all His manifestations are within Him, and He is identical with all His manifestations—His *rūpa*, *guṇa*, etc. In the state of transcendental meditation (*Dhyānayoga*), the saints can have a vision of His diverse manifestations including His *dhāmans*, which are real, spiritual, infinite, self-manifesting, eternal and one with Him :

satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ yad brahmajyotiḥ sanātanam/
yaddhi paśyanti munayo guṇāpāye samāhitāḥ//
(Śrīmadbhāgavata 10.28.15).

In the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, of which the Bhāgavata is the source book, it is held that like the phenomenal Vṛndāvana which is material, there is also a transcendental Vṛndāvana which is the spiritual abode of Kṛṣṇa. However, both the Vṛndāvanas are real, but while the transcendental

Vṛndāvana is absolutely real, the phenomenal Vṛndāvana is only relatively real, but not a false appearance of the former. Herein this view differs from the view of Plato that the objects of sense-experience are nothing but untrue copies of the transcendental Ideas or Substances, and as such, unreal.

If Advaita Vedānta is a paradigm of systematic abstract Idealism, the Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇava Vedānta is a specimen of systematic concrete Spiritualism. We are not supposed to pass any judgment on a subject that is not within the reach of ordinary human intellect. Nevertheless, we can say that the Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇava Vedānta with its realistic standpoint presents an account of Truth or Reality, that is more attractive to the people at large than the Advaita Vedānta with its nihilistic standpoint as regards the reality of the phenomenal world of things and beings. In the Bhāgavata tradition of Vedānta, Godhead (Parabrahman) and His manifestations, both are real, but not so equally. Of course, there are grades of existence— material, mental and spiritual. Thus everything is accommodated in the Bhāgavata system of Vedānta without denial of reality to the world of phenomenal being. According to the Bhāgavata tradition, there is no difference between Godhead and the Absolute Truth (*Paramasatya*). Truth or Reality is at the root of everything. Truth is divine, error is human. Perhaps, in modern times, Mahatma Gandhi, the great spiritual humanist, was one of those who realised properly the Bhāgavata concept of Godhead as Absolute Truth, and so he could say :

> "If it is at all possible for the human tongue to give the fullest description of God,... then we must say that God is Truth. ... But I went a step further and said, Truth is God." ('Young India', 31.12.1931).

TRUTH : THE BUDDHIST WAY

B. Banerjee

The fundamental principles of Buddhism are based on the concept and treatment of the four Noble Truths. The whole of Buddha's philosophy is woven round these four truths.

Siddhārtha, the son of the feudal chief at Kapilāvastu, attained the *bodhi* 'enlightenment' and became the Buddha when he discovered the *Truth*. It is an historical fact that the prince left his hearth and home on a Noble Quest to find out the truth behind human sufferings. The truth realised by him was preached by himself for about forty-five years with a missionary zeal and inflexible determination to serve the cause of the suffering humanity. In his very first sermon delivered to his former associates at Sarnath the Buddha enunciated the four-fold truth the comprehension of which would help one to get above the worldly sufferings. It is, however, clear from Buddhist texts that the four truths constitute just a formula for application to everything perceived and not a doctrine. The four truths are : *Duḥkha*, there is suffering; *Samudaya*, there is a cause for suffering; *Nirodha*, there is cessation of suffering and *Mārga*, there is a Path leading to the cessation. These have been analysed and explained in Pāli and Sanskrit texts.

1. The world is full of miseries and even apparent pleasures have sorrows in them. Birth is sorrow, decay is sorrow, sickness is sorrow and death is sorrow. Association with things we dislike is sorrow, separation from what we like brings us sorrow.

2. The second truth points to the cause of suffering. Nothing in this world is unconditional in origin— everything depends on conditions for the origin. Our sorrows are there

because something is there. Buddha points out that our life has miseries because we have the birth *(jāti)*. If a man were not born he would not have been subjected to these maladies. Birth in its turn is also conditioned by the will to become *(bhava)*. Our mental clinging to or grasping of the worldly objects is behind our will to be born. The clinging or grasping is due to our thirst or craving to enjoy objects of senses. A previous sense-experience of the object is necessary for developing the thirst and that is due to the sense-object contact originated by the six organs of our cognition dependent on the organism composed of mind and body. The organism could develop only with some initial consciousness derived from the impressions latent in the experience of past life that persists owing to ignorance about the truth. It may be observed that there are twelve links in the chain of cause and effect which constitute the wheel of existence, birth and rebirth. These twelve links have been interpreted to cover the three periods of life which are causally connected in the manner that the present life can be conveniently explained with reference to its past conditions and future effects. Proceeding from cause to effect these factors cover the three periods of life as from ignorance are generated impressions concerning past life, from impressions spring the desire to be born through different states touching the present life, ultimately causing rebirth leading to the inevitable death in future. That the external phenomenon of life or the living organism is dependent on an internal desire is a notable contribution of the Indian mind, particularly of the Buddha.

3. The third truth asserts that any caused or conditioned matter is liable to be removed. Since misery or suffering depends on some causes or conditions for its origin, there must be a cessation of suffering, it will cease if the originating conditions are removed. Only if certain conditions are fulfilled the state of liberation from miseries

is attainable in the present existence itself. Perfect control of passions and constant contemplation over the truth lead one to perfect wisdom through the four stages of concentration, and he is then no longer under the influence of any worldly attachment. The fetters that bound him to the post of existence are broken and he is freed as liberated and the state of an *arhat* is attained. Buddha shows the simple truth that a cause produces an effect, suffering is generated by ignorance; one has to defeat and eliminate the cause and misery itself will disappear. Ignorance is removed by intuition and craving destroyed by ethical striving.

4. Having indicated that suffering can be stopped by destroying ignorance the fourth truth shows the Path *(mārga)* to be followed to attain the state of liberation from misery. The Path having eight parts is known as *ārya-aṣṭāṅgika-mārga.* (Pāli : *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo)* : Eightfold Noble Path, that forms the corner-stone of Buddhist ethics. Since ignorance gives rise to wrong views or *mithyā dṛṣṭi* about the self and the phenomenal world which is at the root of sufferings the first step necessary is the acquisition of right view *(samyak dṛṣṭi).* Only a theoretical right view will not help if a proper determination *(samyak saṅkalpa)* is not undertaken to conduct the life and act in the light of the acquistion of right views. In this state all attachments to the world and its objects are to be renounced, no ill-feeling towards others to be cultivated and no harm to be done to others. Right determination must be translated into action by right speech *(samyak vāk)* and lying, slandering, using of unkind words and indulging in frivolous talks are to be avoided. Control of speech thus forms an important part in the process. Right conduct *(samyak karmānta)* should follow right speech and one should refrain from killing, stealing, sensuality, intoxication, etc. Right speech and right conduct should lead to an honest livelihood *(samyag-ājīva),* indicating thereby that no forbidden course of conduct be

adopted to maintain oneself. It is observed that even when one performs adhering to these principles he is likely to be prompted by the old deep-rooted evil ideas to shun the path of right conduct etc. as also to be overwhelmed by fresh evil thoughts that may arise constantly to deter his progress along the right direction. Under such circumstances a constant effort, a right endeavour *(samyak vyāyāma)* is needed to root out old evil thoughts and prevent fresh entry of evil thoughts and make strenuous efforts to fill the mind with good ideas and retain them. This effort in both negative and positive action serves as a sort of warning to those who have made some progress in the path about their slipping off. A constant vigilance or strong mindfulness *(samyak smṛti)* is then necessary to bear in mind the perishable nature of things. A strong mindfulness will help to realise all that is happening within the body and mind and this practice is necessary to keep off attachment to things and to do away with grief over any loss. It seeks to train one in constant contemplation about the *truths*. Right concentration *(samyak samādhi)* is the last step in the path that leads to the goal of the journey, the cessation of suffering. One who has carefully and successfully passed through the seven states has freed himself from the passions and made himself fit and competent to enter into the four deeper and deeper stages of concentration. In the first stage of concentration the aspirant engages the pure and unruffled mind on reasoning and investigation of the truths and in this state joy and ease born of detachment and pure thought can be enjoyed. In the second stage is enjoyed peace and tranquillity generated by intense and unruffled meditation where all doubts about the truths are dispelled rendering reasoning and investigation unnecessary. In the third stage is developed detachment even from the joy of tranquillity and an attitude of indifference is developed. Though a perfect equanimity is thus experienced there still persists a feeling of bodily ease. The fourth state of concentration is a state of full and more perfect equanimity and indifference when there is detachment from all feelings of joy or bodily ease of any kind. This is the state of perfect wisdom, a state with perfect bliss, i.e., *Nirvāṇa.*

The above analysis may indicate that the fourth *truth*, i.e., the Path consists of three sections of discipline pertaining the physical *(śīla)*, mental *(citta)* and intellectual *(prajñā)*. Observance of moral discipline or restraint in physical actions is demanded of followers of any religious system. In Buddhism the physical discipline consists of right speech, right conduct and right livelihood. The whole code of Buddhist moral laws can be included in these three sections. After the physical discipline comes the mental one which in Buddhism does not indicate only meditation : right exertion, right mindfulness and right meditation comprise the mental discipline in Buddhism. Intellectual discipline of Buddhism is based on right resolution and right view. In the background of various moral and meditational practices current in India of the time we may not find anything particularly Buddhist in the physical and mental disciplines but in the third idea of intellectual discipline, right view, Buddhism seems to have offered a solution of the highest riddle of the iniverse. By intellectual discipline is generally meant the comprehension of the Noble Truths but it includes a realisation of the fact that the constituents of a being *(skandha)*, organs of sense and their spheres *(āyatana)*, the faculties *(indriyas)*, etc. have only momentary existence and have no substance *(anātman)*. The Noble Truths as analysed in the above lines form a part of the Buddha's own enunciation, as noted above, and both the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists base their treatment of the concept of Truth on this general principle. Different schools or sects have approached the general concept in the light of their respective viewpoints and the Mahāyānists like the

Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra schools have made detailed treatment of the problem. It is not possible to touch upon those expositions here in detail. We may however, look into a general Mahāyānic statement on the Truth available in some texts. It is said by Nāgārjuna in the Mādhyamika Vṛtti and also by Śāntideva in the Bodhicaryāvatāra : The teachings of Buddha are based on two kinds of truth, the truth of the world and the truth in the highest sense :

dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā/
lokasaṃvṛtisatyañ ca satyañ ca paramārthataḥ//[2]

Saṃvṛti is so called because it envelops the real knowledge and also because it helps to uncover that which is, as a matter of course, enveloped. *saṃvriyate āvriyate yathābhūtaparijñānam svabhāvāvaraṇād āvṛa (=abhūta) prakāśanāc ca nayet saṃvṛtiḥ.* It is synonymous with ignorance, delusion or misconception— *avidyā moho viparyāsa iti paryāyaḥ.* It is the same as ignorance on account of its completely enveloping the reality,— it is identical with ignorance, *avidyā.* It is elucidated that ignorance superimposes a form on a non-existent thing and thus creates an obstacle to the correct view of the reality. Ignorance is the non-realisation *(apratipatti)* of the *truth* and faith in falsehood. The *paramārtha satya* does not admit of any distinction as subject and object and is indeterminable by speech and unknowable by knowledge. It is beyond the range of *buddhi* i.e., perception while that which comes within the *buddhi* is conventional or *saṃvṛti.*

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] *Majjhima Nikāya* I (P.T.S) p. 261, *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* I. 8, *Dīgha Nikāya, Dhammacakkapavattanasutta,* etc. cf. N. Dutt : *Early Monastic Buddhism* 1, Chapter 5.

[2] *Madhyamaka* 5. (Passim) p. 492, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (A.S.B), p. 361.

CONCEPTS OF TRUTH AND FALSITY IN ADVAITA ŚAIVA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

D. Sen Sharma

Truth and falsity are multidimensional concepts which play an important role in epistemology of all schools of Indian philosophical thought and also have relevance in metaphysical formulations as well. It is a very vast subject that cannot be dealt within a single essay. It is therefore proposed to look at the problem in the context of the metaphysical thought of one particular school of philosophical thought, namely the Advaita Śaiva School of Kashmir, popularly (though wrongly) called Kashmir Śaivism.

At the outset, it must be mentioned that realist schools like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika look upon the correspondence between the knowledge of an object and its real nature as the criterion for determining the fact of experience as real or true : *yadbhāvavati yatprakāraṃ jñānaṃ yathārthajñānam*. Its opposite, namely, the lack of this correspondence between an object and the fact of experience is that which constitutes the falsity *yadabhāvavati yatprakāraṃ jñānam ayathārthajñānam*. While most of the schools of Indian philosophical thought generally concur with this view about truth and falsity of knowledge of an object the Śāṃkara Vedāntins introduce another characteristics, namely the non-contradiction of knowledge as an additional criterion for regarding that knowledge to be true. This idea stems from their laying stress on the immutable character of the object of knowledge. They talk about two distinct kinds of objects of experience, one existing on the plane of phenomenal world and the other existing on the level beyond the phenomenal world. The objects existing on the phenomenal world last till the nescience envolping their substratum is not negated by the knowledge of Brahman hence their knowldedge is provisionally true, it is false looking from the point of view of the non-dual Brahman. Brahman alone is existent as immutable Reality, its knowledge alone is true and everlasting. The knowledge of phenomenal objects is not true because it gets sublated with rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The Śāṃkara Vedāntins compare truth and falsity to light and darkness which being mutually opposite in nature cannot co-exist. They cancel one another.

The Advaita Śaivites of Kashmir are realists like the pluralist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the dualist Sāṃkhya-Yoga, therefore, they regard the world manifestation to be as real and existent as the ultimate Reality of which the world manifestation only as a mode of self-manifestation. It may be mentioned here that the Advaita Śaivites are also staunch advocates of the philosophy of non-dualism, but their concept of non-dualism differs radically from that of the Śāṃkara Vedāntins whose concept of non-dualism is based on philosophy of negation (*neti neti vāda*). Sri Aurobindo calls it a narrow and truncated concept of non-dualism. The Advaita Śaivites' concept of non-dualism is broad and all-engulfing one, based on vision of the ultimate Reality as the integral one. It makes room for all in the One non-dual Reality which is variously called as the *Parā Saṃvid* (Supreme Experiencing Principle), the Supreme Lord (Parameśvara), the Supreme Śiva (Parama Śiva), etc. The Advaita Śaivites do not deny the existence of the multiplicity of the world but they integrate it by postulating its existence in the bosom of the *Parā Saṃvid* which is both the immanent Reality pervading and permeating in the entire cosmos, at the same time always staying outside the world manifestation as the transcendent Absolute (*anuttara*), all at once. Everything that is experienced in the world existing on the phenomenal world is of the nature of *Saṃvid* there true and real. It is as real as the Absolute because nothing can possibly exist outside the *Saṃvid.* Both the phenomena and the noumena are real as they constitute the two different modes of the self-manifestation of the *Saṃvid*..

This view about the nature of the *Saṃvid* is based on the Advaita Śaivites holding that the *Saṃvid* is endowed with Śakti called the *svātantryaśakti* which enables It to manifest Itself in diverse forms. It is held that the *Saṃvid* exercising its Śakti, held inseparable from the *Saṃvid*, the *Śaktimān*, assumes the forms of infinite number of sentient subjects, unisentient objects and the means of their knowledge out of its free will. Since everything experienced in the phenomenal world is a manifestation of *Saṃvid*, it must be regarded as real and true. Even truth and falsity are not exception to this. The Advaita Śaivites appear to argue that if truth alone be held as existing in the *Saṃvid*, where would the falsity exist? There is no other reality other than the *Saṃvid* which can serve as the locus for the existence of falsity. The Advaita Śaivites hold truth and falsity, existence and non-existence though mutually opposite in nature are distinct categories which are grounded in the *Saṃvid*. Everything that we know of or speak about whether it is abstract concept or concrete object of knowledge, has *Saṃvid* as the substratum, truth and falsity are not exceptions to this.

It may be mentioned here that the Advaita Śaivites do not reject rival views about Reality and the world put forward by different schools of Indian philosophical thought as false on the ground that they are mutually contradictory. They hold that the different views about the nature of Reality and the world are all true but they give only imperfect view of Reality. They represent different partial approaches to grasp the Reality, nevertheless they are all true. The Advaita Śaivites alone possess the capacity to obtain total and complete picture of the *Saṃvid,* the ultimate Reality on account of their having integral vision. They succeed in obtaining the total and complete picture of the integral nature of the ultimate Reality—*Saṃvid.* As a matter of fact, they arrange the different views offered by different schools in ascending hierarchical order (*sopānakrama*) of knowledge of the ultimate Reality, treating all of them to be equally true but partial and imperfect. The ultimate Truth is infinite; finite mind can obtain only a partial glimpse of the Infinite Truth.

TRUTH AND FALSITY IN BUDDHIST LOGIC : A STUDY OF DHARMAKĪRTI

N. Bandyopadhyay

Truth, as it seen by many schools of Indian Philosophy from the epistemological point of view, means nothing but correspondence with facts. But what a fact is? To quote a modern Western philosopher, "a fact, in one sense of the term, may be said to be a state of affairs that exists (though in another sense of the term, it would be a state of affairs that is known to exist)."[1] While examining the Buddhist theory, let us confine ourselves to the first sense alone. Considered in the above light, the word 'truth' may find a Sanskrit equivalent in *yathārthatva* or *prāmāṇya*, although our philosophers sometimes distinguish between the two concepts. An awareness, at least in the opinion of a Sautrāntika Buddhist which may be treated as an ancient Indian counterpart of the traditional 'correspondence theory' of the West, is called true or *pramāṇa* when it corresponds with the state of affairs that exists.

The third verse of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika records a definition of *pramāṇa* which states that a *pramāṇa* is a conforming awareness *(pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam)*. Dharmottara, in his commentary on the Nyāyabindu gives a fully Sautrāntika twist to the definition and presents us with a realistic interpretation of Dharmakīrti. Being *avisaṃvādin* (or *avisaṃvādaka*) is as good as being *saṃvādaka*. But any idea of cognitive conformity remains incomplete unless and until it is told what an awareness may conform to. Dharmottara falls back upon a simple analogy. In our common practice a person who enables us to get at that which he has talked of is called *saṃvādaka; saṃvādakatva* thus settles down to *prāpakatva*. An awareness reveals an object. When a knower, acting on the basis of his awareness, reaches the object which has been revealed, the awareness which has helped him arrive at its object should be taken as *prāpaka* or *saṃvādaka* or *pramāṇa*, whichever name one may like to employ. But what is actually meant by this *prāpti* or getting at ? Dharmakīrti explains : *arthakriyāsthitir avisaṃvādanam.*[2] A reality, according to the Buddhists, is that which may fulfil some purpose; for instance, a fire which makes burning or cooking possible may be treated as something real. Now, suppose a person has got an awareness of fire. If he, by activating himself, finds the purpose of fire like burning or cooking fulfilled, his awareness of fire is considered a true one. Thus an unfailing fulfilment of the required purpose *arthakriyāsthiti* determines the truth of an awareness.[3] It may be said that the truth of a prior awareness is determined by a subsequent awareness of the fulfilment of purpose. Then *saṃvādakatva* comes to mean the conformity of one awareness with another awareness. Determination of truth may be obtained through an inference : Awareness which leads to the fulfilment of a purpose is a veridical one; my awareness is such that it has led to the fulfilment of purpose. The conclusion deduced from these two premises will be that my awareness is a veridical one. However, it is not very clear from the Buddhist texts whether they recognise the role of any inference in determining the truth of an awareness.

Treated in the above manner, the Buddhists look very much akin to the Naiyāyikas by asserting that determination of truth is obtained only through a subsequent cognition *(parataḥ prāmāṇya)*. But it will be a very lopsided assessment of the Buddhist position as a whole. The question crops up— what is the status of the subsequent awareness (i.e., *arthakriyājñāna* or the cognition of the fulfilment of the purpose)? Is it *pramāṇa* or *apramāṇa*? It cannot be *apramāṇa*, since an awareness which itself is not veridical fails to determine the truth of another awareness. If it is *pramāṇa*, then does it, for its verification, await another subsequent awareness of *arthakriyā* ? If it is so, an infinite regress is bound to follow. So the Buddhists come to the conclusion : unfailing fulfilment of the required purpose in general is taken as the criterion of truth. When there is no such *arthakriyā* as is simultaneous with the awareness of an object, you have to wait for an *arthakriyā* which happens later on. For here there is a scope of doubt about the truth. But when you feel the burn in your finger, you have no doubt about the truth of that feeling *(arthakriyānirbhāsa)*, since the purpose is fulfilled then and there. To speak in the words of Prajñākara :

uttarārthakriyābhāvāt pūrvasya yadi mānatā/
tadaivārthakriyābhāvād uttarasya kathaṃ na sā//[4]

Thus the truth of *arthakriyājñāna* does not depend on any further knowledge of the state of affairs, but on the state of affairs itself. It reminds us of the Nyāya position that the subsequent inference which determines the truth of a preceding awareness is self-evident or *svataḥ pramāṇa*, otherwise you cannot help landing in *anavasthā*.

Yet *svataḥ prāmāṇya* or self-evidence is not restricted to *arthakriyānirbhāsa* alone. It is often observed that a person, after perceiving fire, does not proceed to verify his perception. Or, it may happen that in spite of his activating himself, he cannot get his purpose fulfilled due to some obstruction. What will be the status of his perception then? Is it veridical or not? The Buddhists argue : One need not necessarily proceed upto verification. An awareness which manifests such an object as is able to serve some purpose expected of it is reckoned to be *pramāṇa— prāptuṃ śakyam artham ādarśayat prāpakam, prāpakatvāc ca pramāṇam*.[5] But how can one assess that the object caught in one's awareness has this ability? Here the Buddhist

Manorathanandin talks like a Naiyāyika. When a person is accustomed to an object, his awareness needs no verification. Verification is required in *anabhyastadaśā* or unfamiliar situations alone. Manorathanandin cites an analogy after Bhartṛhari.[6] An expert jeweller can assess instantaneously whether jewel is genuine or spurious as soon as he catches sight of it; he need not test the jewel. The same can be spoken of an accustomed perceiver.

So long, we have taken note of the points on which the Buddhists more or less agree with the Naiyāyikas. But the Buddhists have some extraordinary opinion as to the status of perceptual judgment and that of inference; this opinion is highly influenced by their theory of momentariness and the definition of reality. Every reality, according to them, is a momentary existence. That we consider ourselves as perceiving one and the same object for a long duration is because of the fact that we conceive a series or stream binding the momentary individuals together in a *seeming* or *ascribed* oneness. Oneness of the series gets superimposed on the transitory individuals which are absolutely different from one another. The Buddhists draw a distinction between fundamental reality *(paramārthasat)* and constructed or conventional reality *(saṃvṛtisat)*.[7] The discrete individuals which contribute one by one to the fulfilment of some purpose constitute the realm of fundamental or ultimate realities. They are called *svalakṣaṇa*s (i.e. having own particular essence) because of their uncompromising discreteness. Opposed to *svalakṣaṇa* there is *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (lit. having general essence) which consists of some general constructions like a name, a universal, a class, etc. They are unreal from the fundamental point of view as they cannot fulfil any purpose whatsoever. So they belong to the domain of constructed realities. *Svalakṣaṇa*s are grasped solely through perception which, the Buddhists think, is indeterminate by nature, involving no predication or identification by name or class character. All unreal constructions like class, name, subject-predicate-relation are smuggled into a perceptual judgment like 'This is fire'. What corresponds to fact is the indeterminate or *nirvikalpa* awareness (i.e., *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* according to the Buddhists). It is *nirvikalpa* alone which is marked by perceptual immediacy. Our perceptual judgment involves identification of what has been grasped earlier with what is grasped later *(pūrvāparayoḥ anu sandhānam).*[8] It is recognitory in essence since some mnemonic element is tagged to it. Our sense-organ ceases to operate at the time of *vikalpa* or identificational cognition. This view of the Buddhists makes their *vikalpa* completely detached from reality and as such it has no claim to truth. That the dragging of past experience detracts from the truth of a perceptual judgment is noted by Dharmakīrti himself when he remarks : *gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāṃvṛtam.*[9]

Apparently speaking, an *anumāna* may be easily called a *pramāṇa,* because the inferential judgment 'the hill is fiery', achieved through the knowledge of an invariable relation of smoke with fire, is in a position to make the knower get at fire in the hill. All other types of awareness, be it a state of uncertainty or that of an illusion, are considered *apramāṇa* as they do not correspond with facts. A person taking a mirage for water, cannot reach the object manifest in his awareness. So this illusory awareness is far from being a *pramāṇa*. Again, a person who sees a thing, but doubts whether it is a post or a man, never finds out the object as it is seen. The doubtful awareness projects an object as oscillating between two mutually exclusive extremes; such an oscillating object— an object with a double nature— is, however, never to be found. The Buddhists accommodate verbal cognition in *anumāna*. But at the same time they hold that a verbal expression does not have an invariable concomitance with any reality. The meaning which is intended and expressed by the speaker and grasped by the hearer is a conceptual construction, independent of external realities. Prajñākara calls our attention to the different disciplines of philosophy which assign contradictory predicates to the same subject. But one of the contradictories must be true and the other false. Hence both the contradictory predications cannot correspond to the state of afffairs that exists. Yet the fact remains that both the contradictory statements convey their respective meaning. So meaning belongs to a conceptual plane, not to the plane of facts.[10] This thesis brings the Buddhists very close to the Pāṇinians who, however, do not accept the validity of an inference. Thus verbal cognition, if it is chosen to be a kind of *anumāna*, happens to be a very special type of *anumāna* which does not bother about factual correspondence.

While analysing the Buddhist standpoint in detail, we are confronted with a lot of puzzling questions. Firstly, it is quite difficult to account for the discriminatory treatment meted out to perceptual judgments. *Anumāna,* the Buddhists admit, has no reality or *svalakṣaṇa* for its direct object. Our inferential judgment 'the hill is fiery' manifests some general notion, the concept of fire for instance, which is predicated of the subject, hill. The Buddhists are aware of this weakness of *anumāna* and argue that an inferential judgment cannot be true from the fundamental point of view. We externalise the general notion of *vahni,* identify it with the external individual and regard the judgment as veridical when the expected result is obtained : *api bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā.*[11] This is the actual fate of *anumāna* in the Buddhist Logic. In this connection we may refer to the famous observation of Dharmakīrti : Two persons, one taking the lustre of a gem for the gem and the other taking the flame of a lamp for a gem rush to get the object; both of them suffer from illusions. Yet the first person acquires the gem while the second does not. Similarly, both inference (i.e., *anumāna)* and pseudo-inference (i.e., *anumānābhāsa)* are fundamentally wrong. Yet the former has a validity in practice, while the second does not.[11a]

After taking all this into consideration, we have a humble question to ask : why should not we grant this privilege of practical validity *(sāṃvyavahārika prāmāṇya)* equally to perceptual judgments? Moreover, an indeterminate sense-experience can never prompt one to act. We can activate us only after identifying an object by name or class character. Even the Buddhists admit that a *nirvikalpa jñāna* can neither be a direct *pravartaka* nor a *prāpaka*. For establishing itself as true, a *nirvikalpa jñāna* is very much dependent on *vikalpa* which, however, has no truth of its own. Does the Buddhists like to abide by another favourite theory of Bhartṛhari, the leading exponent of the Pāṇinian school : *asatye vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṃ samīhate*?[12] One may reach the truth by adopting a means which is untrue. Do the Buddhists claim that it is only *gṛhītagrāhitva* which may relegate a perceptual judgment to a lower stratum in comparison with the inferential one? But is not a perceptual judgment as informative as its inferential counterpart from the practical point of view? Any information, if ever conveyed through *nirvikalpa,* is conveyed through a *vikalpa* or *adhyavasāya* alone which directly informs us whether the object is a jar, or a cloth and so on.[13] All our practices would come to a halt in absence of judgments *(vikalpa = kalpanā)* involving identification in the form of subject-predicate relation.[14] So hardly there is a rationale behind discriminating between perceptual and inferential judgments. Should we then take *anumāna* in a pure derivative sense and thus include in it any judgment which follows some other rudimentary awareness.[15] Then any talk of an invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum as a basis of *anumāna* will be a redundant business.

Secondly, it is a bit ludicrous to demand on the part of a Buddhist that one can get at the same object or entity which has been grasped in one's awareness. The Buddhist theory of momentariness does not make allowances for such a claim. The object which has been caught in cognition is different from the object towards which the knower activates himself, not to speak of that which he arrives at—this is the metaphysical position of the Buddhists since the moment of cognising, the moment of activating and the moment of reaching an object differ from one another. Hence Prajñākara has got to admit that the definition *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam* is advanced only in deference to the practical behaviour of man.[16] Supposed oneness of a supposed series or stream is superimposed upon the different point-instants which fall under it— namely, the object of our perception, the object of our motivation and the object of our arrival. Thus the Buddhist 'correspondence theory' of truth is lost in the final count.

This explains why Dharmakīrti hastens to add in his Pramāṇavārttika that all the discourse of *prāmāṇya* (and *aprāmāṇya,* of verification (and contradiction) is restricted to the realm of our practice *(prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa)*[17]. In our day-to-day behaviour we bank upon *arthakriyāsthiti* or *arthakriyājñāna* for ascertaining the truth or falsity of an awareness. An awareness, strictly speaking, can never be false. Every awareness, irrespective of its being veridical or non-veridical, is an undeniable epistemic fact. This paves the way for the Yogācāra deduction that from the ultimate standpoint indeterminate self-manifestation of our awareness *(sva-saṃvedana)* is the only awareness which is really unsullied, as Prajñākara points out :

> *sāṃvyavahārikaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ pratipādayatā paramārthata ekam eva svasaṃvedanaṃ pratyaksaṃ ity uktaṃ bhavati.*[18]

He takes recourse to a statement of Dharamakīrti himself— *ajñātārthaprakāśaḥ*[19]— which literally means the manifestation of something which has not been manifest before. Unlike Manorathanandin, according to whom, both *avisaṃvādakatva* and *ajñātārthaprakāśatva* together constitute a definition (which finally means : a conforming cognition that manifests what has not been manifest before is called *pramāṇa*) of *pramāṇa*, Prajñākara takes the second criterion to be the only appropriate definition and explains it in such a way as may suit the Yogācāra doctrine of idealism. Hence Prajñākara concludes : The word *artha* here stands for the ultimate reality, i.e., *vijñānasvalakṣaṇa* or momentary awareness according to the Vijñānavādins. Manifestation of unmanifest reality means manifestation of ultimate reality *(paramārthaprakāśa)*. Ultimate reality *(paramārtha)* is that which is nothing but a unique individuality. Its manifestation is the only veridical awareness which needs no verification.[20] However, if one does not want to fall in line with such an extreme form of idealism, one may remain content with taking *arthakriyā* as the criterion of truth in this practical world of ours, compromising thereby the theory of momentariness to some extent at least.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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[3] Prajñākaragupta : *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute (KJRI), Patna, 1953, p.4.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Dharmottara : *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, KJRI, Patna, 1955, p.21.

[6] Bhartṛhari : *Vākyapadīya*, 1.35.
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[7] *Pramāṇavārttika*, 2.3.
[8] *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 50-51.
[9] *Pramāṇavārttika*, 1.5.
[10] *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, p.7.
[11] *Pramāṇavārttika*, Bauddhabharati, 2.56.
[11a] Ibid, 2.57-58.
[12] *Vākyapadīya*, 2.38.
[13] *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 84-85.
[14] *Pramāṇavārttika*, 2.145.
[15] *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 39.
[16] *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, p.25.
[17] *Pramāṇavārttika*, 1.7.
[18] *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, p.25, also see ibid., p. 30.
[19] *Pramāṇavārttika*, 1.7.
[20] *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, p.30.

TRUTH AND FALSITY IN JAIN PHILOSOPHY

S. R. Banerjee

It is generally believed that the birth of Philosophy is to understand the creation of this Universe— its things around the world. And in understanding this Universe, different philosophers have tried their best to explain the world differently. Hence we have different approaches to the matters of the Universe. In this respect, the philosophers are grouped into two : Abstract concepts and Highest General concepts. One group of people labours under the idea that the objects around the world can be divided into some Abstract concepts and these abstract concepts are characterised by some properties which differentiate one from the other. And the abstract concepts are again relasted into the Highest General concepts.

The other group says that every substance is characterised by its own features and these features are nothing but the qualities of things which differentiate one from the other. This group also says that these qualities are changeable. These features have led us to think of Pluralism and Individualism. The Jains have tried to synthesise the two opposite views, and in a sense, this is the origin of *syādvāda* in Jainism.

The knowledge of a thing must be of utility purpose. Knowledge itself is a proof :

pramāṇād arthasaṃsiddhis tad ābhāsād viparyayaḥ
(Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra 1)

That is why the Jains have emphasised on the *samyagjñāna*, 'proper knowledge', because that knowledge is true and that knowledge will make us understand the substance of this Universe.

According to the Jains, as far as substance *(dravya)* is concerned, it is permanent in the midst of changes. When it is permanent it is called *dravya,* when its qualities *(guṇa)* are changeable, it is called *paryāya.* All the matters are both *dravya* and *paryāya.* This is what is known as *anekāntavāda.*

The truth and falsehood in Jainism are this that if we say that the *dravya* is permanent, then it will be false to say that it is *paryāya* as well. If one is true, the other is naturally false.

In Jain philosophy, the doctrine of Reality *(sat)* is different from the rest of the other systems of philosophies. The definition of *sat* as described by Umāsvāti is :

> *utpāda-vyaya-drauvya-yuktaṃ sat* (TS V.30)
>
> 'Existence is characterised by origination, disappearance (destruction) and permanence' (S.A. Jaini).

It is a permanent reality in the midst of change of appearance and disappearance. This conception of Reality is peculiar to Jainism. An existing reality in order to maintain its permanent and continued existence must necessarily undergo change in the form of appearance and disappearance. It seems to us a paradox at the beginning. But a closer analysis and minute observation will help us to appreciate the significance of this description of reality. For example, let us look at the seed of a plant. When the seed is planted in the soil it must necessarily break the shell and sprout out. This is the first step in its attempt to grow. Then the sprouting seed further undergoes change and some portions of it come out seeking the sunlight and another goes down into the soil will undergo enormous changes into the root system. Similarly the portion that shoots up into the air and sunlight will also undergo enormous changes of sprouting out in tendrils and leaves finally resulting in branches and stem of the plant all engaged in the task of procuring nourishment with the help of sunlight. At every stage thus we find change, the old leaves being shed off and the new sprouts coming in. This seems to be the general law of Nature. The life of the seed *does* never *die*; it lives even though it is being constantly changed, and this is what is *sat*.

Anekāntavāda

What is true of a plant, is also true with regard to the basic or fundamental thing of Nature. In this respect, I believe, Jain concept of Reality is different from the other Indian philosopies. Some philosophers would only emphasise permanency as the nature of Reality, while others would emphasise change alone as the characteristic of Reality. The one-sided emphasis either on permanency or change is rejected by Jain thinkers. They consider this system as *anekāntavāda*, a system which clings to a partial aspect of the reality. So they call their theory as *anekāntavāda*, that is to say, a system of philosophy which maintains that Reality has multifarious aspects and that a complete comprehension of such a nature must necessarily take into consideration all the different aspects through which Reality manifests itself. Hence the Jaina *darśana* is technically called *Anekāntavāda*, often translated as 'Indefiniteness of Being'. It tells us that any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter, and this may assume any shape and quality. Thus *mṛttikā* (clay) as a substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay *(ghaṭa-paṭādi)*, or its colour, may come into existence and perish.

Anekāntavāda describes the nature of a *dravya* (substance). *Anta* means *pakṣa*, or *koṭi* or *dharma*, another side of a substance. In analysing a substance, it is observed that it has, at least, two aspects. In one sense a permanent substance is an *anta* (one side) and *anityatva* is also an *anta* (another side). Nāgārjuna in his Mādhyamikakārikā says :

> *astīti nāstīti ubhe api antāḥ suddhīti*
> *asuddhīti ime'pi antāḥ/ tasmād ubhe*
> *ante varjayitvā madhye'pi sthānaṃ*
> *prakaroti paṇḍitāḥ//*

In his opinion, existence and non-existence, purity and impurity all are distinctive features of a substance. And this is *anta* or *dharma*. And therefore in an *anekāntavāda*, the nature of contradictory features of a substance is described. If there is no mutual contradictory features then it is not described by *anta*. In the Upaniṣad, a substance is considered as only permanent, the Buddhists consider the existence of a substance as transitory. But only the Jains think that a substance *(dravya)* is both permanent and transitory. When it is *nitya* (permanent), it is a *dravya* (substance) ; when it is *anitya* (transitory), it is called *paryāya*. The description of a substance in the form of *dravya* and *paryāya* is the basic tenet of *anekāntavāda*.

Saptabhaṅgī

The doctrine of *anekāntavāda* is upheld by a logical method called *sapta-bhaṅgī*. According to this doctrine, there are seven forms of metaphysical propositions, and hence it is known as *sapta-bhaṅgī*, 'seven syllogical forms of propositions'. As the seven forms contain the word *syāt* 'may be', it is also known as *syādvāda*. So the *sapta-bhaṅgi* is nothing but the seven propositions of the *syādvāda*. The *sapta-bhaṅgī* is defined in the Syādvādamañjarī of Malliṣena (1292 A.D) thus :

> *ekatra jīvādau vastūni ekaika-sattvādi-dharma-viṣaya-praśnavaśād avirodhena pratyakṣādi-vādā-parihāreṇa pṛthag bhūtayoḥ samuditayoś ca, vidhi-niṣedhayoḥ paryālocanayā kṛtvā syācchabda-lāñchito vakṣyamāṇaiḥ saptabhiḥ prakāraiḥ vacana-vinyāsaḥ saptabhaṅgīti gīyate/*

The Nature of Syādvāda

The doctrine of *anekāntavāda*, as it is said earlier, is established by a logical method called *syādvāda.* These seven propositions are as follows :

(1) *syād asti,*
(2) *syān nāsti,*
(3) *syād asti nāsti ca,*
(4) *syād avaktavyaḥ,*
(5) *syād asti avaktavyaś ca,*
(6) *syān nāsti avaktavyaś ca,*
(7) *syād asti nāsti avaktavyaś ca.*

The word *syāt* means, 'may be', and is explained by *kathañcit* 'somehow'. The word *syāt* here qualifies the word *asti,* and indicates the Indefiniteness of Being (or *astitvam).* For example, we say a jar is somehow, i.e. it exists, if we mean thereby that it exists as a jar; but it does not exist somehow if we mean that it exists as a cloth or the like. The purpose of these seeming truisms is to guard against the assumption of the Vedāntins that Being is one without a second, the same in all things. Thus we have the correlative predicates 'is' *(asti)* and 'is not' *(nāsti).* A third predicate is 'inexpressable' *(avaktavya)*; for existent and non-existent *(sat* and *asat)* belong to the same thing at the same time, and such a co-existence of mutually contradictory attributes cannot be expressed by any word in the language. The three predicates variously combined make up the seven propositions, or *sapta-bhaṅgas*, of the Syādvāda. (Jacobi, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Jainism, p.468.)

According to this logical doctrine every fact of Reality can be described in two logical propositons— one affirmative and the other negative. We have described before that the ultimate Reality is a permanent and changing entity manifesting itself through constant change of appearance and disappearance and then we can understand that a fact of Reality when looked at from the underlying permanent substance may be described to be non-permanent and changing. When a substance is described from the aspect of the underlying substance, it is called *dravyārthikanaya* and when the description is based on the modifications or changes, it is called *paryāyārthikanaya.* As a *dravya* has two aspects, it should be described logically from two points of view : positive and negative. For example, if a jar is made of clay, then it is possible to say that it is a jar made of clay. But can we describe it as a jar made of stone? Certainly not. But it must be remembered that to describe every fact of Reality four conditions are to be taken into considerations : *dravya, kṣetra, kāla* and *bhāva,* i.e. name of the substance, the place where it is, the time when it exists, and characteristics presented in it.

Every object from its own *dravyas* admits an affirmative predication and looked at from the *paradravya* admits of a negative predication. So the example given above from its own substance (clay) admits of affirmative predications, and from the view of *paradravya,* a negative predication. Similarly, from the point of view of *kṣetra,* it can be stated in two ways : if a thing is really in the room, then we can say affirmatively it is in the room, and negatively it is not in the room. Similarly, if a thing exists at this particular time, it may not be so at some other time. So also is the case with *bhāva.* If some characteristics are intrinsically present in it, it may not be so in other cases. To sum up, the whole system of *syādvāda* can be tabulated thus :

Syādvāda	*Saptabhaṅgī*	*Saptabhaṅgī-vacanavinyāsa*	applicable to *Jīva*
1. syād asti	*prathamo bhaṅgaḥ* (in a positive way)	*syād asty eva sarvam iti sadaṃśa-kalpanā-vibhajanena prathamo bhaṅgaḥ, yathā syād asty eva ghaṭaḥ* "May be the jar exists".	In a certain sense *jīva* exists, and in another sense it does not.

Syādvāda	*Saptabhaṅgī*	*Saptabhaṅgīvacana-viṇiyāsa*	applicable to *Jīva*
2. syān nāsti	*dvitīyo bhaṅgaḥ* (in a negative way)	*syān nāsty eva sarvam iti paryudāsa-kalpanā vibhajanena dvitīyo bhaṅgaḥ* "May be the jar does not exist".	In a certain sense *jīva* does not exist, in another sense it exists.
3. syād asti nāsti ca	*tṛtīyo bhaṅgaḥ* (both in a positive and negative way)	*syād asty eva syān nāsty eva iti krameṇa sadaṃśāsadaṃśa-kalpanāvibhajanena tṛtīyo bhaṅgaḥ, yathā syād asti nāsty eva ghaṭaḥ.* "May be the jar exists and in a sense it does not exist".	In a certain sense *jīva* exists, and in another sense it does not exist as well.
4. syād avaktavyam	*caturtho bhaṅgaḥ* explains impossibility of affirming and denying simultaneously	*syād avaktavyam eveti sama-samaye vidhi-niṣedhayor anirvacanīya-kalpanā-vibhajanayā caturtho bhaṅgaḥ, yathā syad avaktvya eva ghaṭaḥ.* "May be the jar is indescribable"	In a certain sense *jīva* is indescribable. The positive and negative aspects of *jīva* cannot be eplained simultaneously by any word.
5. syād asti avaktavyaś ca	*pañcamo bhaṅgaḥ* takes into consideration the existence and	*syād astyeva syad avaktavyam eveti vidhi-prādhānye na yugapad-vidhi-niṣedhā-nirvacanīya-khyāpanā-kalpanā-vibhajanayā*	In a certain sense *jīva* exists as well as it is indescribable.

Syādvāda	*Saptabhaṅgī*	*Saptabhaṅgīvacana-vinyāsa*	applicable to *Jīva*
	indescribable nature both *simultaneously*	*pañcamo bhaṅgaḥ, yathā syād asty eva syād avaktavya eva ghaṭaḥ.* "May be the jar exists as well as it is indescribable"	
6. *syān nāsti avaktavyaś ca*	*ṣaṣṭho bhaṅgaḥ* explains the negative character of the things as well as the indescribable nature of the same.	*syān nāsty eva syād avaktavyam eveti niṣedhaprādhānyena yugapan-niṣedha-vidhyanirvacanīya-kalpanā-vibhajanayā ṣaṣṭho bhaṅgaḥ, yathā syān nāsty eva syād avaktavyo ghaṭaḥ.* "May be the jar is not and indescribable as well."	In a certain sense *jīva* is not and is indescribable as well.
7. *syād asti nāsti avaktavyaś ca*	*saptamo bhaṅgaḥ* is a synthesis between the fifth and the sixth.	*syād asty eva syān nāsty eva syād avaktavyam eveti kramāt sadaṃśāsadaṃśa-prādhānyena-kalpanayā yugapad-vidhi-niṣedhā nirvacanīya-khyāpanā kalpanā-vibhajanayā ca saptamo bhaṅgaḥ, yathā syād asty eva nāsty eva avaktavyaḥ ghaṭaḥ.* "May be the jar is and is not and is indescribable as well."	In a certain sense *jīva* is and is not and is indescribable.

Nayavāda

Supplementary to the doctrine of *syādvāda* is the doctrine of *naya-vāda*. The *nayas* are ways of expressing the nature of things. There are seven *nayas* : *naigama, saṃgraha, vyavahāra, ṛju-sūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta*. Out of these seven *nayas*, four refer to concepts and three to words. The *nayas* are necessary in order to understand the partial true nature of a thing.

Naigama : *Naigama* is that *naya* where the general *(sāmānya)* and the specific (*viśeṣa*) features of the things are judged. For example, conscious man is a *jīva* (soul). Here the general and the specific nature of *jīva* is described. This *naya* is also recognised by the Nyāya and the Vaśeṣika schools of Indian philosophy.

Saṃgraha : *Saṃgraha* is a *naya* by which the general qualities of the things are taken into consideration not by ignoring the specific qualities of the thing, but the emphasis is given on the general qualities alone. This *naya* is also recognised by the Sāṃkhya and the Advaita schools of Indian philosophy.

Vyavahāra : *Vyavahāra* is that *naya* by which the specific qualities of a thing are taken into consideration, not completely ignoring the general qualities of a thing, but by bypassing the general qualities of a thing. This *naya* is recognised by the Cārvāka school of Indian philosophy.

Ṛju-sūtra : *Ṛju-sūtra* is that *naya* by which a thing is to be judged as it is without looking into the past and future nature of the thing. As past is already lost and the future is not born yet, this *naya* does not refer to the past and future of the thing. This *naya* is also recognised by the Buddhists.

Śabda : *Śabda* is that *naya* by which a thing is recognised simply by hearing the name of a thing. *Śabdanaya* includes all grammatical aspects of a word or of a sentence. For example, there was a city named Paṭaliputra. The word "was" in the sentence indicates that it is different from the present one. This is accepted by the grammarians.

Samabhirūḍha : *Samabhirūḍha* is that *naya* by which the meaning of a word is judged on the basis of its different etymological meanings. This *naya* is deeper than the *Śabda naya.* For example, the meaning of *jīva* means consciousness. And, therefore, all who have got consciousness are *jīvas*. Etymological meaning of a word is the most important feature of this *naya.*

Evambhūta : When the meaning of a word is established on the basis of its etymology, it is called *Evambhūta naya.* For example, king means as long as a person holds the sceptre of a kingdom, he is king. In other times, he is not a king. Grammarians accept this *naya.*

It should be noted here that in the Tattvārthasūtra (1.34, 35) *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta nayas* are considered under the *Śabdanaya,* as they are the variety of the *Śabdanaya,* and therefore, according to Umāsvati, the *nayas* are five in number.

Tri-ratna (*Ratna-traya*) (three gems)

For the path of liberation, i.e., to release oneself from the "cycle of transmigration", the Jains believe that the *ratna-traya* or otherwise known as *guṇa-traya,* is to be observed. The *guṇa-traya* is a technical term, and it means *samyag-dṛṣti* (right vision), *samyak jñāna* (right vision), and *samyak cāritra* (right conduct). The acquisition of these three qualities will lead someone to the path of liberation. That is why, in the Tattvārthasūtra (1.1) the subject begins with the statement : *samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣāmārgaḥ.*

i.e., 'The right vision (or faith), right knowledge, and right conduct are the path of liberation.'

The word *samyak (sam-añc + kvip)* is to be construed grammatically with all the members of a *Dvandva* compound by the dictum : *dvandvādau dvandvānte ca śrūyamāṇaṃ padaṃ pratyekam abhisambadhyate iti vacanāt*, 'in the beginning or end of a *Dvandva*-compound when a word is syntactically connected, that word is to be construed with all the members of the compound.' And so, we have *samyag darśana, samyag jñāna* and *samyak cāritra*. The Sarvārthasiddhi of Pūjyapāda has explained the sūtra thus :

> "The attribute 'right' is added to faith in order to include faith based on true knowledge of substances. Knowing substances such as the souls as these actually are right knowledge. The attribute 'right' is intended to ward off uncertainty, doubt and error in knowledge. Right conduct is the cessation of activity leading to the taking in of *karmas* by a wise person engaged in the removal of the causes of transmigration. The attribute 'right' is intended to exclude conduct based on ignorance, or wrong knowledge. That which sees, that by which it is seen, or seeing alone is *darśana*. That which knows, that by which it is known, or knowing alone is knowledge. That which acts, that by which it is acted or acting alone is conduct." (S. A. Jaini, p.3)

So *samyag darśana* means right faith in the dogmas of the religion, whereas *samyag-jñāna* makes the knowledge of the right faith of the dogmas accurate. *samyak cāritra* means 'self-restraint or discipline'.

Trigupti (three forms of self control (=*gupti*)

As a measure of self-restraint, the *triguptis* (three forms of self-control) are to be followed. These three *guptis* are—*vāg-gupti, kāya-gupti* and *mano-gupti*.

Vag-gupti means the control of speech. The Sarvārthasiddhi explains speech as follows :

> "Speech is of two kinds, physical and psychical. Therein psychical speech is material as it arises on the destruction-cum-subsidance of energy-obstructing *karmas* and sensory

> and spritual knowledge obscuring *karmas* and on the rise of physique making *karmas* of limbs and minor limbs. For in the absence of matter there can be no functioning of psychical speech. Matter prompted by the active and endowed with this capacity takes the mode of speech. Hence physical speech is also material." (S. A. Jaini, ibid, p. 145)

Kāyagupti means the control of activity of body. The control of body from the different point of *karmans* is the *kāyagupti*. In the Tattvārthasūtra (2.36) the different forms of body are described. These are "*āudārika* (the gross), *vaikriyika* (the transformable), *āhāraka* (the assimilative), *taijàsa* (the luminous) and *kārmaṇa* (the body composed of karmic matter)."

Manogupti means the control of mind. The control of mind is regarded as one of the best ways of the *ratnatraya*. Mind is fickle and feeble *(cañcalaṃ hi manaḥ)*, and so to control it is one of the ways by which one can lead oneself to the path of liberation. Like *kāya-gupti*, Pūjyapāda in his Sarvārthasiddhi has explained it in the following way :

> "The mind is of two kinds, physical and psychical. The psychical mind characterized by capacity (for comprehension) and consciousness is material as it is assisted by matter. Similarly, owing to destruction-cum-subsidence of knowledge-covering and energy-obstructing *karmas* and the rise of name *karmas* of limbs and minor limbs, particles of matter transformed into mind assist the living beings tending to examining good and evil, remembering things etc. Hence the physical mind also is material. It is contended by others that mind is a different substance, that it is bereft of colour, form etc. and that it is of the size of an action. Hence it is improper to consider it as material." (S. A. Jaini, ibid, p. 145)

In this way, by means of argument Pūjyapada says that ultimately mind is connected with the soul and the soul stirs the mind to activity. And, therefore, for the purification of the soul, the control of mind is necessary.

According to the Jains, truth *(sat)* is ascertained through the *pratyakṣa pramāṇa,* direct perception. But at the same time, the Jains say that the so-called *pratyakṣa* is really *parokṣa,* indirect source of knowledge. In their opinion, Relativity is the very soul and cement of our knowledge; for, all knowledge not only implies a Self or Subject which knows and a Not-Self or object which is known, but a relation between them as well. The object or the external world, by acting on the peripheral ends of our sense-organs, rouse in us a certain kind of stimulus through the channels of our sensation; and this brings the Self or Subject to stand in particular relation with it, the Non-Self or the Object. This is *vyañjanāvagraha* or the stage of acquisation of materials for knowledge.

The reaction between the Self and the Not-Self is thus established, and the notion of the extra-mental object is homogeneous and indefinite in character in as much as the distinction between the Self and the Not-self only begins to dawn on the mind in the most rudimentary forms. In Jain psychology it is called *arthāvagraha* or the presentative or cognitive stage in the processes of perpetual elaboration.

The third stage of our cognition is *īhā.* From the *arthāvagraha* stage, some sorts of sensations are going in the mind according to the laws of association and concomitant detection of the points of identity and difference between present and past sensations.

Then follows the stage of *avaya* in which the presentative element known as sensation is fused with other elements represented in the consciousness and thus results the recognition of the object, more definitely expressed in such vocabularies as *this* and not *that.*

The last stage is the *dhāraṇā.* Through *dhāraṇā,* the processes of objectification and localisation we are led to the knowledge of things as extra-mental realities existing objectively in space. *Dhāraṇā* is the name for this particular phase of knowledge.

Thus sensuous perception which enjoys the privilege of being reckoned as a direct source of knowledge is really, to all intents and purposes, an indirect or mediate means *(parokṣa-pramāṇa)* to the acquisition of knowledge.

The indirect means of knowledge are *smṛti* (memory), *prtyabhijñāna* (knowledge derived from a semblance between things), *tarka* (knowledge arising out of *vyāpti* 'invariable concomitance'), *anumāna* (inference) and *āgama* (verbal testimony).

TRUTH (*PRAMĀ*) AND FALSITY (*APRAMĀ*) IN THE MEDICAL SCIENCE ĀYURVEDA

B. Gupta

Literally speaking the terms 'truth' and 'falsity' correspond to the Sanskrit terminology *satya* and *mithyā* respectively. These two words, as such, appear to be contradictory in terms, as the concept 'true' (*satya*) is totally opposite to the idea of 'untrue' (*mithyā*). In the ancient Indian philosophical school s there were lots of discussions with regard to the idea—what is true and what can be really taken as false (*mithyā*). What appears as 'true' to one, may appear 'false' to other. Even the very idea of truth (*satya*) varies from one to other as there are lots of gradations in it. For example, in the ancient Buddhist text of Mādhyamakasūtra of Nāgārjuna 'truth' has been analysed from the viewpoint of 'limited truth' (*saṃvṛti satya*) and 'absolute truth' (*paramārtha satya*)[1].

In the Vedānta school one comes across three shades of truth viz. *prātibhāsika satya*, *vyavahārika satya* and *pāramārthika satya*. To an Advaita-Vedantin (monist) when the highest Brahman is accepted as truth, the realistic world-experience will appear as false.[2] This is what happens in the domain of philosophy.

. But Āyurveda being a practical medical science has to deal with day-to-day health-care problems of a real man and his surroundings. As such it cannot ignore this realistic world. Hence what is the ultimate 'truth' and what is 'false' in philosophical thinking does not come within the purview of Āyurveda as its subject matter. But nevertheless, the object of Āyurvedic study, a common man, is taken in its totality with its body, mind and soul. Therefore, it is in the fitness of things that 'truth' and 'falsity' in the practical Āyurveda can be understood in the sense of *pramā* and *apramā*. Now, what is 'true' (*pramā*) and false (*apramā*) in Āyurveda? It has been pointed out that Āyurveda, being primarily a medical science known as *dehavidyā*, is ultimately concerned with the patients, their ailments, treatment of ailments, remedy through medicines, etc. As such, the Āyurvedic approach, being entirely realistic to cure a real man, is not provided with much scope for a threadbare discussion on philosophical tenets. But it cannot be also denied that Āyurveda while studying or nurturing a human being as a patient was fully aware of its social, cultural and philosophical background. The early Indian society was enriched with Vedic culture, Upaniṣadic thoughts and noble philosophical ideas. Āyurveda, being a product of the then society could not be altogether blind of its cultural heritage. In order to thrive as a popular science Āyurveda incorporated into its body all the existing thoughts and ideas of philosophy as its background and interpreted them to serve its own purpose of *dehavidyā*.

Let me now discuss the main theme what is *pramā* (truth) and what is *apramā* (falsity). Earlier philosophical texts have hardly given any definition of *pramā* (true knowledge or cognition)[3]. Rather, they have described it with the help of 'means of cognition' (*pramāṇa*). As such that knowledge, which arises through the true means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) can be regarded as true knowledge (*pramā*) or right knowledge. Consequently the opposite of true knowledge (*pramā*) is untrue or false (*apramā*).

Now, what are these right means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) which have been discussed in the Āyurvedic texts? Normally the number of *pramāṇas* varies to a great extent from one to many amongst the exponents of early philosophical thoughts. In the Āyurvedic text of Carakasaṃhitā (=CS) too, the exact number of *pramāṇa* varies from three (viz.

pratyakṣa, anumāna and *āpta*) to six (including *yukti, aitihya* and *aupamya*), or even to eight (including *sambhava* and *abhāva*). Commentator Gaṅgādhara in his commentary 'Jalpakalpataru' on Carakasaṃhitā has deduced the numbers to four by the inclusion of *upamāna, sambhava, arthāpatti* and *abhāva* under *anumāna*, and *aitihya* under *āptopadeśa*.[4] While counting the *pramāṇa*s for examining the true nature of things Caraka has verbatively accepted these four as true means of cognition.[5]

It can be noted that Caraka has added here a new type of *pramāṇa* called *yukti* in addition to the three *pramāṇas*—perception, inference and authority, normally accepted by the traditional scholars. Caraka's introduction of this new *pramāṇa* of *yukti* (proper reasoning or argumentation) was probably considered to be most helpful for a physician to diagnose the disease of a patient. Be what it may, the confusion with regard to numbers of *pramāṇa*s in Vimānasthāna may encourage someone to think that there are obviously some later interpolations in the text of Caraka. Or this confusion may be explained otherwise. The entire Carakasaṃhitā being called a 'collective text' (*saṃhitā grantha*) contains different layers of thought process which were simply put together at the time of the final redaction by Dṛḍhabala, the last redactor of Carakasaṃhitā. This conjecture appears to be more plausible when we come across the bold statement in the last portion of Carakasaṃhitā—"Whatever is presented in the Carakasaṃhitā can be found elsewhere, but that which is not stated in the Carakasaṃhitā cannot be found anywhere".[6]

One can however doubt whether these philosophical concepts of *pramā, pramāṇa*, etc. were at all necessary for undergoing a medical treatment of a patient, Caraka observes that with the help of these sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) the true nature of things what is happening in the inner body of a patient can be traced and this will help to arrive at a proper diagnosis of the ailments of patient. That is why Caraka ascribes these cognitive methods as method of examining (*parīkṣā*) a patient.[7] In the text of Caraka *pramāṇa* and *parīkṣa* appear to be synonymous. Cakrapāṇidatta, the authentic commentator of Caraka-saṃhitā in the 11th century A.D. arrives at this conclusion when he asserts : *parīkṣyate vyavasthāpyate vastusvarūpam anayeti parīkṣā pramāṇāni.*[8]

Now let us discuss the means of true knowledge (*pramāṇas*) which may help a physician to arrive at a correct diagnosis of the ailments of a patient out of these four means of cognition viz., perception, inference, testimony of an authentic personality (*āpta*) and *yukti* (proper reasoning). A traditional scholar like Carakamuni obviously places *āptopadeśa* at the first position. Orthodox scholars believe that the information conveyed by the enlightened persons or by scriptural texts, can convey only true information and as such it can never be false. Because these enlightened or experienced persons (*āptas*), by virtue of their truthfulness and penance are free from mental attachment and prejudices caused by *rajas* and *tamas*[9]. It may be interesting to note that some Nyāyavaiśeṣika texts upheld the validity of Āyurveda being instructions of trustworthy persons. Jayanta-bhaṭṭa, a Naiyāyika of 9th cent. A.D., observes :

> "the very large number of medicines, their combinations and applications are of such infinite variety that it would be absolutely impossible for any one man to know them by employing the experimental methods of agreement and difference. It is only because the medical authorities are almost omniscient in their knowledge of things that they display such superhuman knowledge regarding diseases and their cures which can be taken only on trust of their authority"[10]

After the *āptapramāṇa*, Caraka comes to perception (*pratyakṣa*). Caraka defines perception as 'instantaneously manifested cognition (or direct awareness) which arises in proximity of soul, sense-organs, mind and the objects.'[11] When soul, mind, sense-organs and the objects come together, the knowledge they produce, is called perceptual cognition. In analysing the definition of perception Cakrapāṇidatta upholds two points. Firstly, four kinds of contact, which have been narrated here, are the real cause of the phenomenon 'perecption' and secondly the instantaneous resulting cognition coming out of such a contact, can be truely regarded as perception. Because inference, memory, etc. which can also come out as a result on account of the contact of four, in later stages, cannot be called as instantaneous awareness.[12] This simple definition of perception might have received a positive response amongst the contemporary or later philosophers of other school of Indian philosophy.[13]

After perception Caraka proceeds further to define inference. Inference is that which is preceded by perception (*pratyakṣapūrvakam*). It is of three types and related to three time-dimensions— past, present and future.[14] Similar attempts to define 'inference' as 'that which is preceded by perecption (*pratyakṣa*)' can be found in the text of Upāyahṛdaya of Buddhist philospher Nāgārjuna[15] or in the Nyāyasūtra.[16] This simple approach of Caraka to define inference with its three varieties has become much complicated in the works of later philosophers in course of time.

Yukti or reasoning is the fourth means at cognition in the Carakasaṃhitā. Reasoning as a separate means of cognition could not be found earlier and not accepted later on. So *yukti* as a separate *pramāṇa*, is the new introduction of Carakasaṃhitā.[17] Even other texts of Āyurveda did not accept *yukti* as a separate *pramāṇa*. Suśrutasaṃhitā (=Su) takes no cognition of it. It admits four types of *pramāṇa*, but instead of *yukti*, Suśrutasaṃhitā accepts analogy (*upamāna*).

While upholding a new type of *pramāṇa*, Caraka probably has foreseen that to admit a new *pramāṇa* called *yukti* may not appeal to the traditional scholars. So he tries to establish it first through some examples which were known to the common people of the then society. By applying the reasoning one can think about the 'possibility of growth of crops from the combination of irrigation, ploughed land, seed and seasons; formation of embryo from the combination of six constituents (*dhātu*s)', production of (sacrificial) fire from the friction of upper fire-drill, lower fire-drill and the act of drilling, possibility of cure from diseases through the efficient therapeutic measures of four (viz. doctor, nurse, patient and medicine).[18] Thus after showing the utility Caraka proceeds to define *yukti* : 'The intellect which perceives things as outcomes of combination of multiple causative factors... is known as *yukti*'[19] In case of perception, inference, etc. the causation through multiple factors are not known. Hence Caraka considers *yukti* as a separate type of *pramāṇa* which helps the physician in determining the causative factors of an outcome of a disease. It appears that Caraka's explanation of *yukti* has been totally misunderstood by the later philosophers like Buddhist philosophers Śāntarakṣitā, Kamalaśīla and others. That is why *yukti* has not been accepted by many as a separate *pramāṇa* including the Āyurvedists. Carakasaṃhitā's commentator Cakrapāṇidatta observes that it is not in reality of the nature of an independant *pramāṇa*, but as it helps in arriving at a decision, it is counted as a *pramāṇa*. Caraka himself in another context has described *anumāna* depending on *yukti.*[20]

These are the four means of true knowledge according to Carakasaṃhitā of Āyurvedic medical science. The true knowledge which arises of these *pramāṇa*s can be regarded as *pramā* and that which does not come under the purview of *pramā* can rightly be taken as *apramā* (false). In short, this may be considered as the nature of *pramā* (true knowledge) and *apramā* (untrue or false apprehension) from the Āyurvedic viewpoint.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] *dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā/*
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ//
Mādhyamakasūtra 24.8.

[2] *brahma satyaṃ, jagan mithyā.*

[3] Rāmādvaya, a Vedānta philosopher of c.1300 A.D. has defined *pramā* as *yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā* (vide Dasgupta, S. N. : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol 2, p. 212) which can be also found in *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, p. 28,3.

[4] *upamāna-sambhavārthāpattyābhāvānām atrānumāne antarbhāvān nāsamagravacanasyaitihyasya āptopadeśe antarbhāvac ca/* Jal.Ṭīkā on CS.Vi.4, p 1480. 15-18.

[5] *dvividhaṃ khalu sarvaṃ sac cāsac ca, tasya caturvidhā parīkṣā— āptopadeśaḥ pratyakṣam anumānaṃ yuktiś ceti ca/* Su, 11.17

[6] *yad ihāsti tad anyatra yad nehāsti na tat kvacit*—CS. si. 12.54.

[7] *eṣā parīkṣā nāsty anyā yayā sarvaṃ parīkṣyate*— CS 11.26.

[8] *Āyurvedadīpikā* on CS 11.

[9] cf. *rajastamobhyāṃ nirmuktās tapojñanabalena ye/*
. . . .
āptāḥ śiṣṭā vibuddhās te teṣāṃ vākyam asaṃśayam/
satyaṃ vakṣyanti te kasmād asatyaṃ nīrajastamāḥ//
CS 11. 18-19

[10] S. N. Dasgupta : Ibid. Vol II, p. 280.

[11] cf. *ātmendriyamanorthānāṃ sannikarṣāt pravartate/*
vyaktā tadātve yā buddhiḥ pratyakṣaṃ sā nirucyate//
CS. sū.11.20.

[12] *Āyurvedadīpikā* on CS11.20.

[13] Nyāyasūtra defines, perception as *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam/* 1.1.4.

[14] *pratyakṣapūrvakaṃ trividhaṃ trikālaṃ cānumīyate/* CS 11.21. Gaṅgādhara Ray, later Commentator of Carakasaṃhitā, in his 'Jalpakalpataru' commentary explains the term *anumāna* literally as *anu paścāt yan mīyate jñāyate tad anumānam.* Jal. Ṭī. on CS. sū.11.

[15] *pratyakṣapūrvakam anumānam—Upāyahṛdaya*, Prakaraṇa 1.10.6.

[16] *tatpūrvakaṃ trividham anumānam—Nyayasūtra* 1.1.4.

[17] cf. *pramāṇāntaram eveyam ity āha carako muniḥ/*
Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita, p. 482.

[18] CS 11.23-24.

[19] *buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhāvān bahukāraṇayogajān/*
yuktiḥ...sā jñeyā. . . . .//CS 11.25

[20] *anumānaṃ khalu tarko yuktyapekṣaḥ*
CS.vi.4.4 & 8.40

CONCEPTS OF TRUTH AND FALSITY IN INDIA

G. S. Mukherji

At the very outset it is better to note that the Indian systems of philosophy have not deliberated on the concepts of Truth and Falsity. In the West these have been extensively discussed. In India, philosophers are concerned with *pramā* or valid knowledge and *apramā* or non-valid knowledge. In the West non-valid knowledge is not admitted; there the view is that if it is knowledge it is necessarily true, it cannot be false. In India, it is only Mīmāṃsā Philosophy and the Vedānta Philosophy which propound *akhyātivāda*, the falsity of knowledge is not admitted. In fact, those schools of philosophy which axiomatically admit *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda* accept the view that knowledge is always true. There can be no false knowledge.

Common-sense View

Before entering into the maze of various theories regarding this let us see what the common sense view about truth and falsity is. Ask anyone what a pot or a cow is, one in no time tells 'this is a pot' or 'this is a cow'. He bases his recognition on fore-knowledge of these things. If he is told showing a pot that it is a piece of cloth or showing a cow that it is a tiger he feels that his sense of cognition has been outraged and reacting immediately replies with a big 'no'. If the man is shown a thing which is not known to him previously he says that he does not know what the thing is.

Let us examine this common-sense view. The components of the man's knowledge are : (1) The thing must be known to him previously, i.e. prior to his being asked whether it is true or false. It follows, therefore, that the thing was presented earlier to him for cognition. Some other person must have let him know its name and function or use. If the previous knowledge does not correspond to the thing presented to him for recognition he calls out that it is not what it is said to be, say, a pot or a cow.

What is very much important is it is only in the second presentation of the early verity of a thing that the question viz. is it true or false, can arise. If we are allowed to draw a comparison with the Nyāya system we may say that like *anuvyavasāyātmaka pratyakṣa*, which after *mānasa-pratyakṣa* of a piece of knowledge yields to sentential presentation viz. *ghāṭam ahaṃ jānāmi* etc.

Now this is about the fore-knowledge about a thing; but if he has not previously seen or known it by any means of cognitions he acquires some cognition of the thing and without being able to call it by a name he will refer to it as 'that thing' or 'this thing' etc. But he will never say that it is false.

One thing stands clear in this respect that things in general are there and by their very being they are true. For common sense view about truth is what exists and about falsity is what does not exist. If a man is presented a thing although he does not know it by name or its function he will certainly call it true just because he finds it exists. Some say that such a possibility cannot occur because none has asked about the truth and falsity of things in so many words. But one may ask one's own self about such an object which is being presented for the first time, and the answer to it will of course be, 'it is true', for the person perceives the thing and therefore knows that the thing exists.

It, therefore, remains understood that in every such case a sentential question is involved, and that is, 'Is it true?' or, 'Is it false?'. These questions may not be asked specifically; when something is predicated to something else, the person who hears it cogitates either in mind or openly to some other person about the statement. The answer may either be, 'It is true', or 'It is false'. These sentences to which such answers can be given, in the Western philosophy, are called statements or propositions.

Now the question arises : under what circumstances the statements are regarded either true or false? Experience is one of the conditions that determine the truth and falsity. Let us take, for example, the statement, 'The cow is a four-footed animal'. The person who hears it goes for the past experience, or goes out to see if cow is a four-footed animal. If the result coincides with what he has heard he regards the statement as true. Here, in this connection, we should bear in mind that the statement has two parts, viz. subject and predicate. Normally, the predicate tells something more about the subject, provided, of course, one has valid knowledge of the subject itself. In Indian philosophy the verb (*kriyā*) is not understood as the connector of the subject with the predicate; it has its meaning which enters into the meaning of the sentence either as a qualifier or as an indicator of the subject. *ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ* i.e., 'a pot is a pot' is not a sentence, because the predicate does not add any new knowledge about the subject. Let us expatiate a little more. In the Nyāya system the meaning understood from a group of competent words is called *śābda-bodha*. For example, the sentence, *rāmaḥ gacchati* there are four words viz. *rāma*, *su*, *gam* and *ti*. From each of the word the memory of the meaning of each of the word appears and because of *ākāṅkṣā* 'expectancy' all those meanings enter into the relation of qualified and qualifier and then the hearer understands a qualified meaning which is, *uttaradeśa-saṃyogānukūla-vyapārānukūla-kṛtimān rāmaḥ*. This is what is called *śābda-bodha*. The general rules for arriving at the meaning are as follows : (a) when more than a word combines to form a sentence only then *śābda-bodha* is possible; (b) the cognition of the words in the sentence, and then from each of the word the meaning must come into memory and after that the qualified i.e. a combined one meaning or knowledge in which the meanings of all the constituent words becoming the subject-matter is understood. The meanings of the constituent words must be known by the *vṛtti*s i.e. *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā*, and not by *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*. For the arriving at the particular meaning, for example *ghaṭam ānayati* (he brings a pot) the *karman* i.e. object *ghaṭa* and the *vibhakti* '*aṃ*' are related with the relation *niṣṭhatva*, with the object and bringing the relation is *nirūpakatva* with *kṛti* i.e. effort and bringing the relation is *anukūlatva* and with subject and effort i.e. *kṛti* the relation is *samavāya*. These relations are not understood from the padas i.e. the words in the sentence; but these are achieved by *ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy); (c) In the active voice the subject and in the passive voice the object appear as the main thing to understand; in other words, the meaning of the sentence subsists in them. For example, *rāmaḥ gṛhaṃ gacchati* means *gṛhakarmaka-vartamānakālīna-gamanānukūla-kṛtimān* rāmaḥ. In the same way in the passive voice the verbal meaning will be *rāma-kartṛka-vartamānakālīna-vyāpārajanya-gamanāśrayaḥ grāmaḥ*.

(d) When the meaning of one word is related with the meaning of another word the relation is called *abhedānvaya* i.e. one is not different from the other. Ordinarily, the meaning of *nāman* and the meaning of the *named* and the meaning of the verb there is no *bhedānvaya*.

I have here reiterated what is known to most of us. But why I do it is because the truth and falsity are dependent upon the verbalisation of experience of the cognition, as such if any part of it be missing the intended meaning of the speaker will not be understood. In other words, one will not be able to know whether something is true or false.

The grammarian, however, says that the competence of letting the meaning of a sentence is known to be in the subject of verb. The subject *(kartā)* is one who has *kṛti*. If the subject is *śakya* i.e. known by the *śakti*, the qualifier of the *ākhyāta* or the verb will be *kṛti*. The Naiyāyika says that *kṛti* cannot be the determinant of *śakya* i.e. that which is going to be known by the *vṛtti*s i.e. *abhidhā* or *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā*. According to them *kṛti* is *śakya* and *kṛtitva* is the determinant of *śakya*. In that case the assumption being fewer it is better it is to accept it. According to the grammarian *caitraḥ pacati* means *caitrābhinna pāka-kartā* i.e. the subject of cooking is none other than Caitra, while according to the Naiyāyika it is *pākānukūla-kṛtimān caitraḥ* i.e. the effort favouring the cooking resides in Caitra.

Now, whatever may be the view in both cases the sentential meaning depends upon the meaning of the words involved in them either in the predicate part or in the subject part. If any of these two becomes erroneous the meaning of the entire sentence will be erroneous. The Naiyāyika says that each component of a sentence be examined by the proofs (*pramāṇa*s) i.e. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. If any one of these proofs makes the cognition of the components as *tadvati tat-prakāraka* cognition, the component will be regarded as valid; viz. a 'pot' is one which has 'potness' (i.e. the pot-universal) as the qualifier and the relation between the two is *samavāya*. When all the three i.e., qualifier, qualified and their relation is known without a shadow of doubt it is the qualified knowledge of the pot. In the example *ghaṭatvavatī ghaṭa-vyaktiḥ* i.e. an individual pot which has potness as the qualifier, and these two are related to each other with the relation of *samavāya* 'inherence'; it is a valid knowledge of the pot. If, however, in a qualificant a qualifier is cognised which should not be there the cognition is non-valid. A sentence made of such words would yield a meaning which a man having proper knowledge will be forced to call non-valid. For example, when one sees a piece of rope in semi-darkness and recognises it as 'a snake', one is actually imposing a wrong qualifier on the qualified, as a result the cognition is wrong. The erroneous cognition is dispelled as soon as the qualifier is correctly known either by the seer or by somebody else having the proper knowledge of the qualifier. In the Vedānta philosophy this type of cognition is called *adhyāropa* and, of course, the resultant knowledge is false. The Buddhist says that the *svalakṣaṇa* of the rope has not been cognised, as a result the cognition has become false.

In this connection an interesting question arises about the correctness of the use of such terms as *vandhyā-putra*, *ākāśa-kusuma* and so on. Pāṇini decides that such compounded forms are formally correct, as such, in order to let one understand the meaning the case-ending *su* (the first case-ending) should be added to the terms. Such statements as *vandhyāputro gacchati* is patently false, for the simple reason that there is no such thing as *vandhyāputra*. The components of the word are not individually false for *vandhyātvavatī vandhyā* is true and correct, similarly the *putratvavān putraḥ* is also true. What makes the compounded form incorrect or false is the relation between the meanings of the two words; *janakatva* is imcompatible with the term *vandhyā*, therefore it cannot combine with *putra*, which is here *janya*. But because of this position there should be no compound, which, as we know, can take place only when the components have *sāmarthya* i.e. expectancy, compatibility and proximity. This being the case we are to accept *lakṣaṇā* or implication as the meaning of a word, though it is not *rūḍha* i.e. known through *saṃketa;* it is superimposed on the *rūḍha* meaning; and then too the *su* in *prātipadikārtha* may be attached, just as in the famous example of *laksaṇā 'kaliṅgāḥ sāhasikāḥ'* the words have case-endings.

We desist from presenting the Vedānta view of *vyavahārika* and *prātibhasika* truth and falsity, for fear of making the article much too long. But there too the meaning of words in a sentence may be arrived at by the word-power — *lakṣaṇā*.

In Indian philosophy everything under the sun should be properly examined and even the proofs are to be examined. If the proofs yield a cognition that can be translated into getting a substance or a meaning it is only then the proofs even are called true. Thus in Indian philosophy the validity or non-validity of a cognition is first ascertained through proofs and then the verbalisation in the form of a sentence is presented to which the answer may be given either as 'it is true' or as 'it is false'.

A LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON TRUTH AND FALSITY

K. S. Das

Truth and falsity have been understood in India in terms of both verbal and objective aspects ever since the days of the Ṛgveda. Generally, a proposition is true or false in this that it conveys a true or false idea or so. And what is contrary to truth cannot but be false at any rate. Sanskrit offers a number of words to represent these notions, *satya* and *anṛta* being the most popular among them (cf. *satyaṃ tathyaṃ ṛtaṃ samyak,* and *vitatham anṛtaṃ vacaḥ*— Amarakoṣa, Śabdādivarga 22 & 21). The former has got as its predecessors *ṛta* and *sat* which have developed in course of time a plethora of senses relating to ways of life. The Vedas, in fact, have six equivalents to *satya* (cf. *baṭ, śrat, satrā, addhā, itthā, ṛtam iti satyasya*— Nighaṇṭu, 3.10), in addition to *sat*; cf.

- i) *sac cāsac ca vacasī* [Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā (= ṚV) 7.104. 12];
- ii) *ṛtaṃ naḥ* (ṚV 7.21.5) whereupon Yāska's Nirukta (=Nir.) comments : *satyaṃ vā yajñaṃ vā* (Nir. 4);
- iii) on the word viz. *nāsatya*, Yāska refers to two of his predecessors viz. Aurṇavābha and Āgrāyaṇa; cf. *satyāv eva nāsatyau ity aurṇavābhaḥ, satyasya praṇetārau ity āgrāyaṇaḥ* (Nir. 6), 'truth incarnate' and 'propagator of truth' being the respective meaning therein;
- iv) *satyā bhavantv āśiṣaḥ* (ṚV 7.17.5).

The Upaniṣads clearly exhibit preferential use of *satya* to that of *ṛta* while signifying truth with indication of a shift of meaning in the case of the latter; e.g.,

i) *tasyai tapo damaḥ karmeti pratiṣṭhā . . . satyam āyatanam.* [Kena Upaniṣad (= U) 4.8];

ii) *satyena labhyas tapasā hy eṣa ātmā* (Muṇḍaka U 3.1.5);

iii) *satyam eva jayate nānṛtaṃ,*
satyena panthā vitato devayānaḥ/
yenākramanty ṛṣayo hy āptakāmā,
yatra tat satyasya paramaṃ nidhānam//
(Muṇḍaka U 3.1.6);

iv) *satyaṃ vada* [Taittirīya (= Tait.) U 1.11.1];

v) *satyenainam tapasā yo'nupaśyati* [Śvetāśvatara (= Śveta.) U 1.15].

Thereupon comments Śaṃkara :

i) *satyaṃ yathābhūtavacanam apīḍākaram* (on Kena U 4.8);

ii) *satyena anṛtatyāgena mṛṣāvadanatyāgena labhyaḥ* (on Muṇḍaka U 3.1.5);

iii) *satyena yathābhūtavādavyavasthayā*
(on Muṇḍaka U 3.1.6);

iv) *satyena yathābhūtahitārthavacanena bhūtahitena/*
satyaṃ bhūtahitaṃ proktam iti smaraṇāt
(on Śveta. U 1.15).

In a few cases only, both *ṛta* and *satya* occur to mean exact knowledge of the Śāstra and truthful word and practice respectively (cf. *tasya śraddhaiva śiraḥ, ṛtaṃ dakṣiṇaḥ pakṣaḥ, satyam uttaraḥ pakṣaḥ/*—Tait.U. 2.4).

With *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma* (Tait. U 2.1.3.) and *hiraṇmayena pātreṇa satyasyāpihitaṃ mukham* (Īśa U 15), however, the word *satya* attains a higher plane of philosophical significance viz. omnipresence and Brahman in the solar region (cf. *sad eva satyam, satyaṃ brahmeti brahma vikārān nivartayati/* Śaṃkara on Tait. U 2.1.3, *ādityamaṇḍalasthitasya brahmaṇaḥ*— Śaṃkara on Iśa. U 15).

To Yāska and Pāṇini (=P.) again it was the first meaning viz. truthful statement that struck familiar (e.g. *mṛṣeme vadanti, satyam u te vadanti* — Nir. 1; *kāre satyāgadasya*— P.6.3.70, *satyaṃ praśne*— P.8.1.32, *satyāpapāśa-rūpa* etc. P. 3.1.25 and *satyād aśapathe*— P.5.4.66, while interpreting such forms and expressions as *satyaṅkāra, satyaṃ bhokṣyase, satyāpayati* and *satyākaroti*, respectively), though the latter takes cognisance of an occasional second meaning viz. promise in P.5.4.66 and P.6.3.70. As the Kāśikā on P. 5.4.66 rightly points out, *satyaśabdo'nṛtapratipakṣavacanaḥ/ kvacit tu śapathe'pi vartate*; cf. *satyaṃ sapathatathyayoḥ* (Amarakoṣa, Nānārthavarga 154).

Verily, these two meanings can be well attested to in literature viz, the two great epics, Manusaṃhitā (=Manu.), Raghuvaṃśa (= Raghu.) and the like; cf.

i) *dhanadena samastyāge satye dharma ivāparaḥ* [Rāmāyaṇa (= Rām.) 1.1.19];
ii) *satyas tvaṃ bhava pārthiva* (Rām. 2.34.43);
iii) *satyāt satyañ ca govindas tasmāt satyo'si nāmataḥ* [Mahābhārata (= Mahā.) 5.70.13];
iv) *satyaṃ brūyāt priyaṃ brūyān na brūyāt satyam apriyam* (Manu. 4. 138);
v) *satyā na bhāṣā bhavati* (Manu. 8.164);

and,

i) *sa sītālakṣmaṇasakhaḥ satyād gurum alopayan/ viveśa daṇḍakāraṇyam* (Raghu. 19.9);
ii) *satyena śāpayed* vipram (Manu. 8.113)

and so on.

That the word *sat*, on the other hand, gradually extends to honesty, noble duty, sacrificial performance, penance, gift, etc. is elaborately noted in the Śrīmadbhagavadgītā (=Gītā) (cf. *sadbhāve sādhubhāve ca sad ity etat prayujyate/ praśaste karmaṇi tathā sacchabdaḥ pārtha yujyate// yajñe tapasi dāne ca sthitiḥ sad iti cocyate/karma caiva tadarthīyaṃ sad ity evābhidhīyate//* Gītā 17.26-27)

An oblation, gift, performance or penance, is obviously called *asat* if it is done without dedication thereto : *aśraddhayā hutaṃ dattaṃ tapastaptaṃ kṛtañ ca yat/ asad ity ucyate*— Gītā 17.28). Interestingly, Durgācārya on Yāska construed after Śākaṭāyana the word *satya* as derived from *sat* to mean *santam artham āyayati*, i.e. to say, that which signifies an existing item i.e. true. This original meaning of *sat* is available with the Gītā 2.16 viz. *nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ.*

As for *ṛta*, a major shift of meaning occurred already by the time of Manusaṃhitā according to which *ṛtam uñchaśilaṃ jñeyam* (Manu. 4.5). The Amarakoṣa, Vaiśyavarga 2 has accepted it (cf. *uñchaśilaṃ tv ṛtam*) while others have extended it to a variety of senses (cf. *ṛtaṃ śilońche pānīye pūjite dīptasatyayoḥ*). The word *anṛta* has accordingly gathered a second meaning viz. *kṛṣi* (cf. *anṛtaṃ kṛṣiḥ*— Amarakoṣa, Vaiśyavarga 2); *anṛtaṃ kṛṣāv asatye ca*—Rudra quoted in Vyākhyāsudhā thereupon) and Manu never sanctioned that a brahmin could resort to agriculture under any circumstances. To him each mercantile enterprise banks on both truth and falsity and hence it is *satyānṛtạ* (*satyānṛtaṃ tu vāṇijyam*—Manu. 4.6.).

While Amarakoṣa, Vaiśyavarga 3 has reiterated Manu (*satyānṛtaṃ vaṇigbhāvaḥ*), Ādiśaṃkara in his Adhyāsabhāṣya related to his commentary on the Vedāntasūtra adopts this coinage in a very different context (*satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya aham idam mamedam iti naisargiko'yaṃ lokavyavahāraḥ*) to propagate that whatever we experience in terms of name and form is ultimately unreal and untrue since they are merely phenomenal but at the same time true in the sense that the universal substratum underlying it would never cease to exist.

The Vedānta doctrine of monism, in fact, admits two or three planes of reality according as the circumstances pose to prevail. A snake perceived in a rope in darkness is very much real till the substratum viz. the rope is cognised and the illusory existence of snake is brushed aside. Likewise, the world exists as a reality so long as knowledge of Brahman dawns upon us to wipe out the phenomenal existence of the world as but an effect of superimposition on Brahman that is the ultimate reality viz. omnipresence, omniscience and infinite bliss (*saccidānanda*). Needless to say, phenomenal reality posits itself at an intermediate stage between illusion and dawning of the ultimate knowledge and thereby forfeits its right to rank among truth in the proper sense of the term. Some of the Vedāntins, therefore, accept two realities instead of three, the terms viz. *paramārthasat* and *saṃvṛtisat* being coined for the purpose in certain circles (viz. Buddhist ones).

Verily, truth, or for that matter, falsity can never be absolute ideas irrespective of context and reference. To Manu, for example, what is divorced from established norms of social justice cannot be accepted as true at all (cf. *satyā na bhāṣā bhavati yady api syāt pratiṣṭhitā / bahiś ced bhāṣyate dharmān niyatād vyāvahārikāt//* Manu 8.164). And as the Mahābhārata enjoins, even if speaking the truth is a virtue, to show the way to a murderer who is chasing his target can bring no merit whatsoever cf. *anṛtaṃ vā bhaved vācaṃ, na tu hiṃsyāt kathañcana*—(Mahā, Karṇa, 69.23). Also, cf.

i) *bhavet satyam avaktavyaṃ vaktavyam anṛtaṃ vadet/*
yatrānṛtaṃ bhavet satyaṃ satyañ cāpy anṛtaṃ bhavet//
(Ibid.69.32);

ii) *tatrānṛtaṃ bhavet satyaṃ satyañ cāpy anṛtaṃ bhavet/*
tādṛśaṃ paśyate bālo yasya satyam anuṣṭhitam//
(Ibid. 69.35).

So, even if it is stated : *nāsau dharmo yatra na satyam asti, na tat satyaṃ yac chalenābhyupetam* (Mahā, Udyoga 35.58) it is no absolute formulation for it is by discerning judgment alone that one ascertains what is true and what is false. Cf.

> *satyānṛte viniścitya tato bhavati dharmavit/*
>
> (Mahā, Karṇa, 69.36).

The philosophy of language of the grammar school of Pāṇini has defined both *satya* and *asatya* obviously, in the context of linguistic analysis of speech against the holistic view of immutable *sphoṭa*. To a grammarian-philosopher, *satya* as well as *asatya* occurs both verbally and objectively. While from objective point of view, *satya* means Brahman, the all-pervading cause of the world-appearance which is *asatya* verbally it is *sphoṭa* that is real in contradistinction to the articulate form of speech that is merely apparent and unreal; cf.

> *satyaṃ vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate/*
> *asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyam evābhidhīyate//*
>
> [*Vākyapadīya(=Vp.)* 3.2.2.]

Helārāja, the commentator has deliberated upon this point in details to establish that word and the world being non-different, the verbal monism of the grammarians that is rooted in the Upaniṣadic view viz. *om ity ekākṣaraṃ brahma* does not essentially differ from the Vedānta monism. cf.

> *nehādvaitanaye satyāsatye dve rūpe staḥ advaitahāniprasaṅgāt*; *kintu pāramārthikam evādvayaṃ tattvam... prapañco' tattvam iti... vicāreṇāvidyāvilaye brahmaikaniṣṭhatā darśanānām/*
>
> Helārāja on Vp 3.2.7.

And Bhartṛhari arrives at this ultimate truth through phases from the gross manifestation to the subtlest essence. Cf.

> *satyam ākṛtisaṃhāre yad ante vyavatiṣṭhate/*
> *tan nityaṃ śabdavācyaṃ tac chabdavācyaṃ na bhidyate//*
>
> (Vp 3.2.11)

Verily, as the lump of gold is perceived when all names and forms given to its transformations viz. bracelet, ring, etc. cease to exist, similarly the ultimate reality prevails at the cessation of all its apparent manifestations. Cf.

> *vikārāpekṣayā bhinnasya brahmaṇaḥ satyatocyate/ yathā hi tatra rucakādyākāropamardena suvarṇam ity eva satyam evam anantavikāragrāmāpāye sarvānte avatiṣṭhamānam anapāyi brahmarūpaṃ satyam/* Helārāja on Vp 3.2.11.

Compared to individual particulars (e.g., *ghaṭavyakti*), therefore, the inherent genre (e.g., *ghaṭatva*) is real which again is unreal in comparison with *pṛthivītva* and *dravyatva*. Now, since consciousness *(saṃvit)* is immanent in all objects and it is identical with *parā vāk*, it is this Brahman otherwise called Śabdabrahman, that is the ultimate reality. Cf.

> *vyaktyapāye...gotvādikā nityā... tatrāpi...bhedāpāye vastu ity eva satyam... tatrāpi saṃvidrūpasyānapāyino' nugamāt viṣayākāraviveke tad eva pāramārthikaṃ satyam... saṃvic ca paśyantīrūpā parā vāk śabdabrahmamayīti brahmatattvaṃ śabdāt pāramārthikān na bhidyate/* Helārāja on Vp 3.2.11.

Grammarian-philosophers call it by the name *sphoṭa* and elaborate that all intermediate stages are real only apparently (cf. *satyāsatyau tu yau bhāgau pratibhāvaṃ vyavasthitau/ satyaṃ yat tatra sā jātir asatyā vyaktayo matāḥ//* Bhaṭṭoji 73-74, whereupon Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa remarks : *satyāṃśo jātiḥ asatyā vyaktayaḥ* and ultimately concludes in the Bhūṣaṇa : *avidyādaśāyāṃ jātir eva sphoṭaḥ niṣkarṣe tu brahmaiva sphoṭaḥ/*).

This being the state of affairs in respect of truth and falsity with grammarians of Pāṇini's school, the whole scheme of *apoddhāra* that is analysis of sentence into morphological components going down further to the phonological level, in terms of such devices as affixation, augmentation, gemination and the like, is relegated to a merely academic exercise. Bhartṛhari admits it when he observes : *śāstreṣu prakriyābhedair avidyaivopavarṇyate*

(Vp. 2.233). Verily, there are no words beyond a sentence as words have no constituent parts at all (*pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā hi na/ vākyāt padānām atyantaṃ praviveko na kaścana//*Vp. 1.74). The same is the case with a sentence-meaning (cf. *śabdasya na vibhāgo'sti kuto' rthasya bhaviṣyati/* Vp. 2.13). So, whatever the sentence may be, the ultimate sense it conveys is Brahman for ultimately all sentences are rooted in *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa (tasmāc chaktivibhāgena nityaḥ sadasadātmakaḥ/ eko'rthaḥ śabdavācyatve bahurūpaḥ prakāśate//* Vp. 3.3.87). It is merely for the sake of our convenience that we analyse sentence and sentence-meaning into parts and assign a morphological segment to the semantic one (*vyavahāraś ca lokasya padārthaiḥ parikalpite/ śāstre padārthaḥ kāryārthaṃ laukikaḥ pravibhajyate//* Vp. 3.3.88).

May be, it is true only at the phenomenal level but still it is hailed as the doorway to the ultimate reality (*asatye vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṃ samīhate* Vp. 2.238). Absolute truth, if any, cannot be perceived at all without reference to relative truth.

TRUTH AND FALSITY : A CRITICAL STUDY
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SĀṂKHYA-YOGA VIEW

P. Ghatak

All systems of Indian Philosophy have dealt much upon the problem of reality and to do that they have tried in their own way to ascertain what is truth and what is falsity. In this present essay my humble aim is to discuss especially the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view about truth and falsity.

The English word 'truth' is equivalent to the Sanskrit word *satyajñāna* and the word 'falsity' is equivalent to *mithyājñāna*. Literally the word 'truth' or *satyajñāna* means the cognition of an object which is real, that means the cognition of the object which really exists (*sat*) at the time of cognition and the word 'falsity' or *mithyājñāna* literally means the cognition of an object which is not real, that means the cognition of the object which really does not exist (*asat*) at the time of cognition. It is to note that in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga Philosophy the terms *pramā*, *tattvajñāna*, *pramāṇa*, *vidyā* and *darśana* are used for truth and the terms *bhrama*, *viparyaya*, *apramāṇa*, *avidyā* and *adarśana* are used for falsity.

At the very outset let us bring in the views of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga teachers about truth. According to Vācaspati Miśra, the celebrated commentator of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy, when an ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*) results from an object which is not liable to suspicion (*asandigdha*), which is not to be contradicted (*aviparīta*) and which has not been comprehended earlier (*anadhigata*) that ascertainment only is to be regarded as *pramā*, the valid cognition.[1] Truth is nothing but such *pramā* or the valid cognition. It is to note that the word *pramā* has been used in the sense of valid cognition since the word has been derived from *pra-√mā* ('to know') *+aṅ* in *bhāvavācya— pra* here means 'valid' and *mā* means 'knowledge' 'cognition'. So the cognition which results from an object which is liable to suspicion (*sandigdha*) that cannot be a valid one as because of the fact that there can't be any ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*) in the form of 'this is certainly this'. In such case one does not cognise one thing only at the time of cognition but he cognises two similar things at time—his cognition arises in this form: 'Is it this or that?' Thus on seeing a pillar in the dim light of the night the seer cannot ascertain it as a pillar, but he doubts it whether it is a man or a pillar. In the case of a valid cognition only, the object which really exists (*sat*) is to be cognised—anything else will not be cognised. Thus when one sees a pillar in the broad daylight he cognises it a pillar—he does not cognise it as a man. But in the dim light of the night he cannot ascertain it as pillar only and therefore, such cognition cannot be a valid one (*pramā*). This is a doubtful cognition (*saṃśaya*). Thus when one sees a piece of rope, in the dim light and thinks it to be a snake then that cognition is not to be taken as a valid one since in that case the snake, the object of cognition subsequently becomes contradicted. When the person takes the help of a powerful torch and a stick then he percives well that there is no snake at all, but there exists only a piece of rope. So this is not a valid cognition (*pramā*), this is an erroneous one (*bhrama*). Similarly when one cognises a person whom he comprehended earlier then in that case the cogrition is nothing but remembrance (*smṛti*). This also is not a valid cognition.

The author of the Sāṃkhya Sūtra has expressed his view on truth in the Sūtra: *dvayor ekatarasya vāpy asannikṛṣṭārthaparicchittiḥ pramā* . . . [2] Here the author of the Sāṃkhya Sūtra intends to say that when an object is contacted with a sense-organ then the impression of that object goes to the intellect (*buddhi*) through that sense-organ so that the object goes to be ascertained as 'this is such and such' and such ascertainment (*paricchitti*) is called *pramā*, the valid cognition. This is true knowledge. This is truth. Vijñānabhikṣu in explaining the aforesaid Sāṃkhya Sūtra (1.87) has observed that a real object (*vastu*) which has not been comprehended earlier (*anadhigata*) but is ascertained at present only then this ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa*) of such real object is *pramā*, the valid cognition. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the term *anadhigata* is to be taken to exclude memory (*smṛti*), the term *vastu* is to be taken to exclude error (*bhrama*) and the term *avadhāraṇa* is to be taken to exclude suspicion (*saṃśaya*).[3]

Now let us see the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view about the process by which the valid cognition (*pramā*) is produced. The view is such : when a real object (*sadviṣaya*) which has not been doubted, which has not been comprehended earlier and which is not to be contradicted later comes to the contact of a sense-ogran (*jñānendriya*), then the sense-organ takes the impression of that real object. Then that sense-organ makes over the impression of that object to the mind (*manas*). The mind reflects upon the said impression of the object and gives it over to the egoistic principle (*ahaṅkāra*). The egoistic principle then in its turn appropriates the said impression of the object given by the mind. Finally, the egoistic principle presents the self-appropriated impression of the object to the intellect (*buddhi* or *mahat*) for final ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*). Then a *vṛtti*, a faculty in the form of ascertainment is produced in the intellect. Just then the consciousness of the *puruṣa* is reflected on that *vṛtti* or the *vṛtti* is reflected on the *puruṣa* (as it has been acknolwedged by Vijñānabhikṣu[4]) and then the *vṛtti* in the form of ascertainment becomes manifested. Thus the valid cognition of the object as 'this is such and such' is produced. This process through which the valid cognition is produced has been beautifully illustrated by Vācaspati Miśra. He has illustrated in this way : the village headmen hand over the revenue collected from the villagers to the collector of the district, the collector delivers it to the governor of the country and the governor finally hands it over to the king. In similar fashion the external organs (*bāhyendriya*) make over the impression of the object received by themselves to the mind (*manas*) the mind then reflects on it and gives it to the egoistic principle (*ahaṅkāra*) for appropriation, the egoistic principle in its turn presents the self-appropriated impression of the object to the intellect (*buddhi*)[5]. Thus we see that the sense-organs operate for the mind, the mind operates for the egoistic principle, the egoistic principle operates for the intellect and finally the intellect operates for the ascertainment and its successful manifestation. The valid congnition thus involves the regular operations of the sense-organs, mind, the egoistic principle and the intellect.

According to Vācaspati Miśra *pramā* or the valid cognition is the property of the intellect (*buddhi*). It is not the property of the *puruṣa*. Because no cognition can be produced in the *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is consciousness *par excellence*. The consciousness of the *puruṣa* is reflected upon the *buddhivṛtti* and the cognition is produced them in the intellect (*buddhi*).[6] But Vijñānabhikṣu thinks *pramā* or the valid cognition as a property of the *puruṣa*. Because he says that *pramā* is cognition (*bodha*) belong to the *puruṣa* (*puruṣaniṣtha*). Moreover, all the sense-organs work for the *puruṣa*, so the results should belong to the *puruṣa*. Therefore *pramā* or the valid cognition is the property of the *puruṣa*.[7]

Vijñānabhikṣu has projected all his arguments solely on the basis of the statement of Vyāsa which runs thus : *phalam aviśiṣṭaḥ pauruṣeyaś cittavṛttibodhah.*[8] Now Bhikṣu may be asked, if *pramā* i.e., the valid cognition is really the property of the *puruṣa* then whether the *puruṣa* will be tingled with the *buddhi-vṛtti*, as becasue the *buddhi-vṛtti*, as it has been accepted by Vijñānabhikṣu's answer will be in the negative. Just as a crystal is not really tinged with the redness of the China rose although it takes the reflection of the China rose, so also the *puruṣa* is not tinged although the *buddhi-vṛtti* is reflected thereupon.

So long we have been discussing the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view on *pramā* that means the valid cognition which again stands for the truth. Curiously enough, Vyāsa in his Yogabhāṣya has used the word *pramāṇa* for the truth or the valid cognition more than once[10] although the word *pramāṇa* generally has been used for 'the means of *pramā*, the valid cognition'[11] (the word *pramāṇa* being derived from *pra-√mā* ('to know') *+lyuṭ* in the *karaṇavācya*. It is to note that when Vyāsa takes the word *pramāṇa* for *pràṁā* then he surely takes the word as resulting from *pra-√mā* ('to know') *+lyuṭ* in the *bhāvavācya* (not in the *karaṇavācya*). Here in the word *pramāṇa* the prefix *pra* stands for *prakṛṣṭa* and the substantive *māna* stands for *jñāna*. Therefore, *pramāṇa* means 'the valid cognition'.

Sometimes Vyāsa in the Yogabhāṣya has used the terms *vidyā* and *darśana* for the valid cognition. Thus he says : *vidyāviparītaṃ jñānāntaram avidyeti*[12] '*avidyā* is a different knowledge just opposite to *vidyā*'. Here *avidyā* stands for the *mithyājñāna* 'the nescience' and the opposite to it is *vidyā*. Therefore, the term *vidyā* surely denotes the valid cognition. So also Vyāsa says : *darśanam adarśanasya pratidvandvīti*[13]—'*adarśana*, an error is contradicted by *darsána*'. This *darśana* cancelling an error cannot but be other than the valid cognition of an object.

Having discussed the views of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers on truth we now proceed to discuss what they have thought about falsity. Falsity is nothing but the erroneous cognition of an object which is better known as *bhrama or mithyājñāna* or *viparyaya* or *avidyā* or *adarśana* by the Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophers.

Now let us see, what error is? When one kind of cognition of an object is produced in another kind of object then such kind of cognition is called error. When in the dim light we cognise a piece of rope as snake then this cognition is not a valid one, on the contrary, it is an error. In an error the object, which is cognised that must be contradicted (*bādhita viṣaya*) by the valid cognition (*pramā*) later on. Thus with the help of the torch light and the stick we can realise that this is not a snake, it is a piece of rope. Thus when we see a piece of pearl in an oyster in the bright sunshine then this is not a case of valid cognition, on the contrary, it is an error. Because when we take the oyster in our hand then we can realise that this is an oyster, this is not a piece of pearl. The cognition of pearl is thus contradicted by the valid cognition 'this is an oyster'. In the cases of the two illustrations cited above we can understand that due to certain conditions the stored up impressions are superimpossed and due to such superimposition the error takes place.Thus when we cognise a snake in a rope in the dim light then we actually superimpose the stored up impression of the snake on the rope and when we cognise a piece of pearl in an oyster in the bright sunshine then we superimpose the stored up impression of a piece of pearl on the oyster. We do invariably notice that in both the cases of error mentioned above similarity between the two objects is the cause of the superimposition. Thus, a piece of rope is similar to a snake. Therefore, the snake is superimposed on the rope in the snake-rope illusion. An oyster is similar to a piece of pearl. So the piece of pearl is superimposed in the oyster in the pearl-oyster illusion.

In some cases we find that due to contiguity the attribute of an object is transmitted into another object. As a result, the contiguous object in which the attribute is transmitted seems to be true. But actually such type of cognisance is not true--it is erroneous. For example, a red China rose has been placed very close to a crystal. The crystal is transperent and we shall see that the redness of the China rose has been transmitted into it and the crystal seems to be red. Such cognition that the crystal is red is not true— it is false. Why? If we remove the crystal in a remote corner of the room where any reflection of the China rose is not possible then we shall certainly realise that the crystal is no more red—it is transparent. Here the erroneous cognition 'the crystal is red' is contradicted by the valid cognition 'the crystal is transparent'. In such a case due to the contiguity the superimposition has taken place and thereby the error has been produced. There are innumerable instances where the error takes place due to the contiguity.

Morever in some cases when an effort is undertaken to impose an external object upon another object then the cognition produced is to be taken as an error. Thus the cognisance of god in a lump of clay and the cognisance of letters in the lines are the instances of such type of error. In the first instance the external object god has been imposed upon the lump of clay and in the second instance the external objects letters have been imposed upon the lines.

With the aid of some objects too an error takes place. Thus with the aid of a special type of glass a small letter is seen to be too much big or with the aid of a special type of glass a high mountain is seen to the too much low. With the help of his magical power the magician can show the blue sky as covered with clouds. With the aid of a finger when we press the end of an eye then we see one moon to be two. Undoubtedly all such cognitions are erroneous.

There are innumerable instances of error. But in every case it is to be seen that the error is produced having taken resort to the object which is actually non-existent at the time of cognition. As error is based on the non-existent object and is sure to be cancelled by the valid cognition of the real object in the long run, therefore, it itself is surely unreal. But so long error prevails and is not cancelled by the valid cognition it certainly produces some efforts on the human mind and as result of that it rouses some activities in men and women. If we carefully scrutinise the error in different cases then we shall see that error has different impacts and it begets different results. Thus when one person sees a snake in the rope then one shivers in fear, when one sees a piece of pearl in an oyster one becomes allured and rushes to take it, when one sees god in a lump of clay then one becomes engaged in worshipping, and when one sees letters in the lines then one begins to engage oneself in reading and learning.

What are the causes for the origin of error? We have seen previously that in some cases error is originated due to stored up impressions and in some cases due to similarity between two objects and in other cases due to contiguity between two objects. Too much distance is also the cause for the origin of error. Thus also the defect of the sense-organs is the cause of error.

Now arises naturally the question : when an error can be dispelled? According to Sāṃkhya philosophy when the real form of the substratum is revealed then the error which has been originated in that substratum can be dispelled. This revelation of the real form of the substratum is the valid cognition (*pramā*). Thus error is contradicted by the valid cognition. As intellect is inclined to the truth[14] so it naturally tends to the valid cognition and by the help of this valid cognition it cancells the error in the long run. Thus when we perceive the real form of the rope then the cognition of the snake disappears and when we perceive the real form of the oyster then the cognition of a piece of pearl fades away. According to Sāṃkhya, error is also responsible for all pleasures and miseries of the people who are engrossed in earthly pleasures and interests. Really the *puruṣa*, the self is consciousness *par excellence* and it is devoid of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. Therefore, in reality, it is ever-pure and free, and it is free from all pleasures and miseries. All pleasures and miseries really belong to *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* which only constitute the *prakṛti*. Therefore, all pleasures and miseries really belong to the *prakṛti*. But the *puruṣa*, the self, is closely associated with the *prakṛti*. Due to such close association the properties of the *prakṛti* i.e., of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are superimposed on the *puruṣa*. Therefore, the *puruṣa* becomes contaminated with the properties of the *prakṛti*. So the *puruṣa* experiences pleasures and miseries. As an error is caused by the superimposition of one thing on another, therefore, the *puruṣa's* experience of pleasures and miseries is also a kind of error as it has been caused by the superimposition. So long this error exists and exerts influence on the person engrossed in earthly pleasures and interests till then that self experiences pleasures and miseries. But in this case Sāṃkhya opines that the error can be removed only by the repeated practice of true knowledge (*tattvābhyāsa*) of all the *tattvas* and then only the self can realise that neither any pleasure nor any misery of his own—he is ever pure and ever free.[15]

So long we have been discussing about falsity which also been termed as *bhrama* which again stands for error. We have discussed its different aspects as far as possible. Now let us see what Patañjali, the maker of the Yogasūtras and Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya, have said about falsity. Falsity has been termed by Patañjali as *viparyaya*. To define *viparyaya* Patañjali has framed the rule, *viparyayo mithyājñanam atadrūpapratiṣṭham.*[16] He has intended to say here that when the cognition of an object does not correspond to the real form of the cognised object and is sublated by the true cognition later on then this cognition is a false one (*mithyājñāna*) and such a false cognition is to be called *viparyaya*. We have discussed earlier the characteristic feature of *bhrama* or error and we have no hesitation to say that Patañjali's *viparyaya* is also an error. When one sees two moons in the sky then surely that is a false cognition and that is *viparyaya.* The moon really is one that shines in the sky at night. The cognition of two moons is sublated later on by the valid cognition that moon is one. It is supported by Vyāsa in his Yogabhāṣya. He has observed that *viparyaya* is not a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as it is contradicted by the valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). Valid cognition is always based on the object which is real and really exists at the time of cognition. On the other hand, it is seen that the cognition which is not real that is contradicted by the cognition which is real. Thus the visual perception of two moons is contradicted by the right perception of one moon.[17]

We should note that the suspicion (*saṃśaya*) is to be included into the *viparyaya.* Because in the suspicion the knowledge of the two things simultaneously appears and in the long run the knowledge of one thing becomes contradicted by the true knowledge of another thing which really exists at the time of cognition. Thus when the suspicion arises in the mind of a person and he thinks so 'Is it a pillar or a man'? then he cognises both the pillar and the man simultaneously. But the knowledge of a man is contradicted subsequently by the true knowledge of the pillar which really exists at that time. But still a slight difference is to be observed between *viparyaya* and *saṃśaya.* In the *viparyaya* only one thing appears in the cognition and subsequently that thing is contradicted by the knowledge of another thing which does not exist at all in the *viparyaya* whereas in the *saṃśaya* (suspicion) the two things appear simultaneously in the cognition and at the subsequent period one of them contradicts the other and the thing, which contradicts that also exists in the *saṃśaya* as a part of it. Moreover, in the *viparyaya* although the knolwedge is false but so long it remains, it remains in the form of 'this is such' and here some sort of certainty is to be noticed. But in the *saṃśaya* as two things appear simultaneously, therefore, the knowledge in the form of 'this is such' cannot grow and therefore, there can be no certainty at all.

Patañjali has said about one *avidyā* too which may be equated with falsity. From the very connotation of the term it is well-understood that *avidyā* is a separate type of knowledge which is opposite to *vidyā*, the true knowledge. Therefore, undoubtdely *avidyā* is a false knowledge. But to define *avidyā* Patañjali himself has uttered : *anityāśuci-duḥkhānātmasu nityaśucisukhātmakhyātir avidyā.*[18] That means, according to Patañjali *avidyā* is to cognise the non-eternal (*anitya*) as the eternal (*nitya*), the impure (*aśuci*) as the pure (*śuci*), the painful (*duḥkha*) as the pleasant (*sukha*) and the non-self (*anātman*) as the self (*ātman*). It is to note here that while Patañjali has been defining *avidyā* he has been mentioning the specific cases too where *avidyā* takes place. It is worthy to note here that the cognisance in all the cases mentioned by Patañjali is not true— it is false. Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya, has observed that *avidyā* should be regarded as a positive entity.[19] Accoridng to him, *avidyā* is neither the right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) nor the absence of right knowlege (*pramāṇābhāva*) but it is a kind of knowledge which is opposed to the right knowledge.[20] It should be noted here that the author of the Yogabhāṣya has used the word *pramāṇa* here in the sense of *pramā*, the right knowledge, the valid cognition. But generally the word *pramāṇa* has been used in Sāṃkhya and Yoga in the sense of 'the means of *pramā*' by which the valid cognition is produced.

According to Vyāsa, *avidyā* is to be regarded as having five heads and these are nemed as *tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmiśra* and *andhatāmisra.*[21] Vācaspati Miśra attributes this five-headed *avidyā* to Vārṣagaṇya.[22] But Īśvarakṛṣṇa has never used the term *avidyā* to denote falsity. Rather he has choiced the term *viparyaya* for that purpose. Therefore, he has clearly declared that due to the *viparyaya*, that means, due to the false knowledge the common people undergoes bondage[23]. Īśvarakṛṣna also has acknowledged the five heads of *viparyaya* as those of *avidyā*[24]. Therfore, it may be thought that *avidyā* of the Yoga philosophy and *viparyaya* of Īśvarakṛṣna are indentical. Moreover, Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya describies *viparyaya* as the five-headed *avidyā*[25]. Such description of Vyāsa also tends to support the same thinking. But from the careful scrutiny we can realise that *viparyaya* and *avidyā* are not identical—there remains a subtle difference between the two. Vyāsa, in his Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra 2.24 has clearly stated : *avidyā viparyayajñānavāsanety arthaḥ*'. Thus on the basis of the Yogabhāṣya we can say that *viparyaya* is the false knowledge whereas *avidyā* is the potency which is left out by false knowledge (*viparyayajñānavāsanā*). This is the only subtle difference between *viparyaya* and *avidyā*. It is to be mentioned here that the author of the Yogabhāṣya has not only described the *viparyaya* as the false knowledge but also as the only cause of the worldly existence.[26]

It is worthy to note that the author of the Yogabhāṣya has mentioned that term *adarśana* over and above *viparyaya*, *avidyā* and *apramāṇa*. While explaining the Yogasūtra 2. 23 the author of the Yogabhāṣya has used the word *adarśana* in the sense of false knowledge. He has said that it is *adarśana* which brings out the conjunction between the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*. Really it has been stated in the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga that so long one does not attain the true knowledge of the real nature of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* till then the conjunction between the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* persists and the *puruṣa* considers the pleasures and pains of the *prakṛti* as of his own. Such non-realisation of the real nature of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* is nothing but the false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*). Therefore, there can be no difficulty to consider *adarśana* as the false knowledge.

Thus from the above discussion it becomes clear to us that although there may be a slight difference between *avidyā*, *viparyaya*, and *adarśana* but still all these terms designate the false knowldedge. Whether it is *avidyā* or it is *viparyaya* or it is *adarśana* in every type of knowledge we see that the difference between the two objects has not been realised and that is why one object is identified with the other object. Both of them are real. But the fancied relation between the two is erroneous. According to the author of the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, this conception about the false knowledge is the conception of the Sāṃkhya. Therefore he states : *nanu atattve tattvajñānam iti śāstrakāreṇaiva darśitaḥ saṃsargabhrama iti.* Śāstrakāra here refers to Sāṃkhya and this is known from the statement of the Tattvadīpana which runs thus : *śāstrakāreṇa sāṃkhyenety arthaḥ.*[27] In the Sāṃkhya Sūtra *sadasatkhyātir bādhābādhāt*[28] it has been stated that when the redness of the China rose is reflected on the transparent crystal then the crystal is cognised as red. Really the crystal is transparent. But now it seems to be red due to reflection. But this knowledge is erroneous. Here also the crystal is real, so also the redness of the China rose is real. Both are given. But their relation is fancied, it is not given. Therefore, the cognisance, 'this is a red crystal' is erroneous. According to Sāṃkhya, in everycase of false knowledge or error there must be such fancied relation between the two real objects. So in the light of the above-mentioned Sāṃkhya Sūtra we can say that the false knowledge or error involves two objects which are real, which are given and the relation between those two objects which is not real, which is not given, which has been fancied only. So according to Sāṃkhya, the false knowledge or an error is called *sadastkhyāti*. Therefore the author of the Sāṃkhya Sūtra advocates *sadasṭkhyāti* as the theory of error and so he frames the rule : *sadasatkhyātir bādhābādhat* (5.56).

In the conclusion we are inclined to say that error is very much powerful. In our daily life we often fall prey to error. So we are overcome by the greater influence of error and as a result of that we often fail to judge a thing rightly, we fail to understand what the thing really is and we do wrong on many occasions. Under the enormous influence or error we fail to realise the true nature of our selves and we misconceive the properties of matter as the properties of our own selves and we do carry on our wordly existence having enjoyed pleasures at one time and having suffered from pains in the next moment. In the long run we become very much tired to such experiences and we ardently desire to be free from such experiences. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga views on truth and falsity come to our help. If we can really understand what Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophers have said about the nature and the characteristics of true knowledge then under the able guidance of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophy we may be aware of error and by the acquisition of true knowledge we can get rid of the influence of error and then we can realise that we were so long under the influence of error due to which we considered all worldly experiences of pleasures and pains really belonging to the *prakṛti* as our own. In reality these experiences do not belong to the self, the *puruṣa*. Thus the teachings of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga about error and truth come to our rescue and pave the way for emancipation.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] ***asandigdhāviparītānadhigataviṣayā cittavṛttiḥ pauruṣeyo bodhaḥ phalaṃ pramā/***

Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī **on Sāṃkhyakārikā, 4.**

[2] ***Sāṃkhyasūtra*****, 1. 87.**

[3] *asannikṛṣṭaḥ pramātary anārūḍho'nadhigata iti yāvat/ evaṃbhūtasyārthasya vastunaḥ paricchittir avadhāraṇam pramā...smṛtivyāvartanāyānadhigateti/ bhramavyāvartanāya vastv iti/ saṃśayavyāvartanāya tv avadhāraṇam iti/*

Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, 1. 87

[4] *cetane tāvad buddhipratiivimbam avaśyaṃ svīkāryam/*

Vārttika on Yogasūtra, 1.4.

[5] *yathā hi grāmādhyakṣāḥ kauṭumbikebhyaḥ karam ādāya viṣayādhayādhyakṣāya prayacchanti, visayādhyakṣaś ca sarvādhyakṣāya, sa ca bhūpataye, tathā bāhyendriyāṇi, ālocya manase samarpayanti, manaś ca saṅkalpyāhaṅkārāya, ahaṅkāraś cābhimatya sarvādhyakṣabhūtāyām buddhau/*

Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā, 3.6.

[6] *na hi puruṣagato bodho janyate'pi tu caitanyam eva buddhidarpaṇapratiivimbitaṃ budhivṛttyākārayā tadākāratām āpadyamanaṃ phalam,*

Tattvavaiśāradī on Yogabhāṣya, 1.7.

[7] *pātañjalabhāṣye tu vyāsadevaiḥ puruṣaniṣṭhabodhaḥ pramety uktaḥ/ puruṣārtham eva karaṇānāṃ pravṛttyā phalasya puruṣaniṣṭhatayā evaucityāt ato'trāpi sa eva mukhyaḥ siddhāntaḥ—*

Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, 1. 87

[8] on the *Yogasūtra*, 1.7.

[9] *Cf. yathā javāsphaṭikayor noparāgaḥ kintu javāpratiivimbavaśād uparāgābhimānamātraṃ raktaḥ sphaṭika · iti, tathaiva buddhipuruṣayor noparāgaḥ/ kintu buddhipratiivimbavaśād uparāgābhimāno' vivekavaśād ity arthaḥ/*

Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, on the Sāṃkhyasūtra : *javāsphaṭikayor iva noparāgaḥ kintv abhimānaḥ* (6. 28).

[10] Cf. (i)... *avidyā na pramāṇam.../ kintu vidyāviparītaṃ jñānāntaram/—Yogabhāṣya* on the Yogasūtra, 2. 5.

(ii) *sa kasmān na pramāṇam? yataḥ pramāṇena bādhanam apramāṇsya dṛṣṭam,*

—Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra, 1. 8.

[11] That the word *pramāṇa* is used for 'the means of *pramā*' is clear from the following extracts :

(a) *trividhaṃ pramāṇam iṣṭam prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi/*

Sāṃkhyakārika, 4

(b) *atra ca pramāṇam iti samākhyā lakṣyapadaṃ,*

tannirvacanaṃ ca lakṣaṇam, pramīyate'neneti nirvacanāt pramāṃ prati karaṇatvam avagamyate, asandigdhāviparītānadhigataviṣayā cittavṛttiḥ, bodhaś ca pauruṣeyaḥ phalaṃ pramā/

Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārika, 4

(c) Patañjali in his Yogasūtra and Vyāsa in his Yogabhāṣya have used the word *pramāṇa* in the sense of *cittavṛtti* which is the means of *pramā* :

vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ/ —Yogasūtra, 1.5.
pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ/ —Ibid,. 1.6.
pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni. —Ibid,. 1.7.

indriyapraṇālikayā cittasya bāhyavastūparāgat tadviṣayā sāmānyaviśeṣātmano'rthasya viśeṣāvadhāraṇapradhānā vṛttiḥ pratyaksaṃ pramāṇam/ phalam aviśiṣṭah pauruṣeyaś cittavṛttibodhaḥ/ —*Yogabhāṣya* on the Yogasūtra, 1.7

[12] *Yogabhāsya* on the Yogasūtra, 2.5

[13] *Yogabhāṣya* on the Yogasūtra, 2.23

[14] *tattvapakṣapāto hi dhiyāṃ svabhāvaḥ/*
Saṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā,64.

[15] *evaṃ tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham ity apariśeṣam, aviparyayād viśuddhaḥ kevalam utpadyate jñānam/*
Sāṃkhyakārikā,64.

[16] *Yogasūtra*, 1.8.

[17] *sa kasmān na pramāṇam? yataḥ pramāṇena bādhyate, bhūtārthaviṣayatvāt pramāṇasya, tatra pramāṇena bādhanam apramāṇasya dṛṣṭaṃ, tad yathā, dvicandradarśanaṃ sadviṣayeṇaikacandradarśanena bādhyata iti/*
Yogabhāṣya on the Yogosūtra, 1.8.

[18] *Yogasūtra*, 2.5.

[19] *tasyāś cāmitrāgoṣpadavat vastu satattvaṃ vijñeyam—*
Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra, 2.5.

[20] *...avidyā na pramāṇam na pramāṇābhāvaḥ kintu vidyāparītaṃ jñānāntaram avidyeti/* —*Yogabhāṣya* on the Yogasūtra, 2.5.

[21] *seyaṃ pañcaparvā bhavaty avidyā, avidyāsmitārāgadveṣābhiniveśāḥ kleśā iti, eta eva svasaṃjñābhis tamo moho mahāmohas tāmisrāndhatāmisra iti/*
Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra, 1.8

[22] *'.... pañcaparvā avidyā' ity āha bhagavān varṣagaṇyaḥ*
Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on the Sāmkhyakārikā, 47

[23] Cf. *viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ/* —*Sāṃkhayakārikā*, 44.

[24] Cf. *pañca viparyayabhedāḥ—Sāṃkhayakārikā*, 47.
avidyāsmitārāgadveṣābhiniveśā yathāsaṃkhyaṃ tamomoha-mahāmohatāmisrāndhatāmisrasaṃjñakāḥ pañca viparyayaviśeṣāh—
Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā, 47

[25] *seyaṃ pañcaparvā bhavaty avidyā,*
Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra, 1.8

[26] *viparyayo bhavasya kāraṇam,*
Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra, 1.30

[27] *Brahmasūtra-Śāṃkarabhāṣya*, Calcutta Sanskrit series, Part 1., p. 166.

[28] *Sāṃkhyasūtra*, 5. 56.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DEFINITION OF *ADHYĀSA*

S. Goswami

The definition of illusion has perhaps for the first time been presented by Vātsyāyana[1] in his Nyāyabhāṣya. He has defined it as *atasmiṃs tad iti pratyayaḥ.*[2] Praśastapāda[3] also gives the same definition—*atasmiṃs tad iti pratyayo viparyayaḥ*[4]. Uddyotakara literally follows Vātsyāyana regarding this definition—*kaḥ punar ayaṃ viparyayaḥ? atasmiṃs tad iti pratyayaḥ.*[5] Later on this definition has been expressed as *atadvati tatprakārakam jñānam.* As opposed to this, *pramā* has been defined as *tadvati tatprakārakaṃ jñānam.*[6] This definition of *pramā* is being explained in the following paragraph.

When a piece of silver remains on the ground, I may cognise it as a category (*padārtha*). In that case the cognition of silver is *padārthatvaprakāraka*; if it is known as a substance, the cognition is *dravyatvaprakāraka*; similarly the cognition may be *dhātutvaprakāraka, kaṭhinadravyatvaprakāraka* and also as *rajatatvaprakāraka* depending on the capacity in which it is known. Now if the object of my cognition possesses the attributes *padārthatva, dravyatva, dhātuva*, etc., the said cognition is valid. If not, it is invalid. For example, when there is on the ground a piece of shell, which does not possess silverhood, and I cognise it in the capacity of being silver, the said cognition becomes false.

The definition may be further analysed in the following manner. The seventh case-ending in *tadvati* is to mean *viṣaya* since it is used *viṣayādhikaraṇa*. Comparison may be made with a parallel usage as *mokṣe icchāsti.* So the said definition is now expressed as—*tadvadviṣayakaṃ tat-*

prakārakaṃ jñānaṃ pramā. This is the generally accepted definition of *pramā*.

Now the neo-logicians pose a problem. In their opinion the said definition of *pramā* is too wide in *apramā*. They argue—when there is a piece of shell on the ground and I cognise it as silver, my cognition is *rajatatvaprakāraka*. It means that *rajatatva* has been the object of my cognition. Now *rajatatva* being a universal, it must be perceived in an individual i.e. *rajata* since the universal cannot exist without an individual. Thus the object of my cognition i.e. the object-content of this cognition includes *rajata* also which has the attribute *rajatatva*. Hence this cognition is *rajatatvaprakāraka* and *rajata-rajatatvobhaya-viṣayaka*. This cognition being *rajata-viṣayaka* is necessarily *rajatatvavad-viṣayaka*. The whole intellectual exercise comes to this : The said so-called invalid cognition is *rajatatvavadviṣayaka* and *rajatatvaprakāraka* which means that the definition of *pramā*, as presented by the older logicians is vitiated for being too wide in an invalid cognition or *apramā*.

In order to grapple with this problem the neologicians propose that the said definition of *pramā* should be amended as *tadvadviśeṣyakaṃ tatprakārakaṃ jñānaṃ pramā*. By replacing *viṣaya* by *viśeṣya* the above problem is averted. In Sanskrit grammar *viśeṣya* is admitted as predominant or *pradhāna*. In the instance of shell-silver the effort of the erring person desiring to have the piece of silver is towards 'this' i.e. the shell. So the shell is predominant but not the silver. Thus the illusory cognition is not *rajatatvavad-viśeṣyaka* but *idantāvad-viśeṣyaka*. In this way the neo-logician establishes his position that *pramā* is *tadvadviśeṣyakaṃ tatprakārakaṃ jñānam*.[7]

It is intriguing that in spite of the sharp difference of the Advaita theory of illusion Śaṃkarācārya elects to borrow the same definition of illusion in his *Adhyāsabhāṣya*. This is perhaps due specially to Śaṃkara's deep reverence for

Akṣapāda Gotama and his Nyāya-system, and partially to his respect towards Vātsyāyana also. Śaṃkarācārya quotes the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2 with an introduction as *tathā cācāryapraṇītaṃ nyāyopabṛṃhitaṃ sūtram* under Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.4 (p.72 of NSP edition). Śaṃkarācārya quotes another Nyāyasūtra 1.1.39 in his commentary of Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 4.5, introduction. Further in his commentary on Chapter 2 of Brahmasūtra Śaṃkara animadverts all the systems excepting Nyāya, although he refutes the Vaiśeṣika views and concepts. Most reputed traditional scholars have maintained that as regards the fundamentals the Nyāya and the Vedānta systems do not differ much although in the process of argumentation there appear sharp divergences.

Adhyāsa is initially defined by Śaṃkarācārya as *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*, and after a pretty long discussion on *adhyāsa* Śaṃkarācārya equates his definition of *adhyāsa* with the definition of *apramā* as proposed by Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda in the following manner : *adhyāso namā' tasmiṃs tadbuddhir ity avocāma.*[8] If this expression is interpreted literally then the whole facade of Advaitism will crumble since in this line Śaṃkara has apparently admitted *anyathākhyāti* by accepting *adhyāsa* as the cognition of something *true* on something else. Thus there is scope neither for *anirvacanīyakhyāti* nor for the falsity of the superimposed. Anticipating the misconception of a few logicians of *atasmiṃs tadbuddhiḥ* is the second and an altogother new definition of *adhyāsa*, Rāmānanda Sarasvatī in his *Ratnaprabhā* commentary clarifies that the word *tadbuddhi* should be understood as *tat-tulya-buddhi*[9]. Therefore, *adhyāsa* or illusion, according to this definition, is—cognition of something similar on something else. An illustrative definition will be— Illusion is the congition of something similar to B on something else i.e. A.

According to the Nyāya system we cognise a true silver, remaining at present in a shop, on a piece of shell. So both the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the superimposed (*āropya*) are true. But the Advaita contention is that we cognise something similar to the piece of silver, seen earlier in a shop, on a piece of shell. This similar entity is nowhere existent but it is a creation of ignorance (*ajñāna*), and thus it is false. Here lies the basic difference of these two systems but strangely enough Śaṃkara borrows this definition from the Nyāya system but intends to explain it in his own way. Verily, this is an issue for a serious speculation.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] He flourished not later than second century A.D.

[2] Under Sūtra 2.1.36, p. 503, Metropolitan ed., 1936.

[3] Uddyotakara belonged to fifth century A.D. Since Uddyotakara refers to Praśastapāda, we may place him in fourth century A.D.

[4] P. 423, Sampurnananda ed.

[5] Under Sūtra 1.1.2., p. 72, Metro. ed., 1936.

[6] *tadvati tatprakārako'nubhavo yathārthaḥ/ saiva pramety ucyate.* (*Tarkasaṃgraha*, p.14, Chowkhamba ed.)

[7] *tadvadviśeṣyakatve sati tatprakārakaṃ jñānaṃ pramety arthaḥ* (*Muktāvalī*, Kārikā 135).

[8] *Brahmasūtra, Adhyāsabhāṣya*, p. 44, NSP ed. In a bit different form the same definition is proposed by Śaṃkarācārya under Sūtra 3.3.9.

[9] *taddharmajñānāt svasmin tat-tulya-dharmān adhyasyati ity arthaḥ.*

TRUTH AND FALSITY IN NYĀYA AND ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

S. R. Saha

The words 'true'/'false' are supposed to represent predicates applicable to sentences in the indicative mood or to their meaning called propositions, or to beliefs with respect to them. In Western philosophy different theories of truth have been offered under the labels of correspondence theory, coherence theory, pragmatism and semantic theory. Of these the first and the last ones are taken to be acceptable theories in respect of the nature of truth. The other two theories are valued not so much as theories about the *nature* of truth but as theories about the *test* of truth and are regarded and often referred to as theories of knowledge or of justification by philosophers of eminence[1]. The words 'true'/'false' are both positive terms in appearance as one of them has not been formed from the other by adding to it some negative particle. Philosophers in the West, however, almost invariably have treated one as having positive meaning and the other as having its negation as its meaning. To a bearer of truth-value must belong one of these two values represented by the words 'true'/'false' and this view is known as bivalence theory of truth. Although recent developments in many-valued logic pose threat to this theory it still commands a great following.

The words that will be mostly used in idiomatic translation of 'true'/'false' in the languages of India that have mainly descended from Sanskrit are *satya / mithyā*. Both these words are positive in appearance. The things to which these words may be applied can certainly be beliefs and in an extended sense these may be applied even to the *abhilāpakavākyas*, i.e. to the sentences that express those beliefs. But these two words have been used by many philosophers to refer not simply to beliefs or sentences but also to things. More about this later. For the present, taking beliefs to be bearers of *satya / mithyā* characterisations we many turn to other pairs of words which may be substituted in their place. Unlike similar words as used in Anglo-Saxon philosophy the Sanskrit words of these other pairs are such that one is a positive term while the other one is the negative term even in appearance. Words in some such pairs are nouns and in others such words are adjectives and are used in association with noun words. Examples of the first kind are pairs like *jñana / ajñāna, tattvajñāna mithyājñāna, vidyā / avidyā*, and *pramā / apramā*. Examples of the second kind are pairs like *vyabhicārin/ avyabhicārin, vitatha / avitatha*, and *yathārtha / ayathārtha*. Allowing for the technique of forming opposite words by adding the prefix *vi* we can also have such pairs with members *saṃvādin / visaṃvādin* and *saphalapravṛttijanaka / viphalapravṛttijanaka*. Of such pairs the one consisting of *vyabhicārin*, and *avyabhicārin* come close to *satya / mithyā* and 'true' / 'false' as we ordinarily understand them.

After enumerating the four varieties of *pramā* in NS (=Nyāyasūtra) 1.1.3 Gautama proceeds to offer the definition of *pratyakṣapramā* in the next Sūtra. The word *avyabhicārin* as occurring in Gautama's *pratyakṣa-sūtra* is
? interpreted by commentators as representing truth which is a necessary condition of *pramā*-hood and is believed to be a part of the definiens of the definitions of other *pramā*-s as well even though this word is not explicitly mentioned in the following Sūtras recording their definitions. In his commentary on NS 1.1.4 Vātsyāyana explicates the meaning of the component *vyabhicarin* as *atasmin tad iti* and the compound *avyabhicārin* as *tasmin tad iti*. Udyotakara raises the question whether the adjective *avyabhicārin* should be

understood as qualifying the word representing an object or as qualifying the word representing a cognition. He rightly points out that the latter position is relevant so far as NS 1.1.4 is concerned. The fuller compound words then are *avyabhicārijñāna* and *vyabhicārijñāna*. Accepting Vātsyāyana's explication we can translate these as : That belief is *vyabhicārin* which is such that the thing appearing to have a property does not really have it. And, that belief is *avyabhicārin* which is such that the thing appearing to have a property does really have it. Following Vātsyāyana later Naiyāyikas define *pramā* as *tadvati tatprakārakajñāna/ anubhava.*[2] *apramā* is construed as *tadabhāvavati tatprakāraka-jñana/anubhava*. The word *anubhava* in place of *jñana* is necessary to exclude memory which is not regarded as a variety of *pramā* even if it is true. These definitions are otherwise similar to those of Vātsyāyana we are considering except for the fact that Gaṅgeśa uses *tadvati* / *tadabhāvavati* for Vātsyāyana's *tasmin* / *atasmin*. To an unsympathetic reader it may appear that the root *tad* in *tasmin* which occurs in *tasmin tad* and in *atasmin* which occurs in *atasmin tad* and the same word *tad* in its second occurrence in these very definitions *tasmin tad* and *atasmin tad* being the same, refer to the same object. But as nothing can be the locus of itself his definitions are not acceptable on such an interpretation. Therefore, if Vātsyāyana is not to be believed to have committed such a blunder, we shall have to somehow take the word *tad* in its two occurrences as referring to two different things, if necessary by adding some suffix. In support of such an interpretation we would like here to refer to Śaṃkara. In characterising *adhyāsa* (which is not *pramā*) Śaṃkara makes the statement *atasmin tad-buddhir iti avocāma*. Since the verb *avocāma* as used by him in this statement is in the past tense it implies the existence of another statement made by Śaṃkara earlier. I would like to refer to his general observation about illusion which, he thinks, every philosopher would endorse and this is the earlier statement which is being referred to by him. The observation is to the effect that appearance of a thing as endowed with the property of another is invariably present in all cases of illusion (*...anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatāṃ na vyabhicarati* : Adhyāsabhāṣya). Śaṃkara was a great scholar and also a creative innovator of Sanskrit language. I strongly believe that he was thoroughly acquainted with Vātsyāyana's definitions of *vyabhicārin/avyabhicārin* as *atasmin tad iti/ tasmin tad iti;* the former of these two, I believe, Śaṃkara has paraphrased in his general observation under reference. Vātsyāyana's expression *(atasmin tad),* we further guess, got stuck in his mind for its simplicity and he reproduced it and gave a paraphrasing of it.

Gaṅgeśa who was a great philosopher of the analytical style did however remove the ambiguity inherent in Vātsyāyana's definitions and clarified the meanings of *tasmin / atasmin* of Vātsyāyana as *tadvati / tadabhāvavati* in his own definitions. And after his emendation there exists no possibility of interpreting *tad* in its two occurrences in Vātsyāyana as representing the same entity and if we want to do that we shall have to add *matup* to it in its first occurrence as Gaṇgeśa has done. We would like to make another comment here in support of our hypothesis that Gaṅgeśa's *tadvati / tadabhāvavati* are in clarification of Vātsyāyana's *tasmin / atasmin*. Gaṇgeśa is in fact endorsing the definition of *pramā* as *avyabhicaritatva* of Gautama and Vātsyāyana. Previous to offering this definition of *pramā* Gaṅgeśa has rejected, for some reason or other, the claims of (1) *yathārthānubhavatvam*, (2) *guṇajanyānubhavatvam*, (3) *saṃvādyānubhavatvam*, (4) *abādhitānubhavatvam*, (5) *samarthapravṛttijanakānubhavatvam*, and (6) *tattvānubhavatvam* as definitions of *pramā*. I have shown elsewhere that these may be useful as tests for truth or as representing what some philosophers call theories of knowledge or of justification.[3] But as candidates for a theory about the nature of truth these fail although Gaṅgeśa's own definition does not so fail. I would like to note here that Gaṅgeśa has not criticised the claim of *avyabhicāritatva* as explicating the concept of truth contained in that of *pramā*. Hence, this may as well be claimed that he accepted the definition of the masters as a true and faithful disciple. In fact we have argued that their definition was found acceptable also to Śaṃkara. We would, however, venture a new claim and say that Vātsyāyana's definition certainly looks similar to Tarski's definition of truth in that this is applicable not to any restricted candidate but to all possible sentences/beliefs. Thus given Gaṅgeśa's *tadvati tatprakāraka* interpretation which depicts a structural pattern Vātsyāyana's definition will be applicable to 'Grass is green'/'Snow is white'/'This is silver'/'This is a snake'/ 'This is a pot' and the like. The formulation of such a general definition was felt by our philosophers also, though it is undeniable that Tarski's definition is applicable to quantified propositions of all types.[4] It is yet to be explored whether the definition of *pramā* can be shown to be similarly applicable.

The Naiyāyikas presuppose that whatever figures as a content of a belief, no matter whether that is true or false, is something existing at some place or other and at some time or other. In Sanskrit, *jñeyam sat* and not simply, *prameyam sat*. But others differ from them. Thus, the Vijñānavādins would hold that a belief in which something appears to be an external thing is a belief about the naught or the unreal and their theory is known as *asatkhyātivāda*[5] in /? contrast to the Nyāya theory which may be treated as a version of the thesis of *satkhyāti*. In the writings of Śaṃkara and his followers we come across a third view which is often referred to as the theory of *anirvacanīyakhyāti*, because the illusory content is here viewed as neither real nor unreal. It is not real as it gets sublated later and it is not unreal as it is given as something real in experience. The Advaitins here offer a theory according to which the real *(satya)*, negatively speaking, is unsublated *(abādhita)* and that which is given in illusory experience is an appearance *(mithyā)* even though it gets sublated. Śaṃkara has very expressively put the thesis as *brahma satyaṃ jaganmithyā*. But as these concepts of *satya* and *mithyā* are more close to the concepts of reality and appearance than to those of truth and falsity I have not taken them up for detailed examination, thinking that this may constitute a digression.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] See pp. 44-47 *Knowledge* by Keith Lehrer, published by Clarendon Press, 1974.
See also p. 173 of Bertrand Russell's *Human knowledge : Its Scope and Limits*, George Allen and Unwin 1948.

[2] See p. 436 of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (=*TCM*) : *Pratyakṣa-Khaṇḍa* (Tirupati Edition).
See also Viśvanātha's *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Kārikā 135 and his commentary on it.

[3] See :
- (i) pp. 419-20 of *TCM-Pratyakṣa*
- (ii) pp. 210-13 of my *Meaning, Truth and Predication*, K. P. Bagchi & Co., Calcutta, 1991.
- (iii) pp. 40-42 of J. N. Mohanty's *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth*, Visva-Bharati, 1966.

[4] See Alfred Tarski's "The Semantic Conception of Truth" in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, Appleton Century Crofts, New York, 1949.

[5] See p. 22 of Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī* in *Brahmasūtra-Śaṃkara-Bhāṣya* with *Bhāmatī* and other commentaries, Nirṇayasāgar Press, Bombay, 1938.

TRUTH AND FALSITY : IN ŚAṀKARA'S ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

D. Ghosh

From the literary dawn on the soil of India— the land of the Vedas, the Vedic-seers have been searching for Truth— Is there any truth? If there is any truth— what is that truth? What is the nature of Truth? Is Truth one or many? The rhymes of the Ṛgvedic hymns like :

(i) *indraṃ mitraṃ varuṇam agnim āhur atho divyaḥ sa suparṇo garutvān/*
ekaṃ sad viprā bahudhā vadanty agniṃ yamaṃ mātariśvānam āhuḥ// (1.164.46)

(ii) *eka evāgnir bahudhā samiddha ekaḥ sūryo viśvam anu prabhūtaḥ/*
ekaivoṣāḥ sarvam idaṃ vibhāti ekaṃ vā idaṃ vi babhūva sarvam// (8.58.2)

(iii) *suparṇaṃ viprāḥ kavayo vacovir ekaṃ santaṃ bahudhā kalpayanti/* (10.114.5), etc.

are the echoes of their search for Truth even in the early Vedic period.

If this search for Truth by our ancient Vedic forefathers is analysed by the subsequent Indian philosophers, specifically by the Śāṃkara Monists, then certainly the analysis pinpoints towards Oneness (*ekam*) of Truth (*sat*), Oneness of Truth amidst Multiplicity of Falsity. If the Truth is one (*ekaḥ*, *ekam* in the Ṛgveda), certainly the Falsity is Multiple (*bahudhā*). The expression may be like this : Truth is One, One is Truth and Falsity is Multiple, Multiple is Falsity : just as, Truth is Beauty, Beauty is Truth.

This Ṛgvedic search for One Truth is effluent althrough the following other Vedic Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and finally the search reaches the Vedic literature called the Upaniṣads known as Vedānta (*veda+anta*), the concluding portion of the Vedas, where the search for Truth culminates into the stop of all journeys— beyond which there is nothing for our going further— *yasmāt paraṃ nāparam asti kiñcit* (Upaniṣad)— as if this is Kanyākumārī, the extreme south-end of India, or this search for Truth of ancient Vedic India is like a stream receiving many a mountain-cascade being fed by many a rivulet, last of all, reaches the goal— the ocean of the Vedānta Upaniṣads— the vast ocean of one Truth.

Seeking and trying to discover that One Truth and simultaneously the Multiple Falsity in contrast is the chief element of the philosophical poetry of the Upaniṣads and these elements of 'the philosophical poetry came from a more distant fountain', remarks Prof Maxmüller in his *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature.*

But this is to be noted here that in the Vedānta-Upaniṣads both the words *sat* and *satya* stand for the English word 'Truth' having the identical etymological meaning 'Being' or 'Existence'. Taking together the two *dhātupāṭhas* √*as bhuvi* and *bhū sattāyām* we determine that the *dhātu* or i.e. root √*as* (*adādi-gaṇīya*) means 'Being' or Existence (*sattā*)— (cf. Greek *ēon* from *esōn*, that which 'is' or 'exists') which, with the present participle suffix *śatṛ* (i.e. *at*) forms primarily the word *sat*, then further with the suffixes *tā*, *ya*, and *tva* the words *sattā*, *satya* and *sattva* are formed respectively from— *sat* bearing the common shade of connotative meaning Being/Existence based on the common root √*as* (to be/to exist) added with the common present participle suffix *śatṛ*.

Now with the principle *saṃkoche mānābhāvāt* we should not unnecessarily shrink the meaning 'existence' of the word *sat* > *sattā*, *satya* and *sattva*, and rather we should extend the meaning to the largest possible extent, i.e. that which existed in the past, exists in the present and will exist in the future,— that which never lacks in existence (cf. *nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ,* Śrīmad Gītā), that which was, is and will be, that which due to its Ever-Existingness or Ever-Beingness is *trikālābādhya*— never contradicted or undone by any time past, present, and future, i.e. never proves its non-existence in the three fragmentary time factors— past, present, future. All this is tantamount to the Eternity (*nityatva*) of that (*tat*) which is beginningless (*anādi*) and endless (*ananta*) as well. That (*tat*) existing everywhere is also unbounded by space (*deśāparicchinna*) as has been analysed as unbounded by time (*kālāparicchinna*). Thus That (*tat*) becomes both eternal and ubiquitous. That (*tat*) is Brahman or Ātman, as declared by the Vedānta seers as *tat sat brahma, ayam ātmā brahma*, etc.

Thus the Śaṃkarite Monist-interpreters interpret the words *sat* and *satya* often used in the Upaniṣads as Truth Brahman remaining uncontradicted (*abādhita*) unchanged (*avikṛta*) amidst all the changes (*vikāra*) of the worldly phenomenon (*jagat-prapañca*). If the unchanged Matter called Brahman be Truth and Real, in contrast, the everchanging worldy phenomenon is False and Unreal— *brahma satyaṃ jaganmithyā.* The Ultimate Truth Brahman is an Unchanged Reality (*avikārivastu*)— only One Reality without any second— *sad eva, somyedam agra āsīt, ekam evādvitīyam* (Chāndogya Upaniṣad). Śaṃkara the great exponent in Advaita i.e. Monistic Vedānta Philosophy interprets the word *sat (sat eva = sadeva)* taking it as the synonym for Satya Brahman thus in his Upaniṣad Bhāṣya— *sad eva sad iti astitāmātraṃ vastu sūkṣmaṃ nirviśeṣaṃ sarvagatam. sat brahma* is the only Being or Existence (*astitāmātra*), Matter (*vastu*), Subtle (*sūkṣma*) i.e unlike the gross (*sthūla*) worldy phenomenon, Indeterminate (*nirviśeṣa*) i.e. not determinable as 'this' or 'that' by any name and form (*nāmarūpa*) and ubiquitous (*sarvagata*). To establish that Truth Brahman is the only One Matter without any second, which is changeless real and all-pervading, Śaṃkarite Monists come down on the platform of the empirical world plucking examples therefrom : If we analyse the different worldly objects like *ghaṭa* (jar), *paṭa* (cloth), *maṭha* (temple), etc. we see everywhere the common factor *asti* like *ghaṭaḥ asti* (jar is/exists), *paṭaḥ asti* (cloth is/exists) *maṭhaḥ asti* (temple is/exists). Amidst the varying objects jar, cloth, temple, etc what remains as the only common unchanged all-object pervading is *asti* i.e. *sat* (formed with the root √*as* of *asti*) and *sat* is identical with Brahman formed with the root √*bṛh* (to be large and thus largest)—Brahman which never factually and actually undergoes any change, any distortion, any transformation, any transmutation. In contrast, all other varying worldly objects jar, cloth, etc are only so-called (*vācārambhaṇa*), and only exist in names (*nāmadheyam*)—vide the *śruti*-statement : *vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam* (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.1.4.). These varying worldly objects are non-ultimate Realities—ever-changing and ever-mutually contradicted and therefore are Unreal False (*mithyā*).

The Śaṃkara Advaitins go further unveiling the nature of Falsity of the worldly objects and thus gradually the whole worldly phenomenon thus : that what is Unreal and False is superimposed (*adhyasta*) and that what is Real and Truth is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the superimposed (also known as *āropita*). Reversely, the Real Truth Brahman the substratum of the worldy phenomenon superimposed thereupon only appears as the latter unreally and falsely (*atattvatā*). This is known in Advaita Vedānta as the theory of Vivarta i.e. the theory of appearance—*atattvatonyathā prathā vivarta ity udāhṛtaḥ.* From the empirical standpoint the Śaṃkara-Advaitins take the stock examples of Truth and Falsity from the illusory world thus : the illusory objects snake (*sarpa*) silver (*rajata*) are unreal false— as they are superimposed on the empirically true real objects rope (*rajju*), conchshell (*śukti*)—which are false because are contradicted or undone (*bādhita*) by the knowledge of the substratum rope, conchshell which are real and true, of-course, empirically,— in-as-much as these are also ultimately unreal and untrue or False being ultimately contradicted by the supreme knowledge of Transcendental Truth Brahman.

In all the cases of *adhyāsa* as mentioned above—be those illusory like conchshell-silver, and empirical like *Jagat*-Brahman—the real true substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna or āśraya*) of the *adhyāsa* or superimposition is not least affected by any characteristics—good or bad—of the unreal false superimposed : cf. *yatra yadadhyāsaḥ, tat-kṛtena doṣeṇa guṇena vā aṇumātreṇāpi sa no sambadhyate/* (Adhyāsa Bhāṣya by Śaṃkara). This is then characteristic of the Vivarta doctrine of Śaṃkara Advaitins where the nature of Truth and Falsity have been more unfolded both from Illusory-Empirical and Empirical-Transcendental stand-points.

Therefore the Śaṃkara-Monists are to admit the three strata of Truth, i.e. *sattā, satya* and *sattva*— (1) Brahman, the Transcendental, (2) worldly phenomenon, the Empirical, (3) Objects like snake, rope, conchshell, silver, etc., the Illusory.

The first one is *pāramārthika sattā* according to the Śaṃkarites— *abādhitatve sati prakāśamānatvam* (Vivaraṇa, p. 165)— existing never to be contradicted. This Transcendental stratum belongs only to Brahman. This is supra-Truth to which all the worldly objects jar, pot, etc. (*vyavahārika vastu*) of the only empirical stratum are false, because as soon as the substratum Brahman, the *pāramārthika sattā* or Transcendental stratum dawns as knowledge— all the empirical worldy objects jar, pot, cloth, are contradicted— are undone— do disappear as jar, pot, cloth, etc.

The second intermidiary stratum of truth is *vyavahārika sattā—vyavahārakāla-abādhya*—not contradicted undone, i.e. falsified so long as *vyavahārakāla* exists until the knowledge of Transcendental stratum of Truth dawns. This second Empirical stratum is the second grade of Truth, not like never-contradictable (*trikālābādhya*) Transcendental truth, the first grade of Truth. This empirical stratum is Truth in relation to the illusory stratum of all the illusory objects of the world.

The third and the last stratum is *prātibhāsika sattā—vyavahārakālabādhya*, but *pratibhāsakāla-abādhya*—undone in the Empirical stratum, but not undone in the Illusory stratum. The examples are snake-rope, conchshell, silver, etc.

Of these three strata or gradations of Truth the first one i.e. the Transcendental Brahman Truth is the only Truth, the ultimate Reality. This is unconditional Truth (*nirupādhika satya*), one Indivisible Truth (*eka akhaṇḍa satya*), but the other two are conditional Truths (*sopādhika satya*), should be deemed as pseudo-Truths appearing-as-Truths, or multiple fragmented Truths— to be falsified being all ultimately contradicted by the Ultimate Transcendental Brahman knowledge.

But the extreme monists (*Uttama Vedāntins*) known as *Ekajīvavādin,* also as *Dṛṣtiṣṛṣṭivādinṣ* admit only two extreme strata—Transcendental (*pāramārthika sattā*) and Illusory (*prātibhāsika sattā*), denying the intermidiary stratum of worldly phenomenon which they consider to be included in the an other extreme stratum—the Illusory stratum *prātibhāsika sattā*. Śaṃkara analyses the Taittirīya *śruti* text—*satyaṃ ca anṛtaṃ ca satyam abhavat* (2.6.4) in the perspective of this three-tier *satya* or *sattā* taking the first *satya* and second *satya* as Empirical and Transcendental respectively. The word *anṛta* between the two stands for *prātibhāsika sattā.* Śaṃkara's commentary on the *śruti* text :

> *satyaṃ ca vyavahāraviṣayam na paramārtha-satyam... āpekṣikaṃ satyaṃ, mṛgatṛṣṇikādyanṛtāpekṣayā udakādi satyam ucyate anṛtaṃ ca tadviparītaṃ satyam abhavat-satyaṃ paramārthasatyaṃ kiṃ punaṣ tat? brahma/*

Ref. also to the Brahmasūtra (1.3.8) *bhūmā samprasādād adhyupadeśāt* and Śaṃkara's commentary thereupon—*eṣa tu vā ativadati—yaḥ satyena ativadati tatra satyam iti paraṃ brahmocyate paramārtharūpatvāt/.* Vācaspati Miśra in his subcommentary Bhāmatī here explains *satya* as Absolute Truth (*pāramārthika satya*) and Empirical Truth (*vyavahārika satya*) :

> *tatra satyaśabdaḥ paramārthe nirūḍhavṛttiḥ/ paramārthaś ca paramātmaiva....tato'nyad vikārajātam anṛtaṃ kayācid vyapekṣayā kathaṃ cit satyam/ .*

The word *kathaṃcit satyam* refers to the temporary truth of the empirical existence of the worldly phenomenon—temporary because of falsity to the Transcendental or Absolute Existence and Truth to the Illusory Existence.

But the concept of Falsity (*mithyā*) in general sense is to be understood in the technical sense in Śaṃkara's Advaita Vedānta which posseses an intermediary position between *sat* i.e. Ever Existing Absolute Truth Brahman (extremely positive) and *asat* never-existing objects like sky-flower, horse-egg, etc. (extremely negative). Here *sat* and *asat* are not the two mutually exclusive contradictory terms like white-nonwhite—instead are the two contrary terms like red and white. Such technical *mithyātva* of the Śaṃkara Monists is tantamount to the novel doctrine of *anirvacanīyatva*—Falsity is co-termed as *anirvacanīya* being determinable neither as *sat* nor as *asat—sadasadbhyām anirvacanīyatvaṃ mithyātvam.* The wordly phenomenon belonging to the Empirical Existence is *anirvacanīya mithyā*, because this is not *asat* like sky-flower etc. due to its appearing before (*purataḥ pratīyamānatvāt*), nor *sat* due to being contradicted afterwards by the supreme knowledge of Absolute Brahman (*paścāt brahmajñānabādhyatvāt*). The illusory objects like conchshell-silver (*śukti-rajata*) etc. belonging to the Illusory Existence are also likewise *anirvacanīyā mithyā* because these are not *asat* like sky-flower etc. due to their appearing before as silver etc. nor *sat* due to being contradicted afterwards by the knowldege of the substratums like conchshell (*śukti*) etc. belonging to the Empirical Existence (*vyavahārika sattā*). The Nescience (*ajñāna*) being the cause of both *vyavahārika sattā* and Illusory *sattā* must be of the same nature, i.e. Inderminable False—the Nescience which with its veiling power (*āvaraṇa śakti*) and the projecting power (*vikṣepa śakti*) veils (i) the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) Transcendental Absolute Truth Brahman projecting empirical world thereupon like jar, cloth, temple, etc. in the case of Empirical Existence, and also veils (2) substratum worldly objects of Empirical Existence like conchshell, rope, etc. (and also jar, cloth, temple, etc.) projecting illusory world thereupon like silver, snake, etc. in the case of Illusory Existence.

The concept of Falsity in Advaita Vedānta is also to be made clear through the doctrine of *tadananyatva* which is based on the *śruti* texts of Chāndogya Upaniṣad *vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro*...and the following Brahmasūtra (2.1.14) *tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ*. The gist of the doctrine is like this : the effect (*kārya*) is *tad-ananya—tad* means cause—i.e. constituent cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*), and the effect is not other than its *upādāna kāraṇa*. This *tadananyatva* is nothing but the Indeterminable falsity of the effect according to the Śaṃkarites.

According to the Śāṃkara Monists, the constituent cause, being the only matter (*vastu*) is Truth. This is one. Its otherwise appearing as effect through various names and forms (*nāma-rūpa*) are False. This is Multiple. An example from empirical world is a lump of clay. This is the only matter which is truth (of course, empirically)—*mṛttikā ity eva satyam* (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.1.4). But its effect pitcher, pot, etc. (*ghaṭaśarāvādi*) made of clay are not other than its constituent cause clay. These take only various names and forms as *ghaṭa, śarāva*, etc. which are unreal false in contrast with their only one constituent cause clay. Or reversely it is the original matter and the cause clay which undergoes multiple names and forms such as this is jar, that is pot, etc. and become known as so-called effect of the clay—and therefore belong to the category of Falsity in the Monistic conception. Likewise, the wordly phenomenon as effect with various multiple objects like *ghaṭa, paṭa*, etc. is only the manifestation through various multiple names and forms, and as effect it is not different (*ananya*) from its constituent cause (*tad*) Brahman, the one Transcendental Absolute Cause. Therefore, the effect world with various objects of various names and forms is Unreal and False, whereas its the only constituent cause Brahman having no names no forms is the only and one Truth—*brahma satyaṃ jagan mithyā*. However, Saṃkara's inheritors specifically Madhusudan Sarasvatī the author of Advaita Siddhi have elaborately expounded the nature of Falsity in Advaita Vedānta through different doctrinal approaches.

What about *jīva* the Individual Self?—True or False, Śaṃkara's inheritors differ. Vivaranites, the advocates of Prativimba theory, opine that *jīva* being the reflection (*prativimba*) of *vimbasvarūpa brahma* is identical with Truth Brahman. But according to the doctrine of Sureśvarācārya, the advocates of the *ābhāsa doctrine, jīva*, being *ābhāsa of* Brahman and *ābhāsa* i.e. reflection being false, is false—not Truth as Brahman.

In the Upaniṣadic texts are strewn the words *sat* and *satya* (*satsampanna, sanmūla*, etc. and *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ* *brahma*, etc.) which stands for Brahman—the only Truth. But we must not contemplate that Truth i.e. *Satya* is the attribute (*guṇa*) of Brahman. (Truth is the attribute of Brahman in other Non-Monist Vedānta schools). Truth is intrinsic nature (*svarūpa*) of Brahman like *jñāna, ananta.* Nor *satya jñāna* etc. are the outer adjuncts (*upādhi*) to adjunctless (*nirupādhika*) Brahman. To determinate Brahman as Truth our approach should be negative (*neti neti*)—*Sad* Brahman is *asadvyāvṛtta.* We should pass on through Falsity of the phenomenon as *neti neti* and we discover at last at the end of the negation of all Falsity, I, the Individual self, am the Truth Brahman, through direct perceptual knowledge (*aparokṣānubhūti*). This *Ātmānubhāva,* the supreme self-knowledge is *mokṣa*—Emancipation, the summum bonum of an Individual Self.

REALITY, TRUTH AND FALSITY IN MĀDHVA PHILOSOPHY

S. C. Goswami

Madhvācārya's ontology turns upon the two principal ideas of being i.e. reality and independence. The former presents the idea of reality expressed in space-time relations pertaining to the world of matter and souls. The latter is the higher aspect of reality which is the characteristic of the Deity alone. Reality in ordinary sense of the term may consist of one or more of the three aspects of existence, consciousness and activity (cf. *svarūpa-pramiti-pravṛtti-lakṣaṇaṃ sattātraividhyam*— Jayatīrtha). The criterion of reality according to Mādhva is that it should be unsuperimposed and given as an object of valid knowledge (cf. *anāropitaṃ pramitiviṣayaḥ*—Vyāsatīrtha). The tortoise's hair (*kūrmaroma*) though unsuperimposed is not however a reality, as it is not presented as existing at some time or place to anybody's valid knowledge.

Though existence in space and time is reality which is possessed by the world of matter and souls, there must be something more than mere existence having metaphysical independance or substantiality in its own right. The dependant reals embody the justification and proof of the independent. Thus Madhva classifies *tattva* or reality into two groups— *svatantra* and *paratantra*. The supremacy of God as the immanent-cum-transcendent Principle of the universe introduces order and unity in the cosmos in spite of its internal differences and ramifications. The multiverse of reals becomes a universe in that it owes allegiance to a single source and derives its power, beauty, goodness, etc. from that One. Brahman or God as the only Independant

Real is the highest ontological principle of Madhva's philosophy. Dependent reality (*parādhīnaprameyam*) consists of *cetana* and *acetana*. The subdivisions of the *cetanavarga* are to some extent theological in character. Śrī or Lakṣmī is the presiding deity over the entire domain of *jaḍa-prakṛti* and is designated as *cetana-prakṛti.* She has cosmic sway over the destinies of the souls and the modifications of matter. Rest of this *cetanavarga* is subject to the bondage of *prakṛti* and is further subdivided into released and unreleased.

The *acetana*-section falls into two categories of positive and negative. Positive reals are either eternal or non-eternal. Space, time, the Vedas, the subtle aspects of the elements, senses, *ahaṃkārika prāṇa, mahat, ahaṃkāra* and the qualities of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* are deemed to be eternal. The grosser developments of these are non-eternal. Where the substances show both aspects they are regarded as *nityānitya.* For example, time is viewed as an eternal process and as a succession of moments.

The world of attributes comprising qualities, actions, *sattā, śakti, sādṛśya,* etc. are regarded by Madhva as constituting the very essence of the substances themselves. But when they are conceptually distinguished from their substances they can certainly be enumerated, classified and studied separately. The concept of *viśeṣa* is a contribution of new idea in Mādhva philosophy. Madhva accepts a relation of colourful identity (*saviśeṣābheda*) in respect of essential attributes and difference-cum-identity in the case of transient attributes (cf. *khaṇḍite bheda aikyañ ca yāvadvastu na bhedavat*— Tattvaviveka). In sentient beings those *viśeṣas* are identical with their substrata. In regard to the insentients attributes which are co-eval (*yāvaddravyabhāvin*) are identical with the substances while the impermanent attributes are different-cum-identical with their substrata. In other words, some *viśeṣas* are produced as effects and some others last as long as the thing itself lasts. According to Madhva's view, it is impossible to establish any adequate theory of the relation between substance and attributes without invoking the aid of *viśeṣas*. The function of *viśeṣas* according to his system of philosophy is not merely to distinguish but to unify the part and the whole, and to render a distinction of reference into substance and attribute within inseparable wholes.

Madhva introduces *sadasatkāryavāda*, a combination of *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṃkhyas and *asatkāryavāda* of the Naiyāyikas. According to him change is not merely something new appearing, but it presupposes a substratum that changes in form or state. Causation would be impossible and meaningless without the assumption of continuity of the cause in and through the changes it has undergone. Madhva, therefore, holds that the effect is partially non-existent in its definite form and state and partially existent in the form of the cause.

In Mādhva epistemology the term *pramāṇa* means either knowledge *(kevalapramāṇa)* or the instrument of knowledge (*anupramāṇa/pramākaraṇa*). *Kevalapramāṇa* is defined as that knowledge which does not go beyond the object *(yathārthajñāna)*. *Anupramāṇa* is the instrument that enables us to have valid knowledge *(yathārthajñanasādhana)*. *Kevalapramāṇa* or valid knowledge is divided into four types in the descending order of merit as *īśvarajñāna*, *lakṣmījñāna*, *yogijñāna* and *ayogijñāna* on the basis of intrinsic differences in quality, luminosity and range. The first two are *swarūpajñāna* or knowledge in essence by nature, while the other two include *vṛttijñāna* or sensory knowledge also. Again the *svarūpajñāna* of Īśwara and Lakṣmī differs from the *svarūpajñāna* of all other souls in that the latter is limited by nescience. The *svarūpajñāna* of Īśvara and Lakṣmī is all-pervasive *vibhu* and not limited as that of other souls whose knowledge is obtained through the effect of thought.

The *svarūpajñāna* of the soul is the efficient cause that directs its *manovṛttijñāna* or the knowledge which is in the form of the modifications of the mind (*manas*). *Yogijñāna* is that knowledge which is obtained by *yogins* through their Yogic power obtained by constant meditation on Īśwara. Knowledge of *ayogins* is full of various sorts of inadequacies. It is evident therefore that *kevalapramāṇa* has two aspects : knowledge consisting of essence of selfhood and that arising from mental processes. These are further graded in regard to validity into *uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama*.

Madhva classifies all knowledge into three groups : valid knowledge, error and doubt. He brings dream-knowledge and recollection under valid cognition. To him objects cognised through them are real. Recollection is originated by the mind and not by the impressions in the mind as the Nyāya-school holds. Madhva accepts that the non-existent can be cognised and states that the apprehension of the non-existent as existent and the existent as non-existent is error. Absolute non-existence is that non-existence which is present in all the three aspects of time.

Madhva propounds *abhinavānyathākhyāti* i.e. novel theory of *anyathākhyāti* in which he combines the common elements of the two popular theories of illusion known as *asatkhyāti* and *anyathākhyāti*. The most important aspect of the theory consists in the fact that the non-existent is presented in erroneous knowledge. This is itself derived from the nature of the sublating cognition i.e. *bādhakajñāna* (cf. *asad eva rajataṃ pratyabhāt*) and therefore cannot be challenged.

Jayatīrtha explains the definition of valid knowledge (*yathāvasthitajñeyaviṣayīkāritvam*) as the knowledge of a thing as it actually becomes with reference to a particular space-time setting (*yathāvasthitam eva jñeyaṃ viṣayīkaroti*, *nānyathā*). In other words, according to him *pramāṇa* or valid knowledge refers to the actual existence of an object with reference to a spatio-temporal setting in the manner perceived with reference to that setting (*yad yaddeśa-kālayoḥ yathāpratītaṃ tasya taddeśakālayoḥ tathātvam*).

Madhva accepts three instruments of valid knowledge. They are perception, inference and verbal testimony. Analogy is shown as an instance of one or the other of the three *pramāṇas* mentioned earlier. There is nothing distinctive about it.

Percepton is defined as the contact of the defectless sense-organ with a defectless object. The sense-organs of perception are of two kinds— the witness consciousness (*sākṣin*) and the physical sense-organs. The witness consciousness cognises the pure existence of the Ātman, its attributes and its nescience, mind and modifications— pleasure and pain, time, space, etc. The physical sense-organs are six. The mind cognises all objects through the instrumentality of the outer senses. Its independent function occurs in reflection only.

In Mādhva epistemology, every perception is determinate by nature. Because, according to Mādhva, perception is the concrete apprehension of an object with all its determinations. Variety in sense-relation is not acknowledgd. There is only one type of sense-relation in perception and that relation is no other than *saṃyoga* (conjunction). There is nothing to prevent the sense-organ from cognising the object as well as its attributes at the first contact. In the perception of a substance with its attributes the cognition is only one and there is no need to postulate one sense-relation with regard to the substance and the other with regard to its attributes.

Anumāna or inference is defined as defectless probans and it results from the cognition of pervasion and of the presence of the probans in place, time, etc. appropriate to the mode of pervasion. *Vyapti* or pervasion means the relation between the probandum and the probans. The probandum characterised by a particular space and time cannot be known without the probans characterised by a particular space and time. The presence of the probans and the probandum in the same locus is not to be literally understood. For example, *'there is the flight of a bird in the sky, because there is its shadow below.'* Here, as the probandum *'the flight of the bird'* is in the sky and the probans *'shadow'* down on the earth, they are not in the same locus. Likewise *pakṣadharmatā,* according to Jayatīrtha is the presence of the probans in an appropriate place which is sometimes the subject and at other times other than the subject. Jayatīrtha rejects the necessity of accepting negative pervasion *(vyatirekī vyāpti)* like the Naiyāyikas and admits only one type of pervasion. *Tarka* or hypothetical argument is valid and according to Jayatīrtha it is treated as a type of inference in Madhva's epistemology. As regards inference for others Madhva finds no meaning in specifying the number of members that should form a syllogism. The syllogism is used to convince others and make them understand the argument of the speaker. If the inference is understood by the mere statement of the probans other members become unnecessary for mentioning in that case.

According to Madhva, defectless statement constitutes verbal testimony. Defects are many (generally seven) like *abodhakatva* (unintelligibility), *nirabhidheyatva* (use of meaningless words), etc. Madhva advocates the reasonableness of *anvitābhidhānavāda.* According to them a word conveys not only its own sense but also its syntactical relation with the objects denoted by other words through a single potency. Veda, according to him is an illustration of verbal testimony not having human authorship. *Varṇas* or letters are admitted to be eternal and pervasive.

In epistemology attached to different systems of Indian philosophy the problem of validity relating to cognition is viewed from two angles— the origination of validity *(prāmāṇyasya utpattiḥ)* and ascertainment of validity *(prāmāṇyasya jñaptiḥ)* D. M. Dutta remarks : "Indian philosophers did not confuse mere psychological belief with logical certainty."

Validity and invalidity are attributes that are present in knowledge and its instruments. The validity of knowledge which does not owe its origin to any factor other than those which are responsible for the origination of the knowledge is said to be intrinsic with reference to origin (*utpattau svatastva*). Again, the validity which is cognised without the aid of any external factor other than those which made us cognise the knowledge is said to be intrinsic with reference to ascertainment (*jñaptau svatastva*). The validity which owes its origin to factors other than those that gave rise to the knowledge is said to be extrinsic with reference to origin (*utpattau paratastva*). And the validity which we cognise through an instrument other than the one through which we cognise the knowledge is said to be extrinsic with reference to ascertainment (*jñaptau paratastva*).

According to Madhva, validity is intrinsic with reference to origin and ascertainment. The validity which is present in cognition is originated as well as ascertained by the instrument which gives rise to and ascertains the cognition. Knowledge and its validity are cognised by the 'witness consciousness' *(sākṣin)*. As for invalidity it is originated by the defects associated with the instruments of knowledge. The *sākṣin* cognises the cognition-aspect of invalid cognition and the invalidity in it is inferred. The invalidity in the instruments *(karaṇas)* of knowledge is originated by external defects and hence it is extrinsic. The cognition of the instruments of knowledge and the potency in them which is responsible for valid knowledge *(karaṇagata prāmāṇya)* are ascertained through different factors. The instruments of cognition such as the outer sense-organs are cognised through inference with the help of a probans like colour, taste and sound. The mind *(manas)* is cognised by the *sākṣin.* Instruments like the probans and words are cognised through sense-organs like sight and hearing. The potency which is responsible for valid knowledge is inferred through tests of workability etc. Hence the potency in the instruments is said to be extrinsic with reference to ascertainment.

Madhva like other Vedāntins belonging to different schools accepts the cognitive faculty of the soul known as *sākṣin.* The existence of *sākṣin* is supported by the scriptures like Taittirīya Upaniṣad (3.5). There it is said that liberated souls who are free from the trammels of the physical sense-organs enjoy still the objects according to their will. This enjoyment becomes possible only through *sākṣin* and not through the *manas* since the latter is destroyed at the moment of liberation. It is with this body as sense-organ that the liberated souls experience and enjoy the pleasures in liberation *(mokṣa).* This *sākṣin* has not only the power to cognise objects other than itself but also the power to cognise itself. It is not a sense organ like the *manas* which is different from the soul. It is this *sākṣin* which cognises the knowledge as well as its validity originated by the *pramāṇa*s. The reflective cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) necessary for cognising knowledge and its validity is done by this *sākṣin* and not by the *manas.*

According to Madhva philosophy, without the aid of *sākṣin* we shall not be able to cognise time, space, knowledge of the self, the validity of cognition, etc. Inference can prove only the existence of time but cannot help us to cognise it. After a pleasant sleep when we recollect the experience in the form 'I slept pleasantly' it is the *sākṣin* that cognises it. Because, all the senses including the *manas* were inactive in sleep. It is not due to inference, because the subject-term 'I' or 'Time' is not cognised. The *sākṣins* are many in number. Each individual possesses separate *sākṣin*. Otherwise the differences in individual experiences cannot be accounted for. It is the *sākṣin* that illumines all the experiences of the individual self.

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NYĀYA VIEW OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

M. K. Gangopadhyay

Validity of pramāṇa

Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtra, does not offer any general definition of either *pramāṇa* or *pramā*, though he speaks of four kinds of *pramāṇas*, and defines and discusses the four types of *pramā*. In some of the statements of Vātsyāyana, however, we find some hint as to what is to be regarded as validity of knowledge.

Before entering into the actual explanation of the Sūtras, Vātsyāyana adds an introduction of his own in which he begins with the very defence of *pramāṇa*, establishing the fact that it is possible to ascertain the validity of a piece of cognition. According to him, it can be done by inference and the inference specifically is : *pramāṇam arthavat pravṛttisāmarthyāt*. The term standing here for the inferable property *(sādhya)*, namely, *arthavat*, is significant.

Vācaspati Miśra has brought out its significance. He says that the suffix *matup* in the term is in the special sense of *nityayoga*. But the question is how are we to dissolve the compound in the expression *nityayoga* ? First, it may be taken as a *Tatpuruṣa* compound with the sixth case-ending, *nityayor yogaḥ*, i.e. a relation between two eternal things. But this meaning is not acceptable in the present context. In some rare case a *pramāṇa* and its object may both be eternal, but generally the case is just the opposite.

Secondly, the compound may be regarded as a *Karmadhāraya, nityo yogaḥ,* i.e. an eternal relation. According to Nyāya, such a relation would be none other than the relation of inherence *(samavāya)*. But this meaning also cannot be accepted. The relation of inherence is possible only in certain specific cases and a *pramāṇa* and its object are not mutually related through inherence. Vācaspati Miśra, therefore, comments that the eternality *(nityatā)* we are to understand non-deviation *(avyabhicāritā)*. *Pramāṇa* is said to be *arthavat* because of the fact that it is non-deviating in respect of its object.

It is further pointed out that even then there may be an objection. This meaning also is not really applicable in the present case. The term non-deviation actually means a relation of being the pervader and the pervaded *(vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva)*. But there is no such relation between *pramāṇa* and a *prameya* or vice versa. Vācaspati Miśra, therefore, specifies the exact meaning of non-deviation here in the following terms : an obejct as proved to be of a specific nature by a *pramāṇa* is never found to be otherwise even in a different time, place and condition, and this non-contradiction *(avisaṃvāda)* between the object and its presentation by a *pramāṇa* constitutes non-deviation. In short, a valid knowledge is capable of revealing an object as it actually is *(bhūtārtha-paricchedaka)*. Thus we get the most essential characteristic of valid knwoledge, namely, non-contradictedness.

The view of Uddyotakara

Vātsyāyana has explained that a general definition of *pramāṇa* is available from the grammatical analysis of the term itself. A *pramāṇa* is the instrument for acquiring an awareness *(upalabdhi)*. Following this line of interpretation, Uddyotakara defines *pramāṇa* as the cause of awareness *(upalabdhi-hetu)*. But the term *upalabdhi* stands for any kind of awareness irrespective of whether it is valid or false. In that case the instrument of each and every awareness would have to be considered a *pramāṇa*. But this is not an acceptable position. A doubt *(saṃśaya)* or a contradictory cognition *(viparyāsa)* also represents a kind of awareness, but the instrument producing either of them is not accepted as a *pramāṇa.*

In answer, it is pointed out that the term *arthavat* is to be added to the definition and thus, the implication would be that an instrument would be a *pramāṇa* only when it gives rise to an awareness which has invariable connection with its object. A doubt or a contradictory cognition, though a form of awareness is not invariably connected with its object. The former points to an object as sharing two opposite characteristics, e.g., a thing is presented as a post or as a human being. But an object characterised by the properties of both does not exist anywhere. Similarly, an object is presented by the latter as something which it is actually not, e.g., a piece of rope is presented as a snake. None of these two kinds of awareness can lead to any fruitful activity *(arthakriyā)*. Therefore, none has invariable connection with an object.

Doubt not a form of valid knowledge

From the above it follows that knowledge in the form of doubt is to be excluded from the category of valid knowledge by the addition of the term *arthavat* to the definition as suggested, by Uddyotakara. Though all the schools of Indian philosophy are unanimous on the point that doubt is not a form of valid knowledge, there is some difference of oppinion as to how it is to be excluded. The simplest way to do so is to start with a classification of knowledge into the two categories of *yathārtha* and *ayathārtha*, and then classify the latter further into various types, one of them being doubt. For example, as we actually find, Praśastapāda divides knowledge into two classes, *vidyā* and *avidyā* and includes doubt under the latter. But such an enumeration does not point to any ground for excluding doubt from the category of valid knowledge. If the above line of interpretation is followed an answer is possible, namely, just like illusion, doubt also is deviating in respect of its object and hence it is included in invalid knowledge. This line of thinking seems to be accepted by the Bhāṭṭas also, when they insist that a valid knowledge must reveal a real object *(tattvārtha)*.

However, some authorities exclude doubt by expressly adding a clause that valid knowledge is something other than doubt *(asandigdha)*. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, for example, subscribes to such a view. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tattvakaumudī* also explains the definition of valid knowledge in the same way. Commentators point out that though it is true that in many cases a doubt refers to an object which is contradicted *(bādhita-viṣayaka)* and as such, it may be treated as a case of error *(viparyaya)*, there may be some cases of doubt which are not so *(bhrametara)*. For example, a doubt in the form : Is or is not the tree characterised by conjunction-with-monkey *(kapi-saṃyoga)* ?

This doubt consists of two alternatives : (i) the tree is characterised by conjunction-with-monkey and (ii) the tree is not characterised by conjunction-with-monkey. One of these alternatives is true and hence, the doubt cannot be simply declared to be an error. Thus, at least partly, it may be said to point to a real object just like a piece of valid knowledge. So that even such a doubt is not included in the category of *pramā*, it is necessary to add the clause something other than doubt.

Evidence of the Nyāyasūtra

In this connection it would perhaps be interesting and relevant to note how the commentators of Gautama explain the significance of the term *avyabhicārin* in the definition of perception given by him. According to Vātsyāyana, the term is included to exclude a case of perceptual error. Thus he says :

> "During the summer the flickering rays of the sun intermingled with the heat radiating from the surface of the earth come in contact with the visual organ of a person at a distance. Due to this sense-object contact, there arises, in the rays of the sun, the awareness that it is water. Even such an awareness may be taken for a valid perceptual knowledge. Hence, (Gautama) says 'invariably connected with the object'. An erroneous perception is the perception of an object as something which it is not. A right perception is the perception of an object as it actually is."
>
> (Com. on NS 1.1.4)

According to him, the applicability of the definition to doubt is prevented by a different term, namely, of a definite character *(vyavasāyātmaka)*. Doubt is not excluded by the former term. Since Vātsyāyana says that a right perception is the perception of an object as it actually is, a doubt also may be considered non-deviating.

The idea may be explained as follows. On perceiving, for example, the common characteristics of dust and smoke in a distant object, one has the doubt, is it dust or is it smoke? If the object is really dust the awareness is non-erroneous in its first part and if the object is really smoke, the perception is non-erroneous in its second part. Since the object is either dust or smoke, the awareness may be said to be invariably related to the object or non-deviating. So it is necessary to exclude doubt by a different term.

Therefore, Vātsyāyana contends that the term *vyavasāyātmaka*, of a definite character, has been added by Gautama to exclude doubt from the category of valid perception. So he remarks :

> "On perceiving with the eyes an object at a distance, a person cannot decide whether it is smoke or dust. As such, an indecisive knowledge *(anavadhāraṇa-jñāna)* resulting from sense-object contact may be taken for perceptual knowledge. Hence, (Gautama) says 'of a definite character.' " (NS 1.1.4)

Of course, it may be pointed out that, strictly speaking, non-deviation should be considered a property of valid knowledge in general and not of perception only. It may therefore be asked what is the need for the use of the word *avyabhicārin* in the definition of perception to exclude cases of error? Perception is already admitted to be a form of *pramā* and by definition it should be non-deviating or non-illusory. Cases of error will be automatically excluded from the category of *pramā*. Moreover, even if the term be included in the definition of perception, it should also be included, on the same ground, in the definitions of all the other forms of valid knowledge like inference and others. But the fact is that Gautama has not done so.

The point does not escape the notice of Vācaspati Miśra. After some discussions he answers that actually the non-deviation of all the other forms of valid knowledge is derived from the non-deviation of perception, which ultimately lies at the root of them. All the forms of valid knowledge are indirectly dependent upon perception and if this perception is deviating they also cannot be non-deviating. Gautama uses the word *avyabhicārin* in the definition of perception only to indicate this speciality of perception. In support of his contention he also quotes the authority of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

Position of Vācaspati

While giving the definition of valid knowledge in the Tattvakaumudī, Vācaspati Miśra adds two separate terms, namely, *asandigdha* and *aviparīta* to exclude doubt and error respectively. But while explaining Gautama's definition he does not agree with Vātsyāyana that doubt and error are excluded by two separate terms, but argues that the single term *avyabhicārin* excludes not only error but also doubt. He contends that a knowledge in the form of doubt cannot actually lead to the attainment of an object as indicated *(vikalpyamāna)* by the knowledge. Since it cannot make one attain what is pointed to it cannot be considered as corresponding to reality *(saṃvādaka)* and since it is not *saṃvādaka*, it cannot also be considered *avyabhicārin*. Thus, both doubt and error are excluded by the same term.

What, then, is the significance of the term *vyavasāyātmaka* ? It is used to indicate the fact that, according to Gautama, determinate perception also is a kind of valid knowledge, though it is not accepted as valid by the Buddhists. In fact, according to Vācaspati, Gautama gives not only the definition of perception but also refers to its classification. The terms *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* respectively indicate the two forms of perception admitted by Nyāya namely, indeterminate *(nirvikalpaka)* and determinate *(savikalpaka)*. The rest of the Sūtra gives the actual definition of perception.

However, it has been pointed out that it is difficult to accept Vācaspati's interpretation. It neither agrees with the views of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara nor is it justified by anything in the Sūtra itself. As a matter of fact Vācaspati's zeal to refute the Buddhist view which does not recognise the validity of determinate perception leads him to see in the Sūtra a reference to the two forms of perception and this, as he himself mentions clearly, is in accordance with the line of interpretation suggested by his preceptor Trilocana. The famous Jaina logician Hemacandra remarks, in his Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, that Trilocana and Vācaspati have evolved a novel explanation of the Sūtra disregarding the views of the earlier commentators.

It is wellknown that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, another celebrated commentator of the Nyāyasūtra, generally notes and examines exhaustively the various views and interpretations of a term. But in the present case he also does not refer to any different interpretation and himself reiterates exactly what has been said by Vātsyāyana. Moreover, he emphatically argues that a single term cannot exclude both doubt and error, because they are different by nature *(svarūpabheda)* and they are produced by different causes *(kāraṇabheda)*. Thus doubt refers unfixedly to more than one alternative, but error refers to a single and definite alternative. Again doubt is produced by the recollection of the specific characteristics of more than one thing, but error is produced by that of a single thing only. Therefore, different terms are necessary to exclude different forms of cognition.

Doubt : deviating or non-deviating ?

The argument of those who claim that doubt cannot be excluded by the term *avyabhicārin* is generally that even in the case of doubt one of the alternatives is true and hence, doubt may be considered as non-deviating. The point may be explained further. In the case of error, one single thing is ascribed to another single thing, and when a piece of knowledge negating the wrong awareness is produced the error is removed. But in the case of doubt though two things are ascribed to a single thing the right awareness removing the doubt does not consist of an awareness negating both the things ascribed. The wrong apprehension of a snake in the rope is removed by the awareness 'this is not a snake'. But when there is a doubt in the form (about an object, standing at a distance) 'is it a tree or a man' it is removed by the awareness either 'it is not a tree' or 'it is not a man' (as the actual case may be), and not by an awareness in the form 'it is neither a tree nor a man'. This indicates that an error and a doubt are different by nature.

As against the above, it is pointed out that there can, in fact, be cases of doubt in respect of which such a contention is not true. For example, in the distant field one may be aware of something and have a doubt, is it a snake or a piece of rope? But actually arriving at the spot one may find that it is neither a snake nor a piece of rope, but is really a line showing the crack in the dried up soil. Similarly in the case of something standing in the middle of the distant field one may not decide whether it is a tree or a man, but on reaching the spot may find that it is really neither, being really an iron-pillar. In such cases a doubt is definitely deviating and can be excluded by the term *avyabhicārin.*

Moreover, doubt though consisting of two alternatives, is a single piece of knowledge and the claim that it is deviating with reference to one part and it is also non-deviating with reference to another part is not justified. In fact, such a claim would lead to the total denial of the particular form of knowledge called 'doubt' itself. For example, in the standard example of a doubt, whether the thing standing at a distance is a tree or man, one may argue that if the thing is really a man the knowledge with reference to the second part may be considered as a true ascertainment *(niścaya)* and with reference to the first part it may be considered as an error consisting of one alternative only. In other words, an attempt at defining the character of the knowledge in the case of a doubt by dividing it into separate parts would be illogical. It should rather be admitted as a distinct form of knowledge, without referring to parts, in which the mind oscillates between different alternatives. Thus Udayana, while commenting on the claim of Vācaspati, remarks that the character of a knowledge, whether it is of a definite form *(niścayākāra)* or of an indefinite form, does not make it valid or invalid. What matters actually is non-contradiction, the possibility of actually obtaining the object indicated. But it is never possible to obtain actually an object which appears to be characterised by two mutually opposite properties. That is why doubt should be considered as deviating.

TRUE OR TRULY : AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

P. K. Mukhopadhyay

There are different conceptions of truth. Some conception of truth bears reference not only to knowledge (in the otherwise broad sense of theoretical understanding) but also to certain particular conception of knowledge, or so it is believed. I propose to study if and how far an adverbial conception of truth is associated with the propositional conception of knowledge. What this has got to do with the Indian approach to truth is that, if not most, at least some Indian philosophers (about whom I shall speak here) work with the adverbial conception of truth when they display theoretical interest in truth or interest in the construction of a theory of truth. As is expected they require for their theory a conception of knowledge which they contrast with the sort of conception with which propositional conception of knowledge is usually contrasted. In this weaker sense their conception of knowledge can be regarded as a variety of propositional conception. But I shall argue that this should not mislead us to thinking or making an over zealous attempt to prove that these Indian philosophers believed in something comparable to proposition in the familiar Platonic sense. This article therefore may not only have the negative result of rejecting certain otherwise good argument in favour of proposition or propositional conception of knowledge, it may have the positive value of clarifying the sense in which proposition or propositional knowledge is required by an adverbial theory of truth. It may be seen that we do not need to postulate proposition in the sense of a special kind of abstruct object of knowledge. What is required is not proposition. Knowledge need not know a special type of entity but must have a certain particular analysed form. One may, if one likes, call it a propositional form.[1] But beyond this form which some knowledge or knowledge on some occasion has, there is nothing called a proposition. Thus though adverbial notion of truth bears reference to knowledge it does not involve reference to the propositional conception of knowledge in the sense in which it is contrasted with the thing conception of the same. The Indian philosophers I have in mind, particularly the Naiyāyikas, worked with the thing conception of knowledge, but they gave such a version to this conception that the standard objection against this conception no longer holds. Therefore the Nyāya conception of knowledge avoids the standard defects of thing conception of knowledge and those of the propositional conception of the same.

A few preliminary points may be noted at the beginning. In this paper I shall not discuss if and how far one can attribute to the Naiyāyikas an adjectival conception of truth in addition to the adverbial conception. Secondly, this paper is more a reconstructional study than historical reportive one. Thirdly, space available being limited only brief analysis and a few textual references can be given so far as some Indian Philosophers are concerned. Again, it hardly needs to be mentioned that there is much more in the Nyāya theory of truth than can even be mentioned here. Another point to be noted is that in any attempt such as the present one terminological problem—problem of deciding what English expressions are to be used to translate certain key expressions of the original theory in Sanskrit—is a vexing one.[2] I shall not try to defend the choices I make here. It will however be apparent to any careful reader, what aspect of the corresponding notion of the original theory I considered to be basic when I had made up my mind to use certain English expression like truth, proposition and so on. I may explain however, some of the abbreviated expressions I use to describe certain familiar doctrines or philosophical theories in English, though this may be needed only by a few students of philosophy. By adjectival notion of truth I mean the notion of truth according to which the predicate *is true* requires in standard construction the name of a sentence to form a sentence so much so that the predicate signifies a property of the thing designated by the name. So there is a noun expression and the truth predicate is related as an adjective to this noun. Such a notion of truth is used in Tarskian Semantics.[3] 'Snow is white' is true if and only if 'snow is white' may be taken as a standard example of adjectival construction. Again by thing conception of knowledge I mean certain conception of knowledge according to which the epistemic verbs (particularly verb to know) require in their standard construction the name of certain thing or person in the place of the accusative. Thus 'I know Socrates' or 'I know (the) table' is as much standard as 'I see (the) moon'. What makes such direct object construction standard and paradigmatic is the view according to which (basic form of) knowledge consists in some sort of direct relation—acquaintance, say— with the object. But according to the propositional conception of knowledge the epistemic verbs require, in the standard construction a proposition or a that clause to fill the position of the accusative of such verbs. He knows *that* the table is brown is a standard example.

It may be helpful if I elaborate a little this preliminary explanation of the two notions of truth in question. One of the problems in a semantic theory is to sepcify the notion of truth—to define truth. This is considered to be largely the same as giving sufficient and necessary condition for the (correct use) of the truth predicate 'is true'. Since according to the adjectival theory the truth predicate applies primarily to names of sentences the problem reduces to specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for one to use all such sentences as 'Snow is White' is true. It is believed that just in case snow is white, one can say ' "snow is white" is true'. Obviously, this is very popular and lamentably oversimplified way to present even the popular version of the now familiar theory of this kind. But we are not interested in this theory except as illustrating the view which takes truth predicate to signify some property of sentences. We are not even concerned here with the question whether this theory is correct or not. But one possible conception of truth is the adjectival conception just explained. Whatever the notion of truth, a philosopher's task is to construct some sort of a theory of truth or give a theoretical account of the various aspects of this notion. So, one having the adjectival conception of truth soon faces the question "When does the name of a sentence take the predicate 'is true'?" When can we or do we say ' "Snow is White" is true'? One possible answer is just when snow is white. But this answer should not be misread or misunderstood to mean just where snow is white is true. For in this construction, snow is white is true, there is no sentence name to take the truth predicate. This construction is ill-formed. Just when the snow is white may at least be formulated as just when the name of the thing in question i.e., snow takes the predicate is white. So we can say in the material mode 'snow is white' is true just when snow is white or in the formal mode, just when the name of the thing acceptes the predicate is white. Thus in the compound sentences—' "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white'—the first component amounts to the name of a sentence accepting the predicate is true, while the second component consists in the name of a thing accepting the predicate 'is white' (or the thing has the property white). The predicate 'is white', signifies a genuine property white of a genuine thing, snow; similarly the predicate 'is true' is another genuine predicate of another genuine concrete thing—a sentence. One who operates with an adverbial conception will accept much of this account. He will admit that if the thing snow has the property white colour then we can truly say that snow is white. And if we can truly say that snow is white then "The snow is white" is true. But between snow being actually white and 'snow is white' being true, he introduces another verbal construction— 'saying' modified by the adverb 'truly'. The introduction of this adverbial use in addition to or as more basic than the adjectival use is not without reason.

Though 'Snow is white is true' is not well formed, one cannot object to the construction 'x truly says that snow is white'. It should further be noted that what is the necessary condition for the use ' "snow is white" is true'—viz., snow is white—is also the necessary condition for the use "one truly says that snow is white." But for all that many philosophers hold that neither conceptually nor logically the two notions of truth are the same or equivalent. I shall however, argue that according to the Naiyāyikas these two notions are at least extensionally the same. But not a few will find themselves disinclined to accept this verbal notion or construction because it involves associating a proposition as an abstract object in its own right, with the adverbial construction. Anyway, the adverbial notion makes truth a predicate not of a sentence but of a proposition. Any attempt to ensure even necessary correspondence between these two notions may rob the adjectival notion much of its logical elegance. Because such correspondence may be effected through the convention that a sentence is true just in case it expresses a true proposition. But, as has been noted by prior while as property of a proposition truth is a quasi property of a quasi object, truth as a property of a sentence is a genuine property of a genuine object.

In accordance with the adverbial notion we can say ' "snow is white" is true' just in case we can truly say that snow is white. We can truly say so only when we truly believe or know that snow is white. Thus a propositional knowledge or propositional construction is necessarily involved either as equivalent to or as the basis of adjectival construction. This difference is more than the otherwise formal difference that in the adjectival construction the sentence *used* on the right hand side of 'if and only if', should appear on the left hand side within quotation marks. But at the same time the source of the necessity of propositional reference needs must be understood more thoroughly. For this purpose we may refer to the Nyāya understanding of the situation. To begin with both the adverbial and adjectival constructions of the relevant semantical expression involves reference to sentences either by name or description or through what may be called reproduction. Thus just as the adjectival construction—as in the case of the sentence 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white—is in terms of sentences so also the adverbial construction—such as 'one can say "snow is white" is true' when one can truly say snow is white'—is in terms of sentences. Where does proposition come in?

The Naiyāyikas draw a distinction between one's truly saying something and the saying of one being true. Suppose a man says, '*a* is an F', suppose also that, unknown to the man, *a* is an F; the sentence '*a* is F' is, in that case, true. But the man can hardly be said to have spoken truly. Thus there is a gap between saying '*a* is F' is true' and saying 'the speaker of the named sentence is uttering something truly". The Naiyāyikas cite the utterance of a mistaken deceiver as a case in point[4]. The deceiver mistakenly believes that *a* is not an F, although *a* is as a matter of fact an F. Now to deceive the hearer he is addressing his utterance to, the deceiver says "*a* is F". Then "*a* is F" is true and this is so because the standard sufficient and necessary condition—*a* is F—holds. Yet the speaker none the less is a deceiver, he does not speak truly. Thus when one says "*a* is F" the following are needed for the speaker to be regarded as saying so truly. In addition to *a* being F that is to say, the thing *a* having actually the property F, the speaker should know or believe truly that *a* is F and further he should utter "*a* is F" on the basis of such knowledge. When these conditions obtain the belief the hearer derives from hearing the utterance of the speaker in question can on independent ground be ascertained to be true. Thus saying truly involves knowledge. And by standard theory one has knowledge or one knows *a* is F only when one believes that *a* is F and the proposition *a* is F is true. It is thus outside the context of language such as a context of knowledge that a theory of truth involves reference to proposition. This is how adverbial notion of truth involves reference to knowledge which has to be propositional.

To sum up, predicates like 'is white' applies to names of things like snow. Likewise the predicates like 'is true' applies to names of sentences such as "Snow is white". Thus 'Snow is true' or 'Snow is white is true' are semantically ill-formed just as ' "Snow is white" is bright' is so. But it will be well-formed and we say : when one can truly say about snow that it is white then and then only we can say that the sentence he utters—"snow is white"—is true. But this is more a causal than a logico-semantic way of stating the necessary and sufficient condition of the correct use or application of 'is true' i.e., of the adjectival construction of the relevant semantic expression. Thus we can alternatively say : 'Snow is white' is true if and only 'if snow is white' or 'snow is white is true' if and only if one can truly say about snow that it is white. But one can truly say about snow that it is white just in case (though not simply in case) snow is white. In spite of such correspondences between the adjectival and the adverbial constructions the latter involves notion of a proposition independently or through the notion of propositional knowledge. But this notion of proposition is, controversial besides being useless.

In the next section I shall consider the position that the notion of or reference to proposition is not useless in the analysis of knowledge even if it is so in the analysis of truth. I shall further try to impress (by additional arguments) that uselessness of proposition for a theory of truth appears to be obvious when truth is viewed as a matter of language, but when viewed as a matter of knowledge the notion of truth may be found to involve reference to proposition. In other words, propositional conception of knowledge might have been necessitated by the requirement that knowledge or cognitive act must be capable of being true as well as false. Without further discussion on the relation between the theory that makes truth more a matter of language and one that makes it more a matter of knowledge—something parallel to the relation between the adjectival and the adverbial theories of truth—I shall hazard the opinion that for the Naiyāyikas truth is more or primarily a matter of knowledge. Whatever theory of truth they have is more epistemological than logical as Russell uses these adjectives for the different versions of the correspondence theory of truth[6]. But next I shall discuss a curious situation created by the fact that the Naiyāyikas do not admit propositions as these are ordinarily understood.

II

A theory of truth has a very wide scope. It is multidimensional. It touches almost all the diffferent areas of philosophy including logic epistemology and philosophy of language. A few years back Professor Strawson wrote,[7] on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee Session of Indian Philosophical Congress to which he was invited, "In Western Philosophy discussion of truth tends to merge, on the one hand, with discussion of language and meaning, on the other hand, with discussion of knowledge and belief. There are good reasons for both associations. The former is dominant at present, but it is the latter which is the theme of this session..." He further wrote "One way of making clear the conceptual connexions involved is to indicate the sources of some traditional philosophical debates and tensions and to sketch the lines on which the tension should be resolved". The present study is an attempt in that direction. Be that as it may, from the actual writings of the Naiyāyikas it is clear that they considered truth to be predominantly a topic of epistemology.[8] This is not to say that they did not have conceptions comparable with the conceptions of a true sentence. But what occupied their primary or major concern was truth of cognitive acts. More simply put, the basic and the characteristic uses of the semantic expression in question, for the Naiyāyikas, are in the contexts as 'Preception is a kind of true cognition' 'How do we know the truth of a (true) cognition?' and so on. One should not immediately raise the objection that in none of these contexts the semantic predicate expression has been used adverbially. True, but these contexts make truth a predicate of cognition. A cognition so qualified amounts to knowledge provided knowledge means *yathārthājñāna* but not *pramā*. So the sentences admit of such reformulations as 'Perception is a kind of knowledge' and 'How do we know the truth which characterises a knowledge'. But the standard analysis of knowledge yields that every case of knowledge is a case of believing truly whereas a belief is true just in case the proposition believed is true. Secondly there are genuine adverbial use of expressions corresponding to the English expressions in question. Thus a Naiyāyika does make use of expression like *praminomi praminoti* to be freely rendered in English as 'I cognise truly' and 'one cognises truly' respectively.

What has just been said take care of the following objection. Though in Western Philosophy there are such usages as 'A true sentence' and 'Some compound sentences are true just in case all their components are true yet there are other usages which seem to be equally frequent and standard but in which truth is attached to cognitive states like belief, perception and so on. For the standard analysis of the usages in question yields some such sentence as *x* knows or believes truly..., where *x* believes truly 'means' *x* believes that *p* and the proposition *p* is true.

It may be hasty or presumptuous to argue from what has been said that readiness of associate truth with proposition is only a recent phenomenon, that the analysis or conception of knowledge according to which for x to know p, *x* must believe that p and *p* must be true, is a modern analysis. The fact is that with no mean justification—even though without conclusive justification—the contemporary theorists of knowledge themselves trace their conception of knowledge to Plato. For example, Plato does not only consider in *Theactatus* the definition that true belief is knowledge, he further considers the view that there can be no mistake in believing what is true; he also considered the view that one can think what is not, only in the sense that he can believe something but what he believes is not true. He further examines in *Cratylus* certain views which make truth a property of a sentence or a proposition. But even so it is not very clear whether Plato really believed that between an act of believing and the sentence or proposition believed or more generally between a propositional attitude and the content to which this attitude is directed there is nothing. On the other hand it is very clear, that this is the view of many contemporary epistemologists or theorists of knowledge in the West. It is not also very difficult to find out what can make one propose or accept such analysis of knowing. It is not through detecting the unsuitability for theory of truth of certain other Greek conception of knowledge that some contemporary philosophers came to the conception of knowledge according to which knowing (theoretical) is believing some proposition which is true. With materialistic, physicalistic, behaviouristic or at least anti-mentalistic and anti-dualistic bias gaining popularity among them these contemporary philosophers felt ill at ease to admit that theoretical (let alone practical) understanding or knowledge consisted in certain mental episode or state. A disposition theory of some variety or other better suited their conscience. Such a background of thought coupled with the general strategy of replacing more old-fashioned and metaphysical nature of the thing approach by more paying logic of the word or concept approach led them to concentrate on the epistemic words including the word "knowledge".

All that has been said and in addition the general preference for extensional approach, not only made them almost exclusively interested in the analysis of the verb form of the epistemic expressions in question, but also produced a conviction that nothing more, at least which is at the sametime significant, could be revealed by the study of the relevant expressions in their nominative form. Thus 'to know' or 'knowing' and not 'knowledge' which one needs to study or take seriously. But it is the peculiarity of the English language that the verb "to know" is a transitive verb and normally it governs a that clause which occurs in the position of the accusative of it. Thus though 'He eats an apple' or even though 'He sees an apple' are familiar, standard and permissible constructions 'He knows an apple' is not. The standard English construction involving the verb to know is what is called a propositional construction in which the verb governs a that clause. Thus 'He knows that an apple is a fruit' or 'He knows that twice two makes four' is perfectly in order. From this it is one further easy step that takes one to the conclusion that perceiving, inferring, seeing and the like are all propositional attitudes or words which in their standard employment govern that clauses. For perceiving, seeing, etc. are all cases of knowing. Given further some empiricistic, non-dualistic and non-mentalistic leanings it is but most natural that one would identify with this that clause the proposition which such clauses or expressions are otherwise taken to signify. In other words, one would identify propositions with sentences. In many case, what is called knowledge can be completely analysed into the act of knowing and the proposition known. We can no more use the predicate true to apply to knowing in the same way in which we used it, perhaps (unknowingly) indulging in truism, to apply to knowledge or proposition or sentence. For like other acts, act of knowing may be successful or unsuccessful, it can be many other things, but it cannot be true or false. If truth or falsity is to be attached to anything involved in a knowledge situation it is to be attached to the proposition. Identifying proposition with sentence one claimed that the proper context of the discussion of truth is language and not knowledge. But that is another matter.

I believe that the account given above is correct even if somewhat oversimplified. But my point is not historical. Even if this account suggesting motivation favouring propositional construction of know sentences is not correct, it is no more correct to say that such construction was preferred in consideration of the fact that certain alternative construction, namely the thing construction, of such sentences is untenable. It is one of the major purposes of this article to discuss how this conception of knowledge which was not unfamiliar either to the Indians or to the Greeks fare, in a theory of truth. But before that I would like to make the remark that once truth is made, as in the adjectival theory, a matter of language, the theory of meaning and theory of truth can be brought close to each other. One of the major achievements of contemporary analytic philosophy is that it brought these theories so close that there is hardly any need for both the notions of meaning and truth. The latter and the clearer notion alone can perhaps do the job. This not only suits well the modern realists, the (extensional) logicians, the empiricists, the naturalisers of epistemology but also has effected tremendous simplification in logic, epistemology, philosophy of language and metaphysics which can now be more or less unified within logic with its (resulting) broader sense and scope.[9] This speaks highly of the adjectival theory of truth.

The alternative conception of knowledge referred to above viz. the thing conception is also fairly familiar. But I would like first to refer to the views held by one of the four major realist schools of Indian Philosophy which may suggest that the conception of knowledge or cognitive experience in question goes very well with the concern for truth. The philosophers of this school, the Prābhākaras, share, though for different reasons, with the Bhāṭṭa's and the Advaitavedāntins, the conviction that it is more natural than not that we know and know correctly whatever we know. This is a strong realistic orientation to be contrasted with that of the skeptics (*saṃśayavādinaḥ*) and the nihilists (*śūnyavādinaḥ*) among the Indian philosophers who believe that what needs to be explained is how, if at all, we came to believe that we ever know or knew correctly anything at all.[10] Whatever that may be, the Prābhākara believe that every cognitive act is true and infallible and they offer the following as one of their arguments to reject the possibility of any cognitive experience being false. This argument is apparently the strongest though in some otherwise very comprehensive critique of the relevant view of the Prābhākaras it has not even been noted.[11]

The argument is very simple and can be described in a less dramatic way[12] than is perhaps done here. One who believes that even occassionally, some cognitive experience may be false would be first asked to produce an example. Suppose the standard example of (rope) snake illusion is cited, then the argument proceeds like this. The point being debated is not whether what is not an item of cognitive experience could be false, nor is it whether an unspecified or indeterminate item of cognitive experience could be false. The question is whether the experience of snake which is alleged to be false is really so or not. One who holds that this cognition of snake is false is committed to holding that this is a cognition of snake. In other words a little analysis clearly shows that one who believes this snake experience to be illusory actually believes both the things—that it is a cognition of snake and that it is false. But to believe, claim or say both these things about the same cognition—that it is of snake and that it is false—is inconsistent and theoretically unintelligible. For what can it mean to say that this cognition is a cognition of snake? When or how can a cognition be cognition of a snake? It could not be nor could it be said to be a cognition of snake if it did not cognise or know the snake.[13] But on the other hand how could a cognition of snake be false, if it knows the snake in question? If a cognition is considered false even after it has known its object then no cognition could be true and skepticism would be the only possible doctrine. But what is more, a host of familiar epistemic terms will lose their meaning and become unintelligible. What would the expression 'knowledge of snake' mean if it does not mean a cognitive act which knows a snake? How could the expression 'true cognition' fail to mean a cognition that knows its object. To conclude, a cognition cannot be a cognition of a snake unless it knows the snake, but if a cognition of snake cognises the snake then it cannot be false. Thus either it is not a cognition of snake or it is not false. The very condition of its being the cognition of snake certifies that it is true. A false cognition is a contradiction in terms. It does not need to be mentioned that this argument can be generalised to apply to any kind of cognition whatsoever. It is quite natural that the Prābhākara who believes that every cognition is true would use this argument.

Our immediate interest is not the soundness of the argument but the conception of knowledge (i.e. cognitive experience) one, who is sincere in offering this type of argument, has—though the soundness largely depends on this conception.

For the purpose of easy reference we can call this conception the conception of thing knowledge to be contrasted with the conception of propositional knowledge.[14] According to the conception of propositional knowledge what we know in knowing something is a proposition. But according to the alternative conception in question, what we know in knowing something is a thing. To simplify the matter I shall presume that no one is entertaining or using both these conceptions simultaneously. Now the verb 'to know', according to the thing knowledge conception, governs or takes in its scope, in the standard construction, is the name (or description) of a thing. According to this conception we can make perfect sense of the construction 'x knows *a*', even where the propositional knowledge conception yields as only permissible construction 'x knows that *a*...' where *a*, is a noun or a pronoun and some expression involving on occasion another noun or adjective may be used to fill the gap. According to the advocates of this alternative conception, also called thing conception, this direct object construction is the paradigm of all or almost all constructions involving epistemic verbs or propositional attitude terms.

Anyway, for one who has such a conception, in knowing either we know a thing or we do not know a thing and there is nothing more to it. (According to the propositional conception as we shall see, there is more to it). There is here no place for knowing falsely. It is on this conception of knowledge that the Prābhākaras could construct the forceful argument they use to disprove the possibility of falsehood. Once we grant this conception, it can validly be argued that false cognition cannot be a cognition because it can have no object or content. For a cognition to cognise falsely is not to cognise its object or, for the matter of that, not to be. If the cognition does not cognise the snake, then there is no cognition of snake. And if there is no cognition of snake, there cannot be false cognition of snake. There can be some other cognition but that is besides the point.

From what has been said one may conclude first, that the Prābhākaras operated with the thing-conception of knowledge according to which direct object construction is the paradigm and secondly, there is not or cannot be, at least according to this conception, any false cognition. Every cognition is true or every cognition capable of being true is true. So far this conception should not be found unacceptable to one who is not a confirmed skeptic allowing unlimited scope to skepticism. Actually, however, none of the other three realist schools of India seems to accept this argument. One reason may be that such a conception of knowledge conflicts with at least the standard notion of truth. This renders the conception in question unsuitable for a theory of truth which uses the ordinary notion of truth. Any theory of truth that takes truth in the standard sense cannot therefore accept the conception of knowledge in question. This is what actually counts against direct object construction view of knowledge. Even if the untenability of thing knowledge conception— with which like the Indians the Greeks, and through them, the contemporary philosophers are also acquainted— did not actually lead the contemporary philosophers to develop and advocate propositional conception of knowledge, it could have done so. Hence there is a route to contemporary conception of knowledge other than the one sketched above. One need not reject propositional knowledge simply because one does not share the empiricistic or linguistic bias of the contemporary analytic philosophers. At least, the Naiyāyikas who did not have such bias did not seem to accept the thing conception of knowledge at least quite the way one who rejects the possibility of falsehood the Prābhākara— one who rejects the possibility of falsehood— accepts it. We shall have occasion to consider the question if the Prābhākaras themselves accept or work with this conception; but to begin with they could accept such a conception as much as Plato for reasons to be explained presently. But first we need to explain further the untenability of the thing conception which seems to lie in the background of the argument against the possibility of falsehood as explained above.

III

If knowledge consists in a sort of direct relation with that of which it is a knowledge, then what follows is that knowing is a hit or miss game. Either we know the thing or we do not know it. There can be nothing more of the matter. There cannot be, as the Prābhākaras rightly stressed, knowing wrongly as distinct from not knowing (a thing). But nor can there be, and this the Prābhākaras seem to suppress or overlook, any such thing as knowing rightly unless that meant simply knowing the thing. Thus not only there could be no false cognition there could be no true cognition either if it means anything more than cognising the thing in question. Therefore the thing conception of knowledge is hardly of any use in a theory of truth. But that the conception in question makes truth impossible may still not be as immediately intelligible and acceptable as that it renders falsity impossible. The reason seems to be that, contrary to ordinary view, falsity is reduced to a mere absence— to something negative only , to not knowing. But truth has not been reduced or it has not been reduced to nothing. Ordinary view is that both truth and falsity are positive states or notions. So the view in question does not conflict with the ordinary belief about the positive character of truth. So far as the notion of truth or its explication is concerned the conception of knowledge as direct relation with thing should not be deemed untenable. But though the thing conception does not stand in our way of continuing to hold that truth is a positive notion, it equates truth with knowledge. In other words, the immediate consequence of the thing conception of knowledge is that to know and to know correctly, a cognition and a true cognition become one and the same thing. But this is not in accordance with the ordinary notion of truth or cognition.[15]

One may say that while thing conception is attributed to some Prābhākaras it should be remembered that the conception can be attributed to some Greeks as well including Plato[16]. But it is hardly correct to say that Plato reduced allegedly wrong knowing into not knowing. Some instances of wrong knowing i.e., wrong cognising will certainly come under what is known as opinion (*doxa*). This *doxa* is not a negative state. Thus though for the Prābhākaras falsity does not constitute a distinct variety of cognition, yet the conception of knowledge in question cannot be said necessarily to result in the reduction of falsity to a negative state merely. But, still this conception keeps no room for truth in the ordinary sense. For it allows no distinction, in the system of the Prābhākaras or of Plato, between knowledge and truth. Every case of knowing is a case of knowing truly or correctly. Either falsity is not admitted (to be anything positive) or it is admitted not to be a case of cognition. Either no object *(saṃsṛṣṭa viṣaya)* is assigned for allegedly false cognition to cognise, as in the Prābhākara system, or it has been assigned an object (something mutable or *atattva*) other than the object which knowledge in the true sense of the term cognises[17]. The consequence of all this has been clearly enunciated, not so much in the Advaita Vedānta as in the system of Plato and the Prābhākaras. It is this, what can be true can never be false and what can be false can never be true. The predicates 'is true' and 'is false' never apply to the same kind of thing. The standard theory of truth, however, requires it that 'true' or 'truth' is to be so understood that the kind of things—*pratīti* or belief or cognition which cannot significantly be said to be false cannot significantly be said to be true either and vice versa.[18] The thing conception of knowledge cannot make sense of such truth as can be had by things of a type that can be false also. This constitutes the untenability of such a conception of knowledge. To put it differently 'truth' in the sense of Plato or the Prābhākaras is not the truth of which the standard theory of truth has any use. So even if truth is a feature of knowledge that knowledge is to be conceived of differently— that is, not in the characteristic Platonic or Prābhākara way but perhaps in the way the contemporary philosophers understand it— as propositional knowledge (or as one of a host of propositional attitudes).

We will presently see whether there is anything between thing knowledge in the narrow sense of the term and a propositional knowledge as it is understood by the contemporary analytic philosophers. But I would like to emphasis in the the first place that whether in India or in the West, truth, according to the standard theory of truth, belongs to the same sort of thing to which falsity belongs. The preference for such a conception of truth or such a theory of truth, on the other hand, is justified because it alone is suitable for standard logic which requires that there should obtain a relation of incompatibility between a truth and the corresponding falsity. If truth and falsity belonged to two different sorts of entity or realms then such incompatibility could not be explained. If to be true, an experience is to be an item of knowledge in the Platonic sense then no false experience can be there which while cognises the object which a knowledge cognises, remains yet false. For falsity cannot have the same object as knowledge[19]. In any case, the Naiyāyikas are explicitly aware from the very begining of the need for such a conception of truth as could ensure logical or semantic incompatibility with falsehood. Vātsyāyana's remark: *tattvajñānaṃ tu khalu mithyājñānaviparyayeṇa vyākhyātam*[20] may be translated in this way. 'Truth or true cognition is explained as the opposite of false cognition.' This requirement of incompatibility cannot be fulfilled unless truth and falsity belong to the same sort of thing. If that thing is to be *jñāna* in the sense of cognitive act or experience then a conception of knowledge in the broad sense of cognition or belief should be possible so that a cognition that is true and one that is false should be cognition in the same sense of the term. The users of the conception of knowledge we called thing knowledge are, as has been explained above, bound to be equivocalist in their use of epistemic terms in the context of truth and falsity. This means they cannot keep room in their system for logical or if one likes semantic contradiction. To accept such a conception of knowledge is to undermine the standard logic or one is to hold that logic is a matter of language and epistemology of cognitive experience. But then these two branches of knowledge cannot be integrated. [The Prābhākaras seem to be somewhat aware of this consequence which like other realists they are not prepared to accept]. So the Prābhākaras would consider 'is true' to be an epistemic predicate whereas so called falsity a predicate of voluntary acts that are abortive in nature or, better, a matter of mere linguistic usage. In the system of Plato though there is opinion which can be both true and false, there is no knowing whether the truth that characterises knowledge necessarily and the truth which characterises opinion only occasionally are truth in the same sense of the term. Again in Advaita Vedānta epistemology truth and falsity pertain not to the same kind of thing. The incompatibility which obtains according to them between a truth and the corresponding falsehood is not logical. Not only *caitanya* is not contradicted *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* is also is not contradicted. Vātsyāyana is very explicit on the difference on this point of logical incompatibility between the Naiyāyikas on the one hand and the Advaitins and some Buddhists on the other. He says that what (according to the Naiyāyikas) gets contradicted or removed by a true cognition in the (corresponding) false cognition and not the object (of such cognition).[21]

In any case a Naiyāyika thinks that truth is, primarily at least, a property of cognitive acts. He further believes that not only there is falsehood but also falsity belongs to the same kind of thing— *jñāna* or cognitive acts. We can also attribute to him the constructions like 'this sentence is true' and 'One knows/ speaks/ says truly' and so on. So far therefore a Naiyāyika seems to permit both adjectival and adverbial constructions with the relevant semantic terms. Alternatively, he operates with both the adjectival and adverbial notions of truth. So these two notions come to be more sharply contrasted in Western philosophy. Such contrast becomes inevitable once we refuse to accept that epistemic terms describe any episode or occurrence and concern ourselves with epistemic verbs construed as expressions signifying propositional attitudes. For in that case truth predicate must attach either to the epistemic verb as modifier or to the propositional content as adjective. But in an epistemological theory of truth, truth must characterise either the knowledge or the act of knowing. If a theory of knowledge is constructed in terms of acts of knowing rather than states of knowledge, then truth must belong to or stand attached to the act of knowing. And it can do so only as a modifier of the act yielding adverbial construction as the most standard construction. Under such circumstances we have occasion for admitting truth of a proposition if only the construction 'x knows (believes) truly' can be analysed to mean x believes that p and p is true. Now whether or not the Naiyāyikas construct their theory of knowledge only in terms of acts of knowing they do admit adverbial construction involving semantic expressions in question. They also seem not to disallow adjectival construction even in the modern sense in which truth predicate is applied to names of sentences.

It still remains true that the Nyāya theory of truth is more epistemological than logico-linguistic. So the major concern of a Naiyāyika is not true sentences but knowing truly (if we consider just these two alternatives). But standard explication of 'x knows/says truly' is in terms of proposition represented by the that clause which epistemic verbs take as accusative. But the problem with Naiyāyikas is that they do not seem to admit a special sort of entity called proposition. It may be stated clearly at this point that we do not mean that the adjectival construction must always or only assume the form of a sentence with the name of a sentence in the subject position and the expression 'is true' in the predicate position. But such sentence, made very familiar by certain contemporary account of truth, is a paradigm of not only adjectival construction involving the semantic expression in question but also of such other theory that has no need for some quasi-object like proposition to have truth as its property. Similarly adverbial construction need not necessarily go with epistemic verbs, they may be found also in the context of verbs representing linguistic behaviour. So our reference to T-sentences and epistemic verbs was for the illustrative purpose— they are taken as contexts illustrating use of or constructions involving 'true' and 'truly'. Availability of adjectival notion of truth, that is a notion that emvisages the sort of use of 'true' illustrated with the example of (T) sentences show that one's concern for truth need not necessarily or at all lead one to accept anything like a dubious entity called proposition. If it is possible that one's interest in or concern for truth be exhausted by the sort of adjectival constructions cited then one does not only have no need for a proposition one also has no need for the adverbial form 'truly'. He can make do with 'true' only. He may not accept any obligation to provide means for translating or analysing adverbial construction which have been illustrated to involve reference to proposition. But if he does accept the obligation he may discharge it by the crude method of simply turning references to propositions into references to sentences on the ground that they are the same. Or at least he can adopt a project of devising means to show gradually or, one after another, how different types of adverbial constructions can be reformulated or translated in such a way that reference to proposition remains no longer necessary. On the other hand adverbial construction has been referred to illustrate that such constructions with epistemic or linguistic verbs may lead to one's postulating propositions in the form of a that clause governed by the verbs in question. It may be thought that since on the standard analysis epistemic verbs are propositional attitude verbs, adverbial constructions with them and 'truly', such as '*x* truly believes', really permit their definitional elimination by suitable adjectival construction like '*x* believes that *p* and *p* is true' Had it been so, then the difference between 'true' and 'truly', between the relevant adjectival and adverbial constructions, would really collapse. But in the analysis of adverbial construction reference to propositions is not by name i.e., propositions are never mentioned. Hence such constructions are not really adjectival construction with proposition. In the adverbial constructions in question names that are used are names of things like snow, table, chair, etc. but not of sentences or of propositions.

It is true that one finds in Plato more adjectival than adverbial constructions.[22] There is however, some ambiguity, as we shall see, in the Sanskrit expressions of the type *ghaṭajñānam*, *paṭajñānam* and so on. But the Naiyāyikas will not usually object to translating relevant constructions into 'belief/ cognition of... as ...' or belief/ cognition that... is ...'. How semantic expressions in question fit with such construction? In a fully analysed form we can have such constructions like 'If one knows/perceives/ believes that... is ..., then one knows/perceives/ believes truly, if and only if... is ...'. Such constructions are still not adjectival constructions with nouns naming propositions. So far the Nyāya constructions of semantic expressions with the epistemic verbs are not adjectival propositional constructions but, or for the matter of that, are adverbial thing constructions. In the contexts of epistemology the constructions with semantic expression favoured by the Naiyāyikas can be said to be adverbial construction. Though such constructions really do not ascribe truth to propositions or are not to be confused with possible construction using name of some proposition in the subject position with the adjective 'is true' attached to it as predicate yet they bear reference to propositions. But proposition is believed to be a dubious entity and if possible a theory of truth should avoid reference to it . I shall not question whether propositions are really dubious entity but I shall try to show how the Naiyāyikas could avoid reference to it. For I am inclined to believe that they did not admit the sort of entity ordinarily called proposition.

IV

In current terminology the Nyāya conception of truth is adverbial rather than adjectival. For the Naiyāyikas did not seriously envisage as standard construction with semantic expressions in question, constructions which involve names of propositons (or sentences). This is largely true not only in the context of epistemology but also in the context involving verbs of linguistic act. Thus fully explicit constructions with such verbs which will not go against Nyāya intuition seem to have the form 'If one says truly that p, then one says so, if and only if that p'. In some familiar and perhaps widely accepted sense adjectival constructions with names of propositions alone can commit one to admitting propositions. In that sense the Naiyāyikas cannot be said to be even exposed to the obligation to encounter the sort of dubious entity in question. But a Naiyāyika is under obligation to bring his reflections or views on truth in line with his views on knowledge. And not to admit propositions may have serious repercussions on their theory of knowledge. For we have so far found no alternative between a propositional conception and a thing conception of knowledge. This suggests that if a Naiyāyika is to avoid reference to propositions then in epistemology he will have to make do with a thing conception of knowledge. But it seems that a Naiyāyika cannot accept a conception of knowledge that is likely to affect adversely his theory of truth. It therefore appears that propositional conception of knowledge of the Naiyāyikas conflict with their adverbial theory of truth. Or are we wrong in attributing to the Naiyāyikas either or both of these conceptions? We think the solution lies in properly understanding the situation. For this purpose we may start by reconstructing possible Ṇyāya reply to the Mīmāṃsā argument against the possibility of error which we discussed earlier.

From the point of view of the Naiyāyikas the argument of the Prābhākaras derives its plausibility from certain ambiguity of the notion or expressions like *sarpajñāna* or 'cognition of...' . If one accepts direct object construction as paradigmatic then the gap is to be filled in by the name of a thing or a person as in the constructions 'He sees the Himalayas' or 'He knows Dick'. And what is a knowledge of an *a*, in this sense must know *a* in order to pass for a knowledge of *a*. No knowledge of *a* can therefore be false. But those who admit certain cognition of snake or *sarpajñāna* to be false, do not mean by 'cognition of' exactly the same thing. Where there is no snake to be cognised but only a rope, there cannot be in this sense a cognition *of* snake. If thus a cognition is necessarily a cognition *of whatever there is* actually to be known, so much so that if a cognition knows it, then the cognition would not only be a cognition of that thing but also true, then even those who admit rope-snake illusion would admit that the rope-snake illusory cognition is a cognition of rope and hence true. For there is only rope to be cognised. Or *what* is and could be in this case cognised is a rope. But the illusory cognition, according to them, is at the same time a cognition of a snake, though in another sense of 'cognition of'. It is a cognition of snake not because what is (there and is) cognised is a rope. But whatever the thing may be actually it is cognised *as* snake. So far therefore an illusory cognition of snake is called cognition of snake not because snake is *what* (is there to be cognised and) is cognised but because the cognition cognises whatever is there to be cognised *as* a snake. So a cognition is or may be individuated either in terms of what is being cognised or in terms of how or *as what* whatever is there to be cognised is cognised. Thus though snake cannot be *what* is cognised in the snake—illusion— and in this sense this illusion cannot be a cognition of snake— yet the illusion can cognise *as* a snake whatever is there to be cognised. In the second of the following two senses the illusion is a cognition of rope and in the other sense it is a cognition of a snake. A cognition is a cognition of that *as what* whatever is there to be cognised is cognised. And a cognition is a cognition of *that what* is there to be cognised (truly or falsely). A cognition of seomething in the second of these two senses of 'cognition of...' cannot be false. But this does not exclude the possibility of a cognition of something in the first of the two senses of 'cognition of' being false.

A few objections may be anticipated. First, these distinctions are the invention of the present author and cannot be attributed to the Naiyāyikas. Secondly, whoever may be the actual author of them, these distinctions are *ad hoc* devices to accommodate falsehood within the framework of an epistemology using thing conception of knowledge or direct object construction as paradigmatic construction with epistemic verbs. The third objection is that every cognition which is a cognition of something in the first sense of 'cognition of' is also a cognition of some other thing in the second sense of the term. But the implication is that every false cognition is also a true cognition. Thus a Naiyāyika can accommodate falsity and the possibility of a standard theory of truth only at the cost of the absurdity that every false cognition is also at the same time a true cognition.

So far as the first objection is concerned, we do not plead guilty to the charge. The distinction between what is known in a knowledge and how or as what the thing known gets known in that knowledge is essentially the distinction between the *viśeṣya* and *prakāra*— further sharpened by later Naiyāyikas into the distinction between types of *viṣayatā*— relative to an act of cognition or a knowledge. It is not admitted that there could be a cognition without some object to be cognised. Even memory, doubt or dream, is no exception. Anyway, even in Vātsyāyana's writing we can find evidence of the distinction in question.[23] These distinctions considered as representing different types of *viṣayatā* or different aspects of the object of knowledge can be traced to the distinction between two objects of different descriptions, *tattva* and *pradhāna*, held by Gautama and Vātsyāyana to be involved in every standard case of error.[24] In reply to the second objection, it may be pointed out that for a Naiyāyika the distinctions in question do more than ensure possibility of error. For this reason, if for no other, the distinctions cannot be regarded as makeshift arrangement for accommodating error. The distinction is felt to be necessary even for truth. For if possibility of truth is to be ensured not at the cost of error but along with the possibility of error, then truth cannot be taken to consist merely in cognising an object. For erroneous cognition has an object as much as a true cognition.[25] Further if the relation of incompatibility corresponding to the principle of non-contradiction is to obtain between truth about an object and the corresponding falsehood then both the truth and the falsehood must have the same object. But how can then such two cognitions be incompatible with each other or how can one of them be true while the other is false? Nyāya answer to these questions is in terms of the distinctions under reference. Roughly speaking the answer is this. True cognition of an *a* is *of a* in both senses of 'cognition of' explained above. A false cognition of an *a* is *of a* only in the sense that it cognises *as a* (or as F) a *b* (which is G) what alone *is* there to be cognised. So in every cognition there is something— the what— to be known. This what is represented in cognition by the epistemic subject either generally (i.e., in the form of it/this/*idam*) or as particularised (i.e., in the form of a name or noun such as jar/*ghaṭah*). So far the cognition is a cognition of *idam* or *ghaṭaḥ*. But it is cognition of *ghaṭaḥ* only in the sense that *ghaṭa* is what is there to be known or is being known at the time. In the terminology of Nyāya it is cognition of jar only in the sense *ghaṭajñāna*. In this sense false cognition of a snake is a *rajjujñāna* or cognition of rope. It, however, is not cognition of what is there *as* rope. For cognition of something *as* rope or *rajju iti jñānam* is not there. *As what* the thing represented by the epistemic subject is cognised appears in the epistemic predicate of a cognition. Thus looking at a cognition or its faithful linguistic representation such as *ayaṃ sarpaḥ* 'This is a snake' or *idaṃ rajatam* (This is a piece of silver) we can be sure of what is the epistemic subject and what is the epistemic predicate. With the two senses of 'cognition of' in mind we can even describe the cognition in question differently but consistently as *ayam/idam jñānam* and as *sarpa iti/rajatam iti jñānam*. We cannot, however, be sure whether the cognition is true or false.[26] When the two descriptions are factually or semantically compatible or logically consistent the cognition is true. Thus when a cognition is both *sarpajñāna* and *sarpa iti jñānam*, cognises *what* is a snake and cognises it *as* a snake, the cognition is true. But when the cognition is a *rajju-jñana* but *sarpa iti jñāna*, then the cognition is false. Anyway, the distinction in question is involved both in a true-cognition and in a false cognition. In other words this distinction is needed for the ascription of the truth as well as falsehood.

The Naiyāyikas admit the possibility of thing-knowledge only in the sense that the thing is what is there to be cognised. Such cognitions though *saviṣayaka*, though they cognise object in some sense, cannot be said to be either true or false. Thus to cognise and to be true are not the same if to cognise *x* means to be cognition of something where the something is merely *what* is there being apprehended by the cognition. A cognition in this sense does not have the analysed structure which almost every standard example of cognition has. When in a direct object construction a true cognition is formulated as I know/see Dick— the cognition really has a more complex and analysed form than is clear from such expressions. If we permit evaluation of such experiences in semantic terms then we must admit that the experiences have an analysed structure to express which we require complex sentence of some of the following forms. 'I know the man over there *as* Dick', "It is a jar" or "It is a red jar." In this case the cognition stands analysed into an epistemic subject and an epistemic predicate. Truth of a cognition having such a structure consists in some sort of spacific agreement between the epistemic subject and the epistemic predicate of it. The epistemic predicate must represent under different though compatible description or as characterised by different yet compatible property that which is represented (normally in its bare particularity) by the epistemic subject.[27]

To believe truly or falsely we need not require to postulate propositions as accusative of relevant epistemic verbs. We require to theoretically appropriate the object known in a specific form. We are to analyse what is cognised into the two aspects represented in the epistemic subject and epistemic predicate respectively. An adverbial theory of truth in epistemology requires that our cognitions have some analysed structure or form. If one likes to call it a propositional form one may do so. Thus to avoid thing conception of knowledge suggested by direct object constructions on the ground that it renders impossible any standard theory of truth in epistemology we do not require to admit or advocate a propositional view of knowledge in the strong sense in which any concrete act of knowing is to be analysed into certain propositional attitude on the one hand and proposition as that towards which such attitude is directed and which is comparable with the thing in the direct object construction. It is enough if we admit what may be called propositional form, that is, the form every act of 'knowing *as*' displays. There is no proposition over and above this propositional form. If one likes one can as well describe this Nyāya conception of knowledge, a thing knowledge conception. For what, according to them, is known in a cognitive act is still some *determinate* object (may be as further characterised).

The third objection was that if the reconstructed position is really what the Naiyāyikas hold— if they really subscirbe to the version of adverbial theory of truth and direct object construction view of knowledge sketched above— then they cannot avoid the responsibiiity of admitting the necessity that every false cognition is also a true cognition. One who brings such a charge also precisely formulates a very good test for our reconstruction. If the necessity of admitting the sort of position held to be absurd follows from the reconstructed version then if in the Nyāya literature one finds explicit and general admission of the position then it gets so far confirmed that the Naiyāyikas really held the sort of view about truth and knowledge attributed to them in this reconstructional study and that the reconstruction is defensible. Anyway, it is well known that the Naiyāyikas really maintain that every false cognition is so only in so far as it cognises *as what* the thing being known is not i.e., in the aspect of epistemic predicate.[28] But the cognition is not false in representing in a general or particularised way that there is (*something*) (or some particular) that is being known. This further confirms that ordinary propositional conception of knowledge cannot be attributed to a Naiyāyika. For on the view that knowledge consists in cognising a proposition which is true, no knowledge can be, since a proposition cannot be, partly true and partly false. And if no proposition is admitted, no adjectival construction with names of proposition be admitted either. Though sentence is very much admitted and an adjectival construction necessitating attaching 'true' or 'is true' to the name of some sentence is considered permissible, yet such construction, at least in an epistemological truth theory, must be backed by certain view of knowledge and construction with epistemic verb. Since the conception of knowledge is question does not envisage any use for proposition which could more naturally support an adjectival construction with truth predicate, it appears to be more appropriate to attribute to the Naiyāyikas an adverbial construction. The constructions such as '...know/ knows... as..." and... say/says about... that it is..., and the saying is true" are more faithful and accurate so far as the Nyāya position is concerned, then the construction like '... know/ knows that... or' '...' is true. But a Naiyāyika need not nor does he ban these latter varieties of constructions in which their own literature abound. When the proper and clearer understanding is there one can permit some amount of loose talk without any risk of serious misunderstanding. Even if this appears as assimilating propositional construc-tion to thing construction no serious difficulty like the one we encountered with the Prābhākara use of thing-conception arises for the simple reason that the thing conception has itself been broadened here.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. This notion was first expounded in my article (not published) 'Is *jñāna* Belief? (A few points for comparative study)' included in *'Pramā-Pramāṇa and Knowledge Justification' and 'Empirical Knowledge and Evidence'* being the (cyclostyled) booklet brought out and distributed on the occasion of 1982 All India Seminars organised by the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Calcutta.
2. I considered in detail the question of equivalent expressions in Sanskrit for the expressions like knowledge, belief, proposition, etc. in my paper already cited.

3. Cf. A. N. Prior, *Objects of Thought* (eds. P.T. Geach and A.J. P. Kenny) Oxford University Press, 1971, chapter entitled 'Tarskian and Non-Tarskian Semantics'.
4. Cf. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, *Tattvacintāmaniḥ : Śabdakhaṇḍa*, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1897, p.49.
5. Cf. *ibid*, p.1 ...*arthatattvajñānajanyaḥ śabdaḥ pramāṇam.*
6. Cf. B. Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, Palican Books, 1962, p. 272 f.
7. P.F. Strawson, "Knowledge and Truth" in R. C. Pandey and S. R. Bhatta, (eds.) *Knowledge Culture and Value*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1976. p.17
8. *pramā cāviparītopalabdhiḥ... prāmāṇyam pramātvam Pariśuddhi* on Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.1. also *jñānasya prāmāṇyam* etc. *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa. Prāmāṇyavāda-siddhāntah.
9. Cf. M, Dummett, *Interpretations of Frege Duckworth*, pp. 433-35.
10. Cf. Uma Chattopadhyay (Bandyopadhyay), "Skepticism and Indian Epistomology" in *Research Bulletin of Philosophy* : Special Issue, Jadavpur University, 1984.
11. I have Vidyāraṇya's *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha* in mind.
12. Śālikanātha Miśra, *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (with *Nyāyasiddhi*) Banaras Hindu University, Banaras, 1961.
13. Śālikanātha *op. cit*, p. 48f.

    ya eva artho yasyāṃ saṃvidi bhāsate vedyaḥ sa eva nānyat hi vidyāt vedyasya lakṣaṇam (23) idaṃ rajatam ity atra rajataṃ ca avabhāsate tad eva tena vedyaṃ syāt na tu śuktir avedanāt (24)/ tenānyasya anyathābhānaṃ pratītyaiva parāhataṃ parasmin bhāsamāne hi na paraṃ bhāsate yataḥ (25)/
14. Cf. J. Hintikka *Knowledge And The Known*. D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974, particularly chapters 2, 3, and 11.
15. '*Socrates : Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is your meaning I shall answer that there have been plenty of liars in all ages*'. *Plato, Cratylus 249d.* In a different context Gaṅgeśa wrote : *bhrānteḥ puruṣadharmatvāt.* Mathurānātha further explains it *sakala... jñānasya yatharthatve bhramocchedāt, bhrānteḥ puruṣadharmatvānupapatter iti'. Tattvacintāmaṇi* :

Śabdakhaṇḍa. p. 76.

16. Cf. I.M. Crombie, and R. Hare, *Plato : The Midwife's Apprentice*, London, 1963 referred to by Hintikka.

17. Cf. P.K. Mukhopadhyay, *Indian Realism : A Rigorous Descriptive Metaphysics*, K.P. Bagchi and Company, Calcutta, 1984, See particularly chapters 2 and 3 for relevant discussion and references. Also see the work cited against 10.

18. B. Rusell, *The problems of philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1974 reprint ch. 12 particularly p. 70. Gautama has even argued that false belief about a thing presupposes true belief about that thing cf. Bhāṣya etc. on *Nyāya Sūtra* 4.2.34, see also Ṭīppaṇī (Notes) of Phaṇibhuṣan Tarkavāgīśa in *Nyāyadarśan* Vol. 4. p. 139.

19. The thing-conception of knowledge particularly Plato's version of it gives rise to what is called argument against contradiction. This..: problem arises from comparing with each other statement and its negation. They will be realised by different facts, clearly. Hence these facts are what the statements are about, p and —*p* will be about different things. Hence we cannot deny or contradict what the other says Hintikka, *op cit*, p. 24.

20. Vātsyāyana, *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.2

21. *so'yam mādhyamiko'nubhūyamānāṃ mithyābuddhiṃ nāpahnotum arhati/* (Vācaspati Miśra : *Tātparyaṭīkā* 4.2.36) *mithyābuddheś cārthavādapratiṣedhaḥ/ kasmāt? nimittopalambhāt sadbhāvopalambhāc ca/ upalabhyate hi mithyābuddhinimittaṃ mithyābuddhiś ca pratyātmam utpannā gṛhyate saṃvedyatvāt, tasmān mithyābuddhir apy astīti/* (Vātsyāyana. *Nyāyabhasya* 4.2.36 *mithyopalabdhivināśas tattvajñānāt* (Gautama, *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.35). *sthānaupuruso' yam iti vyavasāyo mithyopalabdhiḥ atasmin tat iti jñānam, sthānau sthānur iti vyavasāya tattvajñānam/ tattvajñānena ca mithyopalabdhir nivartyate, nārthaḥ* (Vatsyayana *op. cit.* 4.2.35).

22. We owe this discloser to John Lyons' work *Structural Semantics : An Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato*, Blackwell, 1963, see Hintikka *op. cit*, pp. 18-19.

23. *kim punas tattvam? sataś ca sadbhāva asataś ca sadbhāva iti sat sad iti gṛhyamāṇam yathabhūtam aviparītaṃ tattvaṃ*

bhavati. This passage occurs in the portion of *Nyāyabhāṣya* which introduces *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1.

24. *tattvapradhānabhedāc ca mithyābuddher dvaividhyopapattiḥ/ Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.37, See also the commentaries on the sūtra.

25. This is clear from Gautama's reply in *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.35 to the question, as formulated by the author of *Vṛtti* : *nanu bhramasyāpi sadviṣayatve tatpratirodhaḥ kathṃ syāt?*

26. Because we have no more information about what is being known than which, can be gathered from the epistemic subject. But the epistemic subject is compatible with the epistemic predicate of both true and false cognition. This point needs thorough elaboration for which there is no space here.

27. Once we understand the nature of this specific argeement we may be convinced that the Nyāya version of correspondence theory of truth is not exposed to all the standard charges.

28. One may consult Phaṇibhūṣan Tarkavāgīśa's *Nyāyadarśana*, Vol. 5, p. 153f.

PHILOSOPHY OF FULLNESS :
An Essay of Easy Outlook

K. C. Dash

Introduction :

om pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idam pūrṇāt pūraṇam udacyate/
pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evāvaśiṣyate//

> OM : That is infinite and this is infinite.
> The infinite proceeds from the infinite.
> Realizing the infinitude of the infinite
> One remains as the infinite.
> (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.1)

1. The Universe :

What stands before us is the Universe. What is it? How to know about it? These are the fundamental questions discussed over centuries together. The great men, scientists, philosophers and others have different opinions. This difference owes its base to the point of realisation of the infinite dimensions of the Universe itself.

This Universe is Brahman. Everything and what is called nothing combined together constitute this. The socalled nothing is only *ajñāta* 'unknown' or *adṛśya* 'not perceived'. Thus known and unknown or everything and nothing form this Universe we love and live within. This is called Bhagavat or Paramātman or any name you can coin to rename it.

The function of this Universe is always within. There is no question of outside. When such question arises the problem of manifestation comes. The manifestation appears as a *piṇḍa* 'frame' or 'body'. This covers all what is called gross physicalities as well as nuclear-frames and the beyond structures in its infinite planes.

2. The Process of Evolution and Dissolution :

The process of Evolution and dissolution is automatic. There are four major relative factors that facilitate the process. These may be called as :

1.	*Mātṛkalā*	Nectarial trait
2.	*Pitṛkalā*	Powery trait
3.	*Iṣṭakalā* or *Devakalā*	Furthering trait
4.	*Gurukalā*	Elevating trait

These factors combined together make the evolution process full and unique. To understand the same in an easy manner the following figures may be useful.



Fig. I
Process of Evolution
(Four Major Traits)



Fig. II
16 Major Trait-Complexes



Fig. III
64 Major Trait-Complexes

The manifestation process starts with a nuclear-frame and becomes a circle. The first circle creates the second. The first and second combined together create the third circle. Similarly, all these three are combined to create the fourth one. Thus the fourth circle becomes the locus or the place of rest. The whole again becomes responsible to create another circle-complex. The circle-complex gets its full shape when it covers a combined course of sixteen major trait-complexes. This major complex of traits again create complexes on similar lines.

The whole structure of a man rests on 64 major trait-complexes. This complexity of human structure stands parallel to the Universe when trait-complexes create infinite sub-complexes.

The process of dissolution is to be understood in the similar manner. Ultimately all the trait-complexes get dissolved in a single circle line and returns to its nuclear-frame. The following figure shows the idea.



Fig. IV
Process of Dissolution

3. Man : The Universe-miniature :

The physical world, as we see, is just like an industry manufacturing gross bodies. Different varieties are found all over the world. Amongst all such bodies human body is found to be the best base or platform of full manifestation of the Universe. The man, therefore, is called a 'small Universe'. The complex system of the Universe, as pointed out above, works with four bodies innate in human structure.

The bodies are :

1.	*Sthūla-tanu*	Gross body
2.	*Sūkṣma-tanu*	Subtle body
3.	*Amṛta-tanu*	Nectarial body
4.	*Brahma-tanu*	Universal body

It is not necessary to discuss about the gross bodies as the fact is open to all. To understand the other bodies, the following figures may guide to certain extent.



Fig. V
Subtle Body


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Fig. VI
Nectarial Body



Fig. VII
Universal Body

4. Consciousness and Functional Range of Neurons :

In consideration of the bodies the level of consciousness may be classified as follows :

1. *Ananta-cetanā*	Infinite consciousness
2. *Acyuta-cetanā*	Non-falling consciousness
3. *Cyuta-cetanā*	Falling consciousness
4. *Ādhāra-cetanā*	Local consciousness

Human brain consists of 35 crores of major *cit-paramāṇu* which may be called neurons in modern terminology. Normally neurons amounting 16 millions are found to be in function with a normal body. In many cases this number is also less. But for a good happy life minimum 50 million of neurons need to be in function.

The following scheme shows the coverage of life in point of the functional range of neurons and the level of consciousness.

Life	Level of Consciousness	Functional range of neurons in million Minimum	 Maximum
1. *Sādhāraṇa* Normal	Local	16	32
2. *Bauddhika* Intellectual	Falling	32	50
3. *Adhyātma* Spiritual	Non-falling	50	64
4. *Divya* Divine	Infinite	64	above

5. Cosmic Function and the Guiding Force :

The cosmic function relates to the traits, bodies, levels of consciousness and the life discussed above. Similarly, the guiding force acts in consonance with cosmic function. The nature of guiding force and cosmic function may be stated as follows :

Nature of guiding force	Cosmic function
1. *Vatsala* 'Loving'	*Sama* 'Homogenous'
2. *Lalita* 'Lovely'	*Sarala* 'Straight'
3. *Vāma* 'Elusive'	*Jaṭila* 'Intricate'
4. *Gahana* 'Inscrutable'	*Kuṭila* 'Curved'

The figures are placed for clear understanding.



Fig. VIII
Homogenous Function



Fig. IX
Straight Function



Fig. X
Intricate Function


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1

Fig. XI
Curved Function

6. Major Streams of the Universe and Knowledge Area :

There are four major streams connected with different area of knowledge in various levels of the Universe. This may be understood in the following way :

Major Streams		**Area**
1. *Āgama-dhārā* Infinite stream	[0]	*Sarvātmaka* All-around
2. *Nigama-dhārā* Source stream	[+]	*Antarmukha* Inner planes
3. *Sugama-dhārā* Accessible stream	[0+]	*Sūkṣma-vahirmukha* Subtle outer planes (All branches of human knowledge)
4. *Saṅgama-dhārā* Associative stream	[0+ −]	*Sthūla-vahirmukha* Gross outer planes (All particulars, their combinations and cross-points)

7. Conceptualisation of Fullness :

Everything is full in its locus. But the item of locale always realises its delimitation. This becomes the characteristic of such an item. Allthough all such items appear full in their outer planes they are really unfinished and therefore, maintain difference.

To conceptualise fullness we have a table here for a clear picture.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
0.	Major Streams	life	Body	Level of Consciousness	Knowledge Area	Functional range of neurons in million	Cosmic function	Nature of guiding force	Major traits
1.	Infinite(0)	Divine	Universal	Infinite	Alround	64.. above	Homogenous	Loving	Elevating
2.	Source(+)	Spiritual	Nectarial	Nonfalling	Inner	50 ... 64	Straight	Lovely	Furthering
3.	Accessible (0+)	Intellectual	Subtle	Falling	Subtle outer	32 ... 50	Elusive	Intricate	Powery
4.	Associative (0+−)	General	Gross	Local	Gross outer	16 ... 32	Inscrutable	curved	Nectarial

8. The Goal and Easy Means :

These four mounts really constitute a full life. To be full is the goal of a life. But a man generally moves in 3rd and 4th levels of his consciousness. The second level is actually the level of peace which is a minimum desideratum. Because in this level the cosmic function is straight and man has a scope to develop his nectarial body which is found dormant in his gross body.

To be one with cosmic function one has to adopt some easy practices. These may be thus :

L4—L1 : i) Developing love for mother by remembering her loving form or any mother form and reciting her name in silence.

ii) simple prayer.

L3—L2 : i) Developing love for father by remembering his loving form and reciting his name in silence.

ii) Developing love for knowing the cosmic function according to own disposition.

L2—L3 : i) Meditating upon a loving form of mother or father or both or any loving form.

ii) Reciting a loving name—

Mother's name/Father's name or simple MOTHER/FATHER.

L1—L4 : Surrender to Mother or Father or Both.

(Level 4 becomes Level 1 for beginners)

9. Picture of Attainment :

When such practices are continuous the guiding force of higher level becomes conspicuous and gives a lead in its own way. Ultimately it leads to the infinite level of consciousness (See fig. No. XII).

After this lead the guiding force gives a placement in spiritual plane of life where one moves freely having his access to all the bodies (See fig. No. XIII).



Fig. XII
Upward Leading



Fig. XIII
Free Movement

10. The Universe and its Lord in point of Truth and Falsity :

The Universe is both Uni-dimensional and Multi-dimensional in point of its function in different levels of consciousness. The man happens to be a small Universe having a good mechanism of his body as the base for realisation of all that happens within and outside. Thus he moves all around beginning from the lowest tips to infinitude of life. The fact is that he fails to fulfil himself with all such realisations because of his confinement to a certain orbit of consciousness. Moreover, there is a difference between conscious moving and unconscious movement. When he is moving consciously the level of moving and the direction determine the degree of truth and falsity in different substrata. The question of Lord comes in conscious movings. Moving, since it is a function, resorts to something from which it ensues, i.e. the source, the Lord or Brahman.

The following table may clear the idea. (see overleaf)

11. Conclusion :

When all such processes are over one actually prefers to remain in infinitude being the very part of cosmic function which is an endless process (as shown in fig. No. XIII). However, it remains open for one to make choice of functioning being one with the Universe at different levels.

The Universe stands as the Lord in higher planes and the same descends on the lower planes to move in different bodies prepared as the base of its manifestation and again it furthers and elevates the same to make everything full and fine.


Orbit of consciousness
Descending order of consciousness
Subtle layer of consciousness
Ascending order of consciousness
Coverage of truth
Range of falsity
Practice and Results
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
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Infinite
Non-falling
Falling
Local
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75%
50%
25%
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25%
50%
75%
0
+
0+
0+−

(This is based on *Āgama. Nigama, Sugama and Saṅgama* tradition of India)

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